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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the use of

governmental power to punish criminal defendants for exercising
statutory or constitutional rights, or to deter them from exercising
their rights, is an abuse of power that strikes at the very heart of due
process.1 Despite this sentiment, the application of the due process
doctrine prohibiting the abuse of prosecutorial power to the reali-

ties of criminal prosecutions has proven difficult indeed. 2 In less
1 Every case that has addressed the issue has condemned the use of governmental
power to punish criminal defendants for exercising constitutional or statutory rights. See
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 25 (1974) (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 724 (1969)); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969) (citing United
States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968)). Cf. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368,
372-73 (1982); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32-33 (1973); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 14-271. The doctrine has proved elusive in both
the substantive and procedural context. The substantive doctrinal difficulties stem, in
the first instance, from the contradiction between the general punitive purpose of criminal prosecutions and the recognition that retribution for the exercise of rights is an
intolerable diminution of due process. Thus, the doctrine, by its nature, attempts to
reconcile apparently contrary policy objectives and, as a result, necessarily reflects in its
application a balancing of interests that are likely to be perceived differently by particular judges in particular circumstances. Much confusion has also arisen from the failure
of the Court to clearly differentiate between the two branches of the doctrine: (a) the

19851 PROHIBITING PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS

343

than eight years, the Supreme Court has enunciated a due process
"prosecutorial vindictiveness" doctrine3 designed to sort out the
proper use of prosecutorial discretion to punish crime from the improper use of power to punish the exercise of rights, 4 has created a
major exception to that doctrine, 5 and has substantially limited the
application of the doctrine to prosecutorial acts that occur prior to
6
trial.
This Article traces the rise and fall of the doctrine prohibiting
prosecutorial vindictiveness from its inception in 1974 to the present. As a necessary introduction to a discussion of the most recent
expressions of the doctrine, 7 Section II presents a detailed analysis
of North Carolinav. Pearce,8 Colten v. Kentucky,9 Chafin v. Stynchcomb,10
prohibition against actual vindictiveness and (b) the prohibition of a "chilling effect" on
the exercise of rights arising from defendants' fear of retaliation for the exercise of protected rights. See infra text accompanying notes 14-126.
Procedural difficulties have arisen because the Supreme Court has never clearly articulated either the procedures or the standard of proof required in vindictiveness analysis. While Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), set forth the procedures and standards to be
applied by judges in resentencing, neither Blackledge, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), nor Goodwin,
457 U.S. 368 (1982), describe in much detail the procedures that apply to prosecutorial
vindictiveness claims in either the "actual vindictiveness" or "apprehension of vindictiveness" context.
3 Blackledge, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
4 The scope of prosecutorial discretion in American jurisprudence has been the subject of continuing attention by scholars. See generally K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE:
A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969); Alschuler, Plea Bargainingand Its History, 79 COLUM. L.
REv. 1 (1978); Halberstam, Towards Neutral Principlesin the Administration of CriminalJustice:
A Critique of Supreme Court Decisions Sanctioning the Plea BargainingProcess, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1982); Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of ProsecutorialPower, 94 HARV. L. REv.
1521 (1981). More particularly, the doctrine prohibiting prosecutorial vindictiveness
has recently received increased attention. See Schwartz, The Limits of ProsecutorialVindictiveness, 69 IowA L. REv. 127 (1983); Note, Unleashing the Prosecutor's Discretion, United
States v. Goodwin, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 507 (1983); Note, Two Models of Prosecutorial
Vindictiveness, 17 GA. L. REv. 467 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Two Models]; Note,
ProsecutorialVindictiveness: Expanding the Scope of Protectionsto Increased Sentence Recommendations, 70 GEO. L. REv. 1051 (1982); Note, ProsecutorialVindictiveness: Divergent Lower Court
Applications of the Due ProcessProhibition,50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 324 (1982); Note, Prosecutor Not Presumed Vindictive in Pre-TrialChargeIncreases After Defendant'sRequestfor aJury Trial,
73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1452 (1982); Note, ProsecutorialVindictiveness in The Criminal Appellate Process: Due Process Protection After United States v. Goodwin, 81 MICH. L.
REv. 194 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Prosecutorial Vindictiveness in the Criminal Appellate
Process]; Note, United States v. Goodwin: Enhanced ProsecutorialDiscretion in the Pretrial
Setting, 10 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 415 (1983); Note, Evaluating Prosecutorial Vindictiveness
Claims in Non-Plea Bargained Cases, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1133 (1982).
5 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357.
6 Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368.
7 Texas v. McCullough, 106 S. Ct. 876 (1986); Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S.
559 (1984); Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 (1984); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S.
368 (1982).
8 Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
9 Colten, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
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Blackledge v. Perry,"I and Bordenkircherv. Hayes, 12 the major cases that
have discussed the development of both the judicial vindictiveness
doctrine and the prosecutorial vindictiveness doctrine. This section
then focuses on the Supreme Court's application of the vindictiveness analysis to prosecutors in United States v. Goodwin.' 3 Section III
of the Article closely examines the reasoning in Goodwin and observes that the Goodwin opinion apparently misconstrues both North
Carolinav. Pearce and Blackledge v. Perry and contradicts the reasoning
in Bordenkircherv. Hayes. Section IV of the Article examines the impact of the Goodwin opinion on the vindictiveness doctrine and suggests that Goodwin may actually require procedures that are more
costly and, at the same time, less effective in accomplishing the
stated purpose of the doctrine than those that existed prior to the
Goodwin opinion. The Article observes that, in spite of expressions
of concern for maintaining the prohibition against vindictiveness,
the current state of the doctrine severely restricts due process limitations on pre-trial use of prosecutorial power to punish defendants
who exercise procedural rights. The most recent expressions of the
doctrine establish an analytical framework that may eviscerate the
branch of the doctrine that addresses the "chilling effect" on the
exercise of rights caused by the fear of retaliation by prosecutors.
Section V of the Article illustrates the development of the
prosecutorial vindictiveness doctrine in the lower courts following
Goodwin and pinpoints the aspects of the doctrine that are likely to
remain in controversy.
II.
A.

GENESIS OF THE DOCTRINE

JUDICIAL VINDICTIVENESS

1.

North Carolina v. Pearce

The doctrine prohibiting both "actual vindictiveness"' 14 and the
"appearance of vindictiveness"' 15 in the exercise of governmental
10

Chaffin, 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
11 Blackledge, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
12 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
13 After this article was written, the Supreme Court decided another judicial vindictiveness case, Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 (1984). See infra discussion of this
case in Addendum at notes 558-59.
14 Actual vindictiveness refers to the use of discretion by eitherjudges or prosecutors

to increase or enhance a defendant's exposure to penalty in retaliation for an exercise of
a constitutionally protected right.
15 The "appearance of vindictiveness" arises when, irrespective of the actual motives
of a judge or prosecutor, a sequence of events occurs that gives rise to a reasonable
inference that a judge or prosecutor acted with retaliatory intent. The "appearance of
vindictiveness" is violative of due process because of the "chilling effect" it may have on
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power in criminal prosecutions was originally discussed by the
United States Supreme Court in North Carolinav. Pearce and Simpson
v. Rice, two companion cases decided in the same opinion.' 6 In rejecting each defendant's claims that the double jeopardy provision
and the equal protection clause prohibited increased sentences following reconviction on the same charges, 17 the Court first clearly
identified the due process implications of such increased penalties
following the exercise of constitutional or statutory rights. 8
In North Carolina v. Pearce, the defendant had been granted a
new trial by the state supreme court on constitutional grounds that
the defendant first raised in a habeas-type, post-trial petition. 19 In a
second trial, Pearce was again convicted, but he received a greater
sentence than that imposed in the first trial. 20 The conviction and
increased sentence were both upheld at the state level, and Pearce
filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court. 2 1 In an unpublished
opinion, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina found the increased sentence unconstitutional and
ordered the state to resentence Pearce within sixty days. 22 Upon the
state's failure to resentence, the District Court ordered Pearce's re24
lease. 23 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the order of the lower court.
From this affirmance the Supreme Court granted a writ of
25
certiorari.
In the companion case, Simpson v. Rice, the defendant pleaded
guilty to several burglary counts and was given a sentence of ten
years. 26 Thesejudgments were set aside several years later in a state
the exercise of the right in question. It arises independently of the subjective intent of
the judge or prosecutor.
16 Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
17 The Court stated, "A new trial may result in an acquittal. But if it does result in a
conviction, we cannot say that the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy of
its own weight restricts the imposition of an otherwise lawful single punishment for the
offense in question." Id. at 721.
18 Id. at 723-26.
19 Id. at 713. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that a two-month delay in
appointment of counsel for the defendant was a denial of statutory and constitutional
rights. Id.
20 Id. The earliest date of release under the original sentence was November 3, 1969,
while the earliest possible date of release under the new sentence was October 10, 1972.
Id. at 713 n.1.
21 Id. at 713-14.
22 Id. at 714.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. Rice was sentenced to four years on one count and to two years for each of
three other offenses. These sentences were to be served consecutively. Id. at 714 n.3.
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coram nobis proceeding on a constitutional right to counsel claim.2 7
The defendant was subsequently tried on three of the four charges
to which he initially pled, and he received a sentence of twenty-five
years. 28 The defendant Rice brought a habeas corpus proceeding in
the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Alabama challenging the increased sentence. District Judge Frank M. Johnson,
Jr., agreed with Rice's due process claim, although he did not believe that increased sentences upon retrial would be unconstitutional "if there is recorded in the Court record some legal
justification for it."29 According toJudgeJohnson, the failure of the
State of Alabama to explain orjustify the increased sentences led to
the "inescapable [conclusion] that the State of Alabama is punishing
petitioner for having exercised his post-conviction right of review
and for having his original sentence declared unconstitutional." 3 0
Because the state failed to make "some showing of necessity orjustification" for the increased second sentence,3 ' Judge Johnson ordered Rice released.3 2 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
34
affirmed,3 3 and the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari.
The majority opinion in Pearce made it clear that an increased
penalty alone was not sufficient to trigger the protection of either
equal protection or double jeopardy. 35 Neither constitutional provision precluded a judge from imposing a greater or a lesser sentence based upon events subsequent to the first trial. 36 The Court,
howevei, took pains to explain the limitations that the due process
clause imposes upon judicial discretion in re-sentencing. 37 Justice
Stewart, writing for the majority, observed that a rule that imposed
greater sentences upon retrial "for the explicit purpose of punishing the defendant for having succeeded in getting his original conviction set aside" would violate the fifth and fourteenth
27 Id.

at 714.

28 Id. The defendant Rice was sentenced to ten years on the first and second counts,
and to five years on the fourth count, all sentences to be served consecutively. Id. at 714
n.4. No credit was given for the time Rice had already served on the original sentences.
Id. at 714.
29 Id. at 715 (citing Rice v. Simpson, 274 F. Supp. 116, 121-22 (M.D. Ala. 1967), aft'd,
396 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1968)).
30 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 715.
31 Rice v. Simpson, 274 F. Supp. 116, 122 (M.D. Ala. 1967).
32 Id. at 123.
33 Simpson v. Rice, 396 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1968).
34 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 715.
35 Id. at 723.
36 United States v. Wasman, 700 F.2d 663 (11th Cir. 1983), aff'd., 468 U.S. 559
(1984).
37 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723-26.
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amendments.3 8 He noted that this would particularly be true in
cases such as Pearce and Rice, in which constitutional errors resulted
in retrial, and that" 'penalizing those who choose to exercise constitutional rights would be patently unconstitutional.' ,,39
In support of the majority's rejection of the use of governmental power to punish the exercise of constitutional rights, Justice
Stewart explicitly referred to the due process analysis in United States
v.Jackson.4 0 In that case, the Supreme Court invalidated a portion of
the federal kidnapping statute that had made the death penalty applicable only injury trials. 4 1 According to the Court inJackson, the
possibility of receiving the death penalty only if the right to a jury
trial was exercised violated due process and created an unconstitutional burden on the right to a jury trial.42 According to the Court
inJackson, "if the provision had no other purpose or effect than to chill
the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose
'43
to exercise them, then it would be patently unconstitutional.
Thus, in addition to the impact of increased punishment on
those who exercise their constitutional rightsJustice Stewart's opinion in Pearce recognized that government acts which have the effect
of deterring the exercise of such rights by others are also violative of
due process. 44 The Court sought to prevent the implicit threat of
punishment and the resulting "chill . . . of basic constitutional
rights" 45 previously condemned in Griffin v. California46 and Johnson
v. Avery. 4 7 After establishing that the doctrine in Pearce arose from
due process considerations that had already been applied to unnecessary burdens placed upon constitutional rights such as the right to
a jury trial, the right of a defendant not to testify at trial and the
right of prisoners to habeas corpus relief,4 8 Justice Stewart made
38

Id. at 723-24.

39 Id. at 724 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)).

390 U.S. 570 (1968).
Id. at 572.
Id. at 581.
43 Id. (emphasis added). This statement indicates that both the intention to punish
or deter the exercise of a right and governmental acts that have the effect of deterring the
exercise of rights are an anathema. Thus,Jackson seems to indicate that acts which have
the effect of chilling the right to a jury trial would be improper, irrespective of the actual
intention of the government.
44 See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724. "[Ihe very threat inherent in the existence of such a
punitive policy would, with respect to those still in prison, serve to 'chill the exercise of
basic constitutional rights."' Id. at 724 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570,
582 (1968)).
40
41
42

45 See id.
46

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).

47 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
48

Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724.
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clear that burdens placed upon the exercise of statutory rights of
49
appeal would also be violative of due process.
The Court then applied these due process considerations 50 to
Pearce and Rice. 51 The Court clearly stated for the first time that
"vindictiveness" must play no part in sentencing on retrial following
either appeal or collateral attack, and also that "a defendant must be
free of the apprehensionof such retaliatory motivation on the part of a
52
sentencing judge."
Since the Court recognized that "such motivations are extremely difficult to prove in any individual case," 5 3 the Court in
Pearce required that (1) reasons for an increased sentence affirmatively appear on the record "so that the constitutional legitimacy of
the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal"; and
(2) the reasons for the increase must be "factual data" or "objective
information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing
proceeding.'
After enunciating the standards that would be applied to test
the propriety of increased sentences after retrial, the Court examined the applicability of those standards to the cases before the
Court.5 5 Justice Stewart pointed out that in Rice, JudgeJohnson had
noted a complete absence ofjustification for the increased sentence
and had made a finding that Alabama had failed to explain or justify
the increase in sentence and was "punishing" Rice for exercising his
right of review. 5 6 In Pearce, Justice Stewart noted that the state had
failed to advance a legitimate justification for the increased sentence
either at sentencing or at any time during the habeas proceeding,
even though the District Court had given the state the opportunity
to resentence the defendant. 57 Because the state in each case had
failed to offer "any reason or justification for the [increased] sentence beyond the naked power to impose it," the Supreme Court
affirmed outright the District Court orders in both Pearce and Rice.5 8
49 Id. Justice Stewart stated that if a defendant was penalized for successfully seeking
a statutory right of appeal or a collateral remedy, then the defendant's due process guarantees would be no less violated. Id.
5o See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
51 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.
52 Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
53 Id. at 725 n.20.
54 Id. at 726.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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Colten v. Kentucky

Colten v. Kentucky 59 and Chaffin v. Stynchcombe 60 are cases decided
after substantial alterations in the makeup of the Court. 61 Colten and
Chaffin were the only cases that applied the judicial vindictiveness
doctrine of Pearce prior to the Court's enunciation of the analogous
"prosecutorial vindictiveness" doctrine in Blackledge v. Perry in 1974.
In Colten, the Court found that in a statutorily granted de novo procedure, increased penalties levied by a judge who had no role in the
62
original trial did not offend the considerations of Pearce.
In distinguishing Colten from Pearce,Justice White observed that
the evil in Pearce was not an increased sentence on retrialper se, 63 but
rather the possibility that the increased sentences on retrial resulted
64
from "purposeful punishment" for having successfully appealed.
For Justice White, the central issue in Pearce was the frequency of
increased sentences after retrials. He stated that "the Court [in
Pearce] concluded that such untoward sentences occur with sufficient
frequency to warrant the imposition of a prophylactic rule" to ensure that neither vindictiveness nor the apprehension of vindictive65
ness deter the exercise of the defendant's right to appeal.
Justice White recognized that ajudge in a court of general jurisdiction who was forced to hear a second trial following a trial in an
inferior court in a trial de novo system might feel that a "defendant
who had a due process trial should be satisfied with it" and, thus,
might also have a punitive motive in sentencing. 6 6 Justice White,
however, concluded that the existence of such a motive is not sufficiently likely in a trial de novo system to require the Pearce
67
procedure.
According to Justice White, the features of the trial de novo sys407 U.S. 104 (1972).
412 U.S. 17 (1973). See infra text accompanying notes 77-126.
When Colten was decided in 1972, three years after Pearce, ChiefJustice Burger had
replaced former Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Rehnquist had replaced Justices Black, Fortas and Harlan. E. L. BARRE-rr & W. COHEN, CONsTIrTrrIoNAL LAw 1576-77 (1981).
62 Colten, 407 U.S. at 116-17.
63 Id. The trial de novo represents a completely fresh determination of guilt or innocence. It is not an appeal on the record. "In all likelihood, the trial de novo court is not
even informed of the sentence imposed in the inferior court and can hardly be said to
have 'enhanced' the sentence." Id. at 117-18.
59
60
61

64
65

Id. at 116.

Id. For a discussion of the relationship between the vindictiveness doctrine and
state court attempts to frustrate the holding in Gideon v. Wainwright see, Schwartz, The
Limits of ProsecutorialVindictiveness, 69 IowA L. REv. 127, 130 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Schwartz].
66 Id. at 117.
67 Id.
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tern that distinguish it from an appeal include: (a) the second proceeding occurs in a different court and before a different judge than
the original trial;6 8 (b) the trial de novo procedure does not require
the second court to "do again what it thought it had done correctly"; 69 (c) the judge in the second proceeding is not asked to find
error in another court's work; 70 (d) the second proceeding in a trial
de novo system is no different than that which would have occurred
had the case originated in the second court; 7 1 (e) it is possible that
the judge in the second proceeding may not even be informed of the
sentence in the inferior court. 72 In addition, Justice White observed
that defendants charged in the inferior court may plead or demand
trial and still retain the option of an entirely new determination of
guilt or innocence, an option that the state does not retain when it
charges in the inferior court.7 3 These factors led Justice White to
conclude that the initial proceeding is in the nature of "an offer in
settlement" that the defendant is free to reject.7 4 Further, Pearcetype restraints, according to Justice White, might well reduce the
imposition of lenient sentences to settle minor cases since the effect
of the application of Pearce would be to limit sentencing options on
75
retrial.
In deciding Colten, Justice White did not fully discuss the "chilling effect" on the exercise of constitutional and statutory rights that
the apprehension of vindictiveness mentioned in Pearce might create. Apparently, Justice White concluded that any apprehension of
judicial vindictiveness on the part of a defendant in a trial de novo
procedure was too subjective to require Pearce-type protections. Implicit in this analysis is approval of an analytical methodology that
examines (a) the additional burdens imposed upon the sentencing
judge as a result of the defendant's exercise of a right, and (b) the
likelihood that those additional burdens might be sufficiently substantial to cause the judge to respond punitively. Thus, Colten introduces a subjective judicial weighing of the probability of the
existence of actual vindictiveness as a method of testing the validity
76
of a defendant's fear of reprisal.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 117.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 118.
73 Id. at 119. It is important to note, in light of the Goodwin opinion, that the trial de
novo procedure in Colten provided for a jury trial in both proceedings. Thus, burdens
upon the right to a jury trial were not implicated in Colten.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. In addition to the factors mentioned by Justice White, a Pearce-type standard
68
69
70
71
72
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Chaffin v. Stynchcombe

In Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, the Court ruled that increased sentences meted out by juries on a retrial after appeal do not offend the
due process clause "so long as the jury is not informed of the original sentence and the second sentence is not otherwise shown to be a
product of vindictiveness." ' 77 Chaffin is important because it introduced the additional concept that some "choice of rights" was acceptable in due process vindictiveness analysis if the exercise of the
right was sufficiently attenuated from any punitive result. 78 The
Court in Chaffin equated the risk associated with an increased juryimposed sentence with the earlier acceptance of "a choice of rights"
in the plea bargaining context approved by the Court in Brady v.
United States.79 The defendant in Chaffin had originally been convicted in a Georgia state court of the capital offense of "robbery by
open force" and had been given a jury-recommended sentence of
fifteen years in prison.8 0 The conviction and sentence were affirmed
on appeal, 8 ' but a retrial was ordered by the federal district court
pursuant to defendant's habeas corpus petition. 8 2 A second trial
83
before a different judge and jury resulted in a second conviction.
The prosecution argued for imposition of the death penalty in the
second trial.84 The jury returned a sentence of life imprisonment.8 5
Although the parties agreed that the jury was unaware of the
would have required a record of the original proceeding so that an increased sentence in
the second proceeding could be subjected to constitutional review. Thus, application of
the Pearce rule to the facts of Colten would have required restructuring the informal, inferior court system and replacing it with a system more closely analogous to the second
level court in Kentucky's two-tier system. Thus, the advantage of disposing of minor
cases quickly and inexpensively would be lost. Id. at 117.
Although the Court did not specifically address this issue in Pearce, the Court seems
to have considered the probability that actual vindictiveness was present, given the references to the number of appeals that resulted in increased sentences. See Pearce, 395
U.S. at 724-25 nn.19-20. One commentator has noted that Pearce may be seen as the
Supreme Court's response to the reluctance of lower courts to give full effect to Gideon v.
Wainwright. Viewed this way Pearce, too, is based upon a "realistic likelihood" of vindictiveness analysis. See Schwartz, supra note 65, at 130.
77 Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 35.
78 Id. at 30-31.
79 Id. at 30-31 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970)).
80 Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 18.
81 Id. at 19.
82 Id. at 18-19.
83 Id. The two trials were similar in most respects. "The case was prosecuted on
both occasions by the same State's attorney and the same prosecution witnesses testified
to the facts surrounding the alleged robbery. Petitioner, however, was represented by
new counsel and, in addition to repeating his alibi defense, he interposed an insanity
defense not offered at the former trial. New witnesses were called to testify for both
sides on this issue." Id. at 19.
84 Id. at 19 n.3. Although the closing arguments from the first trial were not tran-
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original sentence, the jury was certainly aware of the original trial. 86
The defendant's attorney at the first trial even testified in the second
proceeding to explain why an insanity defense was not offered in the
first trial and to give his opinion that the defendant suffered from a
mental defect. 87 The lower court conceded that the jury could only
have speculated whether the retrial was caused by mistrial or rever88
sal on appeal.
After state appeals of the higher sentence were rejected, the defendant applied for habeas relief arguing that Pearce prohibited the
increase in sentence from fifteen years to life. The District Court
and United States Court of Appeals affirmed the higher sentence. 89
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a division in the
courts of appeal on the applicability of the Pearce vindictiveness doctrine to jury resentencing. 90
Justice Powell wrote the opinion for the majority in Chaffin; Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall and Stewart dissented. The majority rejected the defendant's double jeopardy claim 9 ' and the
claim that Pearce required jury sentences on retrial not to exceed the
first sentence. 92 In addressing the petitioner's claim that the Pearce
analysis regarding vindictiveness applied with equal force to both
jury and judicial resentencing, the majority found that the concerns
regarding the possibility of vindictiveness expressed in Pearce did not
arise in jury resentencing. 93 Although Pearce stated that vindictiveness can have no place in the resentencing process, 94 thus implying
that even a remote possibility of vindictiveness requires Pearce-type
protection, the majority cited Colten for the proposition that the
"chilling of rights" vindictiveness analysis was not appropriate
where the "possibility of vindictiveness" did not "inhere in the...
system." 9 5 The majority concluded that "potential for such abuse in
the sentencing by the jury is de minimus in a properly controlled
96
retrial."
scribed, affidavits of counsel asserted that the state argued for the death penalty at both
trials. The court assumed that this was a correct reconstruction of the facts.
85 Id. at 19-20.
86 See id. at 20 n.4.
87 Id.
88 See id. at 20 n.5.
89 Id. at 21.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 24.
92
93
94
95
96

Id. at 28.
Id. at 25-26.
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.
Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 26 (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116 (1972)).
Id. at 26.
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According to Justice Powell, the jury resentencing in Chaffin did
not carry the same dangers that "inhere" in judicial sentencing for
several reasons: (a) the jury was not informed of the previous sentence and, in other settings, may not even be aware of the earlier
trial 9 7, (b) the second jury sentence is not meted out by the same
"judicial authority", and the jury has no "personal stake in the
outcome and no motivation to engage in self-vindication;" 98 and (c)
the jury is unlikely to have the "institutional interests" that may
cause judges to seek to discourage appeals. 99
Apparently recognizing that vindictiveness, or at least the appearance of vindictiveness, may arise even in jury sentencing because of the motivations of the judge and prosecutor, Justice Powell
observed that it may be desirable for judges to give the same instructions to each jury and for prosecutors to make the same arguments regarding sentence. 10 0 Thus, Chaffin carries the implication
that even jury resentencing may be subject to the Pearce rationale as
a result of eitherjudicialorprosecutorialacts that increase the defendant's risk of a heightened penalty. 10 1
In a comment that more clearly foreshadows Goodwin and the
prosecutorial vindictiveness analysis of Blackledge v. Perry, Justice
Powell addressed his concern that higher sentences after retrial may
result from prosecutorial vindictiveness.10 2 According to Justice
Powell, the record in Chaffin did not indicate that the prosecutor ar03
gued for a higher sentence or argued more strenuously on retrial.1
Thus, he concluded, where a jury is unaware of the previous sentence, "there is no basis for holding that jury resentencing poses
any real threat of vindictiveness."'' 0 4 Because the threat of vindictiveness was found to be de minimis before untainted juries in Chaf06
fin, 10 5 the Court declined to apply the Pearce prophylactic rule.
The majority conceded in a footnote that some remedies may be
necessary in cases involving tainted juries, but observed that the
97

Id.

98 Id. at

27.

99 Id.
100 Id. at 27 n.13.
101 See id.
102 He went beyond the facts to note that a recommendation of an increased sentence
might arise from other motives and that the prohibition against informing the sentencing
jury of the previous sentence made "the possibility that a harsher sentence [would] be
obtained through prosecutorial malice... remote." Id. at 27 n. 13.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 28.
105 Id. at 26.
106 Id. at 28 n.15.
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Pearce rule would be difficult to apply.10 7
After rejecting a Pearce-type vindictiveness analysis in jury resentencing when jurors are unaware of the previous sentence, the
majority addressed the "chilling effect" that any jury-imposed increase in sentence might have on appeal rights, irrespective of the
existence of actual vindictiveness.10 8 This analysis of the chilling effect in the exercise of rights did not rely upon Pearce, but rather was
premised upon the doctrine enunciated in United States v. Jackson,10 9
the case from which the Pearce rationale was drawn.1 1 0 In Jackson,
the Court struck down a federal statute that gave death-penalty sentencing power to the jury but not to the judge. 1 1 According to the
Chaffin majority, althoughJackson struck down the offending statute
because it needlessly chilled the exercise of constitutional rights,
Jackson did not prohibit every "government-imposed choice.., that
has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional
1
rights." 12
As an example of a constitutionally acceptable choice, the majority referred to the choice in Brady v. United States between the
"certainty or probability" of a higher sentence if a defendant exer113
cises the right to stand trial rather than accept a plea bargain.
The majority candidly noted that such choices were "upheld as an
inevitable attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation of pleas." 1 14 As applied to Chafin, the majority found that the right to appeal can constitutionally carry with it
some risk of an increased sentence for two major reasons: (1) the
court finds "nothing in the right to appeal or collateral attack...
which elevates those rights above the right to jury trial or to remain
silent;" (2) unlike plea bargaining, or the choice whether to testify,
107 Id. The Court also noted that a due process doctrine that would limit sentences on
retrial to those originally imposed would accomplish the same result that the Court had
already rejected under the double jeopardy analysis. Id. at 28-29 n.15.
108 Id. at 29.
109 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
110 Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 29.
111 Id. at 29-30.
112 Id. at 30. As examples, the Court cited the choice to plead guilty to avoid the

potential imposition of the death penalty and the choice to testify at trial or to remain
silent, thus foregoing either the fifth amendment right to remain silent or to present
mitigating sentencing information. Id. at 30-31. According to the majority, the distinguishing feature in these "choice of rights" cases between permissible and impermissible choices is "whether compelling the election [of rights] impairs to an appreciable
extent any of the policies behind the rights involved." Id. at 32 (quoting Crampton v.
Ohio, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (companion case to McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183
(1971)).
113 Id. at 30-31.
114 Id. at 31.
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the likelihood of receiving a higher sentence is remote when the
right to appeal is exercised. 1 15
According to the majority, several eventualities must occur
before a defendant can receive an increased penalty after exercising
the right to appeal: the appeal must succeed; the case must be remanded rather than dismissed; the prosecutor must decide to go
forward with the retrial; the defendant must choose a jury trial; the
jury must convict; and the "jury or the judge must arrive at a harsher sentence" in circumstances genuinely devoid of actual vindictiveness." 1 16 The majority concluded that the prospect of an increased
sentence that might prevent free choice under such circumstances is
too speculative at the point at which the decision is made to be likely
117
to "chill" the exercise of the right to appeal.
Justice Douglas, in dissent, would have found that applying
Pearce to increased sentences imposed by judges on retrial but not to
juries unconstitutionally burdened the right to be tried by a jury. 118
In another dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart stated that Pearce
should apply, even in jury resentencing, to assure that "vindictiveness ... play no part.... ." 119 ForJustice Stewart, the danger, even
in jury resentencing, comes from both the prosecutor and the
judge.' 20 The possibility that one or both of these instruments of
the state might influence the second jury is sufficient to require application of the Pearce doctrine. He read the prosecutor's request
for the death penalty in the second trial in Chaffin to be an indication
ofjust such vindictive potential.' 2 ' He maintained that the possibility of such motivation is exactly what made a Pearce-type procedure
necessary 122
Justice Stewart would require the judge to reduce an increased
115 Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
116 Id. at 33-34 (emphasis added). This is somewhat misleading, because after Pearce,
judges must also sentence in circumstances devoid of the appearance of vindictiveness.
117 Id. at 34-35.

118 Id. at 35 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570
(1968)).

119 Id. at 35 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 36. Justice Stewart stated the following:
Either or both might have personal and institutional reasons for desiring to punish
a defendant who has successfully challenged his conviction. Out of vindictiveness
the prosecutor might well ask for a sentence more severe than that meted out after

the first trial, and a judge by the manner in which he charges the jury might influence the jury to impose a higher sentence at the second trial.
Id.
121 Id. Justice Stewart explained that he felt that the prosecutor and the judge gave
the jury the option to impose the death penalty as a tactical move to assure that the
petitioner would receive at least another 15-year sentence. Id.
122 Id. at 37.
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jury sentence to the original sentence or to make a Pearce-type record of the reasons for the increase. Thus, he would avoid the
double jeopardy/due process problem alluded to by the majority
and, under the proper circumstances, sentences could be increased
after appeal, but only for assuredly non-punitive reasons. 123 Justice
Stewart also agreed with the dissenting opinion by Justice Marshall
which concluded that allowing a more severe sentence in a jury trial
124
after appeal impermissibly burdens the right to a jury trial.
The Chaffin majority opinion is important primarily because it
builds upon Colten and clarifies the test for the imposition of the
Pearce prophylactic rule by making clear that the possibility of actual
vindictive motive is insufficient to trigger application of the rule.
Rather, the test requires a realistic likelihood of actual vindictiveness. 125 In addition, Chaffin introduced the notion that the chilling
effect addressed in Pearce andJackson does not arise simply because a
defendant is presented with the possibility of an increased penalty as
a result of a choice of rights. Rather, if the exercise of the right is
insulated from any increased penalty by intervening variables that
sufficiently reduce the ability of the government to impose a greater
penalty, possibility of increased punishment is viewed as "speculative" and, thus, unlikely to be a deterrent to the exercise of the right
26
in question.'
B.

PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS

1.

Blackledge v. Perry

The due process doctrine prohibiting prosecutorial vindictiveness was first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Blackledge v. Peny
in 1974.127 The defendant in Blackledge, like the defendant in Colten
v. Kentucky, 128 was originally convicted of a misdemeanor in the
Id.
Id. Justice Marshall took issue with the majority's treatment of United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). Id. at 38 (Marshall,J., dissenting). According to Marshall,
the inquiry should not be whether the burden imposed on a right is incidental. Rather,
the correct inquiry should be whether the chilling effect is unnecessary, and therefore
excessive. Id. at 44. He would ask then, whether the burden on the right to appeal was
necessary to accomplish a legitimate state purpose. His conclusion is that legitimate
state interests are not advanced by permitting increased jury sentences following retrial.
Id.
125 ForJustice Stewart, the author of Pearce, the possibility of such motivation and the
difficulty of proving it remain enough to require a prophylactic rule. Id. at 37 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
126 Id. at 35.
127 Blackledge, 417 U.S. 21.
128 Colten, 407 U.S. 104. See supra notes 59-77 and accompanying text.
123
124
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lower court of North Carolina's two-tier trial court system.' 29 After
the defendant exercised his statutory right to a trial de novo on appeal, 13 0 the prosecutor sought a felony indictment on the same facts
that gave rise to the original misdemeanor conviction. The defendant pled guilty to the increased charge and received a sentence substantially greater than that in the original trial. 13 1 The defendant
then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. In an unreported opinion, the petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust
state remedies.' 32 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that requiring exhaustion of remedies would be futile.1 33 The case was remanded to the district
court. 134

The district court granted the writ, holding, in an unpublished
opinion, that the increased sentence violated the double jeopardy
clause and the defendant's right to a jury trial.' 3 5 The court of appeals affirmed the district court without publishing a written opinion. 13 6 Thus, the Supreme Court granted certiorari without the
benefit of a published opinion from either of the courts below. The
Supreme Court noted, however, that the district court had the benefit of the Supreme Court opinion in Colten v. Kentucky prior to granting the habeas petition. 137 Justice Stewart, writing for an eight to
one majority, rejected the defendant's claim that the increased
charges and punishment violated the constitutional prohibition
129 Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 22. Perry, an inmate in a North Carolina prison, was
charged and convicted of assault with a deadly weapon after a fight with another prisoner. Id.
130 Id. Unlike the system in Colten, the lower court proceeding did not provide for the
election of ajury trial.
131 Id. at 23. Perry was given a six-month sentence for this misdemeanor charge, to be
served after completing the sentence he was already serving. Id. at 22. On appeal to the
Superior Court, Perry was sentenced to a term of five to seven years for the felony indictment, to be served concurrently with the time he was already serving. Id. at 23. The
effect was to increase his potential period of incarceration by 17 months, as compared to
the possible six-month increase from the misdemeanor charge. Id. at 23 n.2.
132 Id. at 23.
133 Id. at 23-24. The United States Court of Appeals believed that the North Carolina
state courts would not be helpful to Perry because the Supreme Court of North Carolina
had "consistently rejected the constitutional claims presented by Perry in his petition."
Id. at 24.
134 Id. at 24.
'35 Perry v. Blackledge (No. 2800 filed Aug. 24, 1972) (unpublished opinion of J.
Larkin). See infra text accompanying notes 325-39.
136 Id.
137 Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 24 n.3. This reference may be significant since the trial
court opinion distinguished Blackledge from Colten because of the difference in jury trial
provisions in each system. It seems to imply approval of the trial court's treatment of
that distinction.
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against double jeopardy. 138 Concerning the defendant's second
claim based on vindictiveness on the part of the prosecutor, the
Court looked to North Carolinav. Pearce139 and its progeny for a due
process analysis that applied to the actions of the prosecutor.140
The majority opinion reaffirmed that Pearce required that "vindictiveness against the defendant.., must play no part" in resentencing following an appeal and that an increased sentence could
not be imposed unless the judge placed "certain specified findings"
on the record. 14 1 The majority noted that Colten v. Kentucky permitted increased sentences in a trial de novo system because the danger
of vindictiveness addressed in Pearce was de minimus. 14 2 The Court
also mentioned Chaffin v. Stynchcombe as the most recent application
of Pearce that found the danger of vindictiveness de minimus in jury
43
sentencing.1
According to the Court in Blackledge, "the lesson that emerges
from Pearce, Colten and Chajfin is that the due process clause is not
offended by all possibilities of increased punishment upon retrial
after appeal, but only those that pose a realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness'."' 14 4 The Court concluded that the "opportunities for vindictiveness" on the part of a prosecutor who could "up the ante" by
increasing charges required an "analagous" rule to that enunciated
in Pearce.' 4 5 The Court reached this conclusion even though the
trial de novo procedure in Blackledge was virtually identical to the procedure which was found to insulate judges from the Pearce rule in
Colten v. Kentucky. The major distinction between the two systems
was that jury trials were only available in North Carolina following
14 6
an appeal from the inferior court.
Applying the analysis suggested in earlier cases, the majority
138

Id. at 25.

139 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
140 417 U.S. at 25-29. In Pearce, the Court considered the constitutional problems
presented when, following a successful appeal and reconviction, a criminal defendant
was subjected to a greater punishment than that imposed at the first trial. "While we
concluded that such a harsher sentence was not absolutely precluded by either the
Double Jeopardy or Due Process Clause, we emphasized that 'imposition of a penalty
upon the defendant for having successfully pursued a statutory right of appeal or collateral remedy would be... a violation of due process of law.'" Id. at 25 (quoting North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 (1969)).
141 Id. at 25-26 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969)).
142 Id. at 26 (citing Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972)).
143 Id. at 26-27 (citing Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973)).
144 Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974). The Court distinguished Blackledge
from Pearce, Colten and Chaffin by pointing out that in Blackledge, the central figure was the
prosecutor, not the judge or jury. Id.
145 Id.
146 See infra text accompanying notes 325-39.
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concluded that even in a trial de novo setting, a prosecutor, unlike a
judge as in Colten, has a stake in discouraging appeals since "an appeal will clearly require increased expenditures of prosecutorial resources before defendant's conviction becomes final, and may even
result in a formerly convicted defendant going free." 147 The Court
observed that few defendants will brave the hazards of the de novo
trial.1 48 Thus, the majority in Blackledge concluded that a "realistic
likelihood" of vindictiveness 4 9 arose because incentives for prosecutors to prevent the exercise of rights' 50 existed simultaneously
with the unfettered power to "up the ante"' 5 1 to deter the exercise
of those rights. 15 2 Unlike Chaffin, there were no intervening, independent occurences between the incentive to punish and the exercise of discretion that made the defendant's fear of retaliation
"speculative".
After finding that the potential for prosecutorial vindictiveness
was sufficient to require the application of Pearce, the Court pointed
out that there was no evidence of actual vindictiveness on the part of
the prosecutor in Blackledge. 153 According to the majority, however,
Pearce did not necessarily require an inquiry into the existence of
actual vindictive motive.' 5 4 If it had, any inquiry into the "realistic
likelihood of vindictiveness" would obviously have been unnecessary. The due process violation arose in Pearce because a person is
entitled to pursue a new trial "without apprehension that the State
will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge."' 5 5 Although
Pearce, Colten, Chaffin and Blackledge all addressed sentencing following a retrial, there is no indication that any of the opinions were
limited to a post-trial exercise of rights. Thus, after Blackledge v.
Perry, the doctrine prohibiting use of the prosecutor's power to punish the exercise of procedural rights by a defendant at any time was
apparently firmly established.
Like the "prophylactic rule" developed for judicial vindictiveness in Pearce, Blackledge required that an increase in potential liability following a defendant's exercise of a statutory or constitutional
147
148
149

Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27.
Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 27.

150

Id.
Id. at 28.
Id.

151

152

Id.
Id.
Id. The Court stated that a due process violation arose if the defendant were subjected to the possibility of increased incarceration. Id. Additionally, the conviction for a
felony usually resulted in longer prison sentences compared to sentences imposed for
misdemeanor convictions. Id. at 28 n.6.
153
154
155
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right be accompanied by objective reasons for the increased liability
which did not exist or which were not known to the prosecution
prior to the defendant's exercise of the rights.1 5 6 Thus, the courts
would be spared the "unseemly task" of divining the subjective motives of the prosecutor, and presumably, if legitimate reasons were
presented, prosecution on the increased charges would be allowed
to go forward. If, on the other hand, the government were unable
to present such objective reasons, nothing in Blackledge would pre15 7
vent prosecution on the original charges.
2.

Bordenkircherv. Hayes

In 1978, the Court again addressed the issue of prosecutorial
vindictiveness in a case that contrasted the Court's earlier acceptance of the practice of plea bargaining with actual vindictiveness on
the part of a prosecutor. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Court held
that a threat to seek additional charges and a mandatory life term if
a defendant insisted upon going to trial was constitutionally acceptt5 8
able in the context of plea bargaining.
The defendant in Bordenkircherhad previously been convicted of
two felonies. He had been committed to a juvenile facility for assault and had received probation for a theft-related charge.' 59 In
pretrial conferences, the prosecutor offered to recommend a fiveyear sentence if Hayes would plead guilty to the charge of uttering
an $88.30 forged check.' 60 The prosecutor also told Hayes that he
156 The nature of the showing required of the state to establish a valid increase in
penalty is not specifically addressed in Blackledge. In one footnote, however, the Court

states that an increase in charges from assault to murder was acceptable when the alleged victim died subsequent to the original trial. Id. at 29 n.7 (citing Diaz v. United
States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912)). This implies that a change in objective circumstances
would be enough to allow an increased charge. There is nothing in Blackledge, however,
that would necessarily limit the showing to such a change in the objective circumstances.
This ambiguity has led to continuing controversy regarding what that showing required.
The "objective-evidence-only" position has been criticized as not allowing a change
in position based upon newly discovered facts that existed at the time of the original
proceeding. Justice Blackmun, in Goodwin, suggests that a more flexible standard would
solve this problem. See infra notes 251-55 and accompanying text.
157 The federal district court allowed the original misdemeanor conviction to stand
pending an appeal by the defendant. Perry v. Blackledge, No. 2800 (Dist. N. C., J. Larkins, Aug. 23, 1972). The appellate opinions do not disclose whether the defendant
filed a subsequent appeal.
158 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357. The Court stated, that "[p]lea bargaining flows from
'the mutuality of advantage' to defendants and prosecutors, each with his own reasons
for wanting to avoid trial." Id. at 363 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758
(1970)).
159 Id. at 359.

160 Id. at 358. The applicable statute at the time called for a term of incarceration of
two to ten years. Ky. REV. STAT. § 484.130 (1973) (repealed 1975).
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would indict him as a habitual criminal, which carried a mandatory
life sentence, if Hayes did not plead guilty.16 1 Hayes decided to go
to trial, was convicted of the increased charges, and was sentenced
to life. 162 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, finding that the prosecutor's conduct violated the doctrine
enunciated in Blackledge v. Perry, which "protect[s] defendants from
the vindictive exercise of a prosecutor's discretion."' 163 The
Supreme Court took the case on certiorari "to consider a constitutional question of importance in the administration of criminal justice." 164 Justice Stewart wrote for the majority; Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, Marshall and Powell all filed dissents.
The majority opinion was careful to "clarify the nature of the
issue" before the Court in Bordenkircher.165 Justice Stewart pointed
out that (1) the indictment on the Habitual Criminal statute was obtained after the plea bargain discussions had ended; 16 6 and (2) Hayes
was informed of the terms of his choice before he decided to exercise his right to go to trial. 16 7 "This is not a situation, therefore,
where the prosecutor without notice brought an additionaland more serious
charge afterplea negotiationsrelatingonly to the originalindictment had ended
with the defendant's insistence on pleadingnot guilty." ' 68 Thus, the majority specifically rejected the filing of more serious charges after the
conclusion of plea bargaining if such an increase was not a part of
the plea bargaining discussions. The Court in Bordenkircher did not
make a distinction between a pre-trial and post-trial exercise of
rights by a defendant, but rather focused on the particular requirements of plea bargaining and the need for flexibility in that neces161 Bordenkircher,434 U.S. at 358. At the time of Hayes' trial, a Kentucky statute (the
Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act) provided that if a person was convicted of a felony for
the third time, then a life sentence would result. Ky. REv. STAT. § 431.190 (1973) (repealed in 1975). The Court noted that under the new statute, the sentence, at most,
would have been for a term of 10 to 20 years. Bordenkircher,434 U.S. at 359 n.2. (citing
Ky. REV. STAT. § 532.080 (5)(b) (Supp. 1977)). In addition, this sentence could only be
imposed if the previous convictions carried sentences of one year or more, if the sentence "was completed within five years of the present offense," and the defendant was of
age at the time the offense was committed. Id.
162 Id. at 359.
163 Id. at 360 (quoting Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 44 (6th Cir. 1976)).
164 Id. at 360.

165

Id.

Id. While the prosecutor did not actually obtain the recidivist indictment until
after the plea conferences had ended, his intention to do so was clearly expressed at the
outset of plea negotiations. Id.
167 Id.
168 Id. (emphasis added). The Court stated, "[A]s a practical matter, in short, this
case would be no different if the grand jury had indicted Hayes as a recidivist from the
outset, and the prosecutor had offered to drop that charge as part of the plea bargain."
Id. at 360-61.
166
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sary, but controversial, process. 1 69
The Bordenkircher opinion rests its reasoning entirely upon what
the Court viewed as the necessary requirements of the plea bargaining process, and the Court specifically limited the opinion to "the
give-and-take of plea bargaining" in which ".... the accused is free to
accept or reject the prosecution's offer."170 The majority opinion carefully limited the reach of Bordenkircher to "the course of conduct en71
gaged in by the prosecutor in this case."'
Two dissenting opinions were filed in Bordenkircher. Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, stated that the
majority was "departing from, or at least restricting, the principles
established in North Carolina v. Pearce . . . and in Blackledge v.
Peny. ' 172 In his dissent, Justice Blackmun took issue with the entire
notion that retaliation does not exist "so long as the accused is free
169 See id. at 361-62. Further, the majority opinion pointed out that the prosecutor
admitted that he made the threat and filed the indictment to influence the defendant to
give up his right to trial. Id. at 361. In the face of the prosecutor's admission of retaliatory motive, the majority concluded that the Court of Appeals "seems" to have concluded that "a prosecutor acts vindictively . . .whenever his charging decision is
influenced by what he hopes to gain in the course of plea bargaining negotiations." Id.
This reasoning is important because it makes clear that the Bordenkircher opinion is an
actual vindictiveness case that speaks specifically to plea bargaining situations, not to situations in which the state increases charges in response to the exercise of the right to trial.
By reading into the Sixth Circuit opinion the idea that it rejected any motive of
inducement in the bargaining situation, the majority opinion directly counterposed the
due process doctrine of vindictiveness with the all-too-necessary practice of plea bargaining. Id. This contra-position, the existence of any or some prosecutorial motive to
induce a defendant to forego constitutional rights in plea bargaining with the due process doctrine prohibiting vindictiveness or the appearance of vindictiveness, was not
necessary in Bordenkircher since "in this case a vindictive nature need not be inferred.
The prosecutor had admitted it." Id. at 361 n.7.
Thus, Bordenkircher was not a case in which the decision to increase charges was
influenced by the prosecutor's desire to induce a plea as the majority stated; it was the only
reason for the increase based upon the facts before the Court. The result of this casting
of the issues by the majority required it to choose between accepting complete discretion
in plea bargaining or applying Blackledge to the facts in Bordenkircher. The result was that
the majority upheld Hayes' life term in the interest of maintaining the plea bargaining
process. Id. at 364-65. "To hold that the prosecutor's desire to induce a guilty plea is
an 'unjustifiable standard,' which, like race or religion, may play no part in his charging
decision, would contradict the very premises that underlie the concept of plea bargaining itself." Id.
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court chose this either/or analysis of
prosecutorial decision-making which is generally applied to "suspect class" analysis in
equal protection cases. Rather, some middle ground may have been preferable. For
example, the Court could have properly found that some motivation to induce a plea is
always present in plea bargaining, but that it cannot be the only motivation. Such an
analysis may have been more in keeping with previous vindictiveness analysis and suspect class doctrine.
170 Id. at 363 (emphasis added).
171 Id. at 365.
172 Id. at 365-66.
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to accept or reject the prosecution's offer."' 173 Justice Blackmun
pointed out that the prosecutor in this case admitted that the sole
reason for the increase in charges was to discourage the defendant
from going to trial. 1 74 According to Justice Blackmun, the situation
in Bordenkircher is precisely that "against which the Due Process
Clause ought to protect."' 175 He would have affirmed the Sixth Circuit's judgment since "prosecutorial vindictiveness in any context is
17 6
still prosecutorial vindictiveness."'
Justice Powell, in an equally strong dissent, focused on the
prosecutor's original decision to forego prosecution under the Habitual Criminal Statute. 177 Justice Powell inferred "that the prosecutor himself deemed it unreasonable and not in the public interest
to put this defendant in jeopardy of a sentence of life imprisonment."' 78 Further, Powell pointed out that none of the cases cited
by the majority support the conclusion that prosecutors or judges
may use their power to induce a defendant to plead guilty.' 7 9 For
Justice Powell, this would have been an easy case, since the prosecutor had admitted using his power to indict to retaliate for defendant's
insistence on exercising his constitutional rights.' 8 0 Justice Powell,
too, would have upheld the Sixth Circuit since "implementation of a
strategy calculated solely to deter the exercise of constitutional
rights is not a constitutionally permissible exercise of discretion."' 8'1
Following Bordenkircher v. Hayes, several of the circuits had the
opportunity to address the issue of prosecutorial vindictiveness in
settings outside the "give-and-take" of plea bargaining discussed by
the majority in Bordenkircher.'8 2 Although the United States
Supreme Court apparently had granted complete discretion to prosId. at 367.
Id. While cross-examining Hayes during subsequent proceedings, the prosecutor
described the plea offer in the following language: "Isn't it a fact that I told you at that
time [the initial bargaining session] if you did not intend to plead guilty to five years for
this charge and... save the court the inconvenience and necessity of a trial and taking
up this time that I intended to return to the grand jury and ask them to indict you based
upon these prior felony convictions?" Id. at 358 n.l.
175 Id. at 367.
176 Id. at 368.
177 Id. at 370.
178 Id. at 371.
179 Id. at 372.
180 Id. at 372-73.
181 Id. at 373.
182 See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 749 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Heidt, 745 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Eddy, 737 F.2d 564 (6th Cir.
1984); United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927
(1981); United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831, 836 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Griffin,
617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863 (1980); Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d
139 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1978).
173
174
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ecutors to threaten retaliation in plea bargaining, and to carry
through on those threats, the circuits consistently applied the
Pearce/Blackledge analysis to vindictiveness claims outside the limited
facts of Bordenkircher.183 Given the care taken by the majority to limit
the reach of Bordenkircher, this reliance on Pearce and Blackledge can
hardly be said to have been misplaced. 184 As a result, prior to the
Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Goodwin, every circuit
that had addressed the issue applied the "appearance of vindictiveness" prophylactic rule expressed in Pearce and Blackledge to both
pre-trial and post-trial settings.18 5 The "likelihood of vindictiveness" standard, which removed the taint from jury resenfencing and
judicial resentencing in a two-tier process, was applied, if at all, to
determine whether the prosecutor had some interest in deterring the
86
exercise of a defendant's rights.
3.

United States v. Goodwin

It was within this context that the Supreme Court accepted the
87
government's petition for certiorari in United States v. Goodwin.1
The Fourth Circuit had reversed Goodwin's felony conviction after
concluding that " 'but for' his election to exercise his right to ajury
trial, defendant would have been tried before the magistrate solely
on the lesser charges.' 188 According to the Fourth Circuit, the resulting felony conviction violated Goodwin's right to due process
under the dictates of Blackledge v. Pery.189
a.

Factual Background

The defendant in Goodwin had been arrested and arraigned on
several state and federal misdemeanors and petty offenses in
1976.190 A trial date was set, but Goodwin failed to appear. After
three years, the police found Goodwin and returned him to federal
district court in Maryland to stand trial on the outstanding
See supra note 182.
See supra text accompanying notes 165-69.
See supra note 181.
See, e.g., Burt, 619 F.2d 831; Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863 (1980).
See also supra note 182.
187 454 U.S. 1079 (1982).
188 United States v. Goodwin, 637 F.2d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 1981). The Fourth Circuit's
use of the "but for" test may have invited Supreme Court review. See, e.g., Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
189 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372.
190 Id. at 370. Goodwin was arrested for assault after he had been stopped for speeding. When the police officer noticed a plastic bag in the car, the defendant fled in his
car, striking the officer as he pulled away. Id.
183
184
185
186
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charges. 191
Goodwin's attorney entered into plea negotiations with the trial
attorney from the Department ofJustice who was assigned to prose92
cute petty offenses and misdemeanors before the magistrate.
Unlike Bordenkircher v. Hayes, during plea negotiations the prosecutor did not mention the possibility that the United States would seek
to increase the charges if the defendant did not plead guilty. 193 The
defendant declined to plead guilty and requested ajury trial, requiring a transfer of the case to the federal district court.' 94 Thus, discussion of the potential for increased charges or penalties was never
part of the bargaining process as it was in Bordenkircher.
After the defendant exercised his right to a jury trial outside the
"give-and-take of plea bargaining," the United States Attorney unilaterally obtained an indictment for a felony based upon the same
facts as the original misdemeanors. 195 Later, the United States Attorney set forth in an affidavit the reasons for his action. 196 The
government attorney denied that Goodwin's request for a jury trial
19 7
was a factor in his decision to increase the charge.
The trial court denied Goodwin's motion to dismiss on grounds
of prosecutorial vindictiveness. 19 A panel of the Fourth Circuit,
however, reversed the conviction after deciding that Pearce and
Blackledge were controlling. 199 According to the Fourth Circuit in
Goodwin, it was not necessary to determine whether retaliation actu191 Id.
192 Id. at 370-71. This prosecuting attorney had neither the authority to litigate felony
cases nor the authority to seek grand jury indictments. Id. at 371.
193 Goodwin, 637 F.2d at 255. "During the discussions, the prosecutor did not mention the possibility that the United States would seek to have defendant indicted for the
felony of forcible assault on a federal officer." Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. The district court stated that "[a]s a result of defendant's election to be tried
by a jury, his case was transferred to the district court for trial, [and that] [t]he United
States Attorney then sought and obtained the indictment charging defendant with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111." Id.
196 Id. The reasons listed in the affidavit were as follows: the defendant's actions
were serious violations of the law, the defendant had a past record of violent crime, the
defendant's conduct on the day of arrest was considered to be related to major narcotics
transactions, the defendant was believed to have committed perjury at his preliminary
hearing, and the defendant had failed to appear for trial. Id. It is not clear from the
opinion when the United States Attorney filed this affidavit.
197 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 371 & n.2. Not surprisingly, there is nothing in the record to
indicate that Goodwin offered evidence to dispute the prosecutor's description of his
own state of mind.
198 Id. at 371.
199 Id. at 372. The Fourth Circuit also relied upon United States v.Johnson, 537 F.2d
1170 (4th Cir. 1976).
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ally occurred. 20 0 Rather, due process required that the defendant
be free to exercise his right to ajury trial without "the apprehension
of retaliation." 20 The Fourth Circuit was careful to note that remedies for apparent prosecutorial retaliation would attach only if the
apprehension of vindictiveness went unrebutted by the government. 20 2 Thus, under the Fourth Circuit's reading of Pearce and
Blackledge the government would remain free to provide legitimate
reasons for the increased charges, if those reasons existed.
In the Fourth Circuit's opinion, the government's failure to
demonstrate that the new charges could not have been brought
prior to the exercise of the defendant's rights required a conclusion
that the defendant's apprehension of vindictiveness was based on a
"genuine risk" that such motivation played a role in the charging
decision. 20 3 The panel concluded that both Pearce and Blackledge required a dismissal of the increased charges to cure the "apprehension of retaliatory motivation.., at least where there is no showing
that the charges could not have been brought before defendant
20 4
made his election for a jury trial."
The Fourth Circuit rejected the government's reliance on
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, pointing out that the Supreme Court opinion
in that case was limited to plea bargaining situations in which the
possibility of the increased penalty had been made clear to the defendant. 20 5 Further, even Bordenkircher had favorably referred to
Blackledge v. Peny in condemning practices resulting in "unilateral
imposition of a penalty upon a defendant who had chosen to exercise a legal right ....206
The Fourth Circuit also pointed out that the cases cited by the
government, Colten and Chaffin, did not address the issue of
prosecutorial abuse. 20 7 Since both Chaffin and Colten arose from
challenges to increased penalties assessed by juries or judges other
1

200 Goodwin, 637 F.2d at 253. The Court stressed:

[T]he rationale of Pearce and Blackledge was that, since the fear of prosecutorial vindictiveness, as well as actual vindictiveness, had a chilling effect on a defendant's
right to appeal, to attack his conviction collaterally, or to be tried de novo, the due
process clause required that a defendant be freed of the apprehension of such a
retaliatory motivation as well as actual retaliation.

Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.

203 Id. at 255.
204 Id. at 253.
205 Id. It is important to note that Bordenkircherwas also an actual vindictiveness case
and thus had little relevance to the pre-existing "appearance of vindictiveness" doctrine.
206 Id. at 254 (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978)) (emphasis
added).
207 Id. at 254.
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than those who imposed the original sentences, there had been little
or no incentive to retaliate. Therefore, a realistic likelihood that the
increased penalty was related to the exercise of the defendant's right
did not exist.20 8 The Court of Appeals distinguished Colten and
Chaffin from cases such as Goodwin, where the prosecutor "had an
incentive to deter misdemeanor defendants from exercising a right
20 9
that would 'require increased expenditures' of his own time."
Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded, " '[T]he danger that the [govemment] might be retaliating is real.' "210
b.

The Supreme Court Opinion: United States v. Goodwin

i.

The Majority

The majority opinion by Justice Stevens 2 1 1 set the tone for the
analysis by casting the issue before the Court in terms of "presumptions,"2 1 2 a concept not previously mentioned in prosecutorial vindictiveness analysis. According to Justice Stevens, the issue in
Goodwin was whether the "presumptions" used to test post-trial judicial or prosecutorial actions should also be used to examine a prosecutor's response to a defendant's exercise of pre-trial rights, such as
the request for ajury trial.2 13 As stated by the majority, the case was
governed by an analytical distinction between due process rights
before and after trial and a distinction between the right to a jury
2 14
trial and other rights.
The Court's analysis began with a review of the policy underlying the doctrine prohibiting vindictiveness in the criminal prosecuId.
Id.
Id. (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)). Finally, the Fourth
Circuit also rejected the argument that even if a genuine risk existed, the Court should
balance the chilling effect on the exercise of a defendant's rights against the limitations
imposed upon the prosecutor's discretion. Id. See also United States v. Andrews, 633
F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980); Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 145 (5th Cir. 1978); Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049 (1978). The
Court held that "Blackledge [v. Perry] suggests no balancing test" precisely to eliminate
the "unseemly task" of examining, in retrospect, the motives of an individual prosecutor. Goodwin, 637 F.2d at 255.
211 Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982). The opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger,
and Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Justice Blackmun filed an opinion that rejected the reasoning of the majority but concurred with the judgment. Justices Brennan and Marshall filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 369.
212 Id. at 373.
213 Id. at 369-70. See infra text accompanying notes 358-68.
214 Id. at 381-82. See infra text accompanying notes 282-408.
The
doctrinal
source of these distinctions was not described in the opinion, nor was it made clear that
any "presumptions" which may have been implicit in earlier cases such as Pearce or
Blackledge were presumptions of a rebuttable nature.
208
209
210
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tion system. 2 15 The majority opinion clearly stated that punishment
for the exercise of a legal right is a "due process violation of the
most basic sort" and that such punishment must be distinguished
2 16
from punishment for violation of law.
The Court then observed that punishment is the "very purpose" of a criminal proceeding, that "motives are complex and difficult to prove''217 and that this reality had compelled the Court to
establish a doctrine that requires the government to show that certain of its actions are not retaliatory. 2 18 The Stevens opinion characterized this process as a "sever[e] . . . presumption [of
vindictiveness]" that arises only in cases where a "reasonable likeli21 9
hood of vindictiveness exists."
The opinion then illustrated this doctrine by referring to North
Carolinav. Pearce, which required an increased sentence to be justified by the presence on the record of "objective information" not
originally available to the sentencing court.2 20 The Court cited
Blackledge v. Perry as an example of the application of this doctrine to
prosecutorial conduct. 2 2' According to the majority opinion,
Blackledge stood for several major principles. First, due process is
not offended by any possibility of increased penalty, but only those
that pose a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness. 22 2 Second, prosecutors have a "considerable stake" in deterring misdemeanants
from seeking a new trial. 22 3 Third, defendants should be free from
the "apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the
2 24
prosecutor."
The opinion then asserted that Pearce and Blackledge reflected "a
recognition by the Court of the institutional bias inherent in the judicial system against the retrial of issues that have already been decided." 2 25 Without citing any specific language in either Pearce or
Blackledge that supports this conclusion, Justice Stevens found that
22 6
this "bias" was at the heart of both cases.
Justice Stevens next looked to Bordenkircherv. Hayes, 22 7 the plea
215 Id. at 372.
216 Id. (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)).
217 Id. at 372-73.
218 Id. at 373.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 373-74.
221 Id. at 375-76.
222 Id. at 375.
223 Id. at 375-76
224 Id. at 376.
225 Id.
226 See id. at 376-77.
227 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357.
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bargaining exception case, as an example of the Court's treatment
of vindictiveness at pre-trial stages. 22 8 He noted that an express threat
to increase charges during plea bargaining was upheld in
Bordenkircher, and he cited Justice Brennan's opinion in Parker v.
North Carolina which distinguished the "give-and-take of plea
2 29
bargaining" from other aspects of the prosecutorial process.
Justice Stevens then pointed out that Bordenkircher was bottomed upon the Court's acceptance of "plea-bargaining as a legitimate process." 2 30 He also noted that Bordenkircher was limited to
"the course of conduct engaged in by the prosecutor... which no
more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of foregoing trial or facing charges on which he was
plainly subject to prosecution. ' 2 31 Justice Stevens then directed his
attention to the application of this doctrine to the facts in
2 32
Goodwin.
According to Justice Stevens, Goodwin, like Bordenkircher, arose
from the pretrial decision to increase charges but, unlike
Bordenkircher, the prosecutor in Goodwin did not admit to a punitive
motive.2 3 3 In spite of his previous treatment of Bordenkircher,Justice
Stevens failed to make clear that it was the plea bargaining process
in Bordenkircher that distinguished it from earlier cases and caused
the Court to accept the admittedly coercive purpose and the punitive result. He asserted that the conviction in Goodwin may be re2 34
versed "only if a presumption of vindictiveness ... is warranted."
Justice Stevens made the point that caution should guide the
examination of pre-trial vindictiveness. 2 35 He listed several reasons
for this restraint, including the possibility of the discovery of additional evidence before trial and the realization of the significance of
evidence in the state's possession. These consideration are not present in a trial or post-trial posture.2 3 6 He concluded that evidence
during or after trial is "more likely" to have been "discovered and
assessed", and therefore, post-trial changes in the charging decision
2 37
are "more likely to be improperly motivated.
228
229
230
231
232
233
234

Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 377.
Id. at 377-78 (citing Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970)).
Id. at 378.
Id. (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978)).
Id. at 380-85.

235

Id.
Id.

Id. at 380-81.

Id. at 381 (emphasis added). The source of this test was not explained by Justice
Stevens but it was apparently a reference to the "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness"
concept introduced in Colten, Chaffin and Blackledge.
236
237

Id.
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Further, he pointed out that defendants, and presumably their
counsel, are expected to raise procedural challenges before trial.2 38
Thus, he concluded, "[I]t is unrealistic to assume that a prosecutor's
probable response to such motions is to seek to penalize and to deter." 23 9 He did not discuss whether such a response is possible,
whether that possibility might deter the exercise of a defendant's
rights, or why a prosecutor would not seek to punish the exercise of
procedural rights, which, though expected, make the prosecution
more difficult and time consuming.
Justice Stevens then turned to an examination of the facts in
Goodwin. He concluded that the timing of the prosecutorial acts suggested that requiring the government to demonstrate that the basis
for the increased charges existed before the jury trial demand is not
warranted because initial charges may not reflect the ultimate extent
of liability. 240 In addition, he concluded that the nature of the right
asserted in this case, trial by jury, did not warrant an examination of
government motives. 241 Justice Stevens pointed out that
Bordenkircherdid not require the government to justify its actions in
carrying out a threat made in plea bargaining to penalize the defendant's request for any type of trial. 242 He next focused on the
distinction between the burdens of a bench trial and a jury trial and
concluded that the added burdens imposed by ajury trial are not so
great so as to require the government to justify its actions when increased charges follow a request for a jury. 2 43 Although Justice Stevens recognized that ajury trial is "more burdensome than a bench
trial,"'2 4 4 he concluded that the burdens are "less significant" than
those imposed either by a general refusal to plead guilty, as in
Bordenkircher,or a trial of any sort as in Blackledge.24 5 He reached this
conclusion without citing doctrinal or empirical support.
Justice Stevens stated that, unlike the judge in Pearce or the
prosecutor in Blackledge, a prosecutor has no "stake" in conducting a
bench trial as opposed to a jury trial and is not being asked to do
again that which he thought he had done correctly. 2 46 Perhaps most
importantly for Justice Stevens, "the institutional bias against the
238 Id.
239 Id. (emphasis added).
240 Id.

at 381-82.

241 Id. at 382.
242 Id.

at 382-83.

243 Id. at 383. The nature of the right asserted by the defendant, the right to a jury
trial, "confirms" that the showing of "objective criteria" required by the Fourth Circuit
was unwarranted. Id.
244 Id.
245

Id.

246 Id.
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retrial of a decided question that supported... Pearce and Blackledge
24 7
simply has no counterpart in this case."
According to the majority opinion, the opportunity for vindictiveness may exist prior to trial, but it is so unrealisticto assume that
vindictive motives may influence a prosecutor's actions that even a
248
rebuttable "presumption of vindictiveness" is not warranted.
The opinion, however, specifically leaves open the opportunity for
2 49
the defendant to prove that vindictiveness actually played a role.
Having disposed of the requirement that the government comply
with the prophylactic rule, the majority opinion also stated in dicta
that an actual vindictiveness violation did not exist in this case and
that the judgment of the circuit court of appeals should be re25 1
versed. 2 50 The case was remanded for further proceedings.
ii. The Concurrence
Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in the result in
Goodwin but criticizing the reasoning of the majority. 25 2 Justice
Blackmun pointed to several major analytical flaws. First, the prosecutor who increased the charges was aware of the original charges
and had at least some interest in dissuading the defendant from exercising the right to a jury trial in the district court. 253 Second, the
pre-trial/post-trial distinction made by the majority was not derived
from previous cases, and Bordenkircherspecifically rejected the unilateral imposition of an increased penalty which took place in Goodwin.2 54 He also took issue with concerns that proper pre-trial
charging decisions would be fettered under the Pearce/Blackledge
rule, because increased charges brought for legitimate reasons
would remain unaffected. 2 55 Accordingly, Justice Blackmun concluded that a "realistic likelihood" of vindictiveness was present in
Goodwin, but that the reasons given for the increased charges satisfied the "objective" justification test required by Blackledge v. Perry
25 6
and North Carolinav. Pearce.
Id.
Id. at 384.
249 Id. The actual vindictiveness issue was never raised in Goodwin. See supra text accompanying notes 232-39.
250 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384.
247
248

251

Id. at 384-85.

252

Id. at 385.

253

Id.

254

Id.
Id. at 386.
Id.
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The Dissent

Justice Brennan filed a rather lengthy dissent, in which Justice
Marshall joined. The dissent maintained that the doctrine enunciated in Blackledge v. Perry required affirmance of the Court of Appeals in Goodwin and that the attempt of the majority to distinguish
the cases was misplaced. 257 According to Justice Brennan, the increase in potential maximum penalties from fines of $3,500 and
twenty-eight months in prison to fines of $11,500 and fifteen years
in prison following Goodwin's request for a jury trial raised a realistic apprehension of vindictiveness. 2 58 Further, he took issue with
the majority's reference to a "presumption" as an attempt to "denigrate" the defendant's claim by making it appear "unreal or technical." 2 59 Justice Brennan proposed an analysis drawn from Blackledge
and Pearce: first, does the increase in charges pose a realistic likelihood of the existence of a vindictive motive?; 2 60 and second, is it
possible that "the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally
deter" the exercise of a legal right? 2 6 ' In Goodwin, Justice Brennan
26 2
would answer both inquiries in the affirmative.
In response to the assertion of the majority that the distinction
between a bench trial before a magistrate and a jury trial in district
court is too insignificant for a prosecutor to have a "stake" in the
defendant's demand for ajury trial, 26 3 Justice Brennan stated that it
is "inconceivable that a criminal defendant's election to be tried by
jury would be a matter of indifference to [a] prosecutor, [because]
2 64
jury trials entail far more prosecutorial work than a bench trial."
He listed juror challenges, voir dire procedures, hearings on motions
to supress, increased witness preparation, preparation of jury instructions, care to avoid mistrials or reversible error, and the possibility of an "irrational" unreviewable acquittal as some of the
"troublesome" features of jury trials which may cause prosecutors
to prefer bench trials. 2 65 As applied to the Goodwin case, Justice
Brennan pointed out that, in addition to the burden generally imposed on the prosecution by the defendant's election of a jury trial,
the government:
(a) was compelled to transfer the case from the magistrate in Hyatts257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id.

at 386-92.
at 387-88.
at 389.
at
at
at
at

389-90 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969)).

390.
383.
390.
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ville, Maryland to the district court in Baltimore, (b) was forced to assign a second prosecutor to the case, (c) lost the value of the
preparation of the first
prosecutor, and (d) incurred administrative in2 66
conveniences as well.

Justice Brennan then paraphased Blackledge v. Perry: "[I]f the prosecutor has the means readily at hand to discourage such [elections]
by 'upping the ante' through a felony indictment ... the State can
insure that only the most hardy defendants will brave the hazards of
'2 67
a jury] trial."
Finally, the dissent differed with the majority's reliance on an
analogy to Bordenkircherv. Hayes.2 68 ForJustice Brennan the analogy
was inappropriate for two major reasons. First, Bordenkircher expressly dealt only with plea-bargaining and specifically with a situation in which a defendant had been presented with the
alternatives. 269 Second, Bordenkircherby its own terms distinguished
the plea-bargaining situation from cases such as Blackledge or Pearce,
which involved "the unilateral imposition of a penalty upon a defendant who had chosen to exercise a legal right." 2 70 Justice Brennan concluded that there was no give-and-take in Goodwin and that
there was the unilateral "imposition of a penalty" in response to the
defendant's request for a jury trial 2 7 1 which had been condemned
by Bordenkircher.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING IN GOODWIN

The line of vindictiveness cases left intact the underlying principle of Pearce that the two-fold evils to be prevented were: (a) vindictive governmental acts and (b) the deterrence of free exercise of
rights resulting from a "realistic" fear of governmental retaliation. 272 It is worth mentioning that, even in Goodwin, the majority
was compelled to note that "punishment for the exercise of a right is
'a violation of due process of the most basic sort.' 27 3 It seems fair
to say, therefore, that whatever Goodwin's impact is on the appearance of vindictiveness doctrine, the constitutional prohibition
against actual retaliation, outside of plea bargaining, on the part of
266. Id.
267 Id. at 391.

It should be noted that this is the same reasoning used by the trial court
in Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27-28.
268 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 391.
269 Id. Justice Brennan also failed to differentiate clearly between the appearance of
vindictiveness doctrine of earlier cases and the actual vindictiveness at issue in
Bordenkircher.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 391-92.
272 See supra notes 16-58 and accompanying text.
273 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372.
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the prosecutor remains undiminished. 274 Thus, the following discussion will focus upon the second portion of the doctrine, the appearance of vindictiveness.
The opinion of Justice Stevens in Goodwin is based upon two
questionable analytical premises which are analyzed separately in
the following section. The first premise is that earlier opinions in
this area were based upon a previously unmentioned reverence for
stare decisis2 75 and an "institutional bias" against new trials, 2 76 rather
than the Court's announced purpose of prohibiting the use of gov27 7
ernmental power to punish or deter the exercise of legal rights.
The second premise is that prior to trial prosecutors have so little
"stake" in punishing or deterring the exercise of rights, particularly
a demand for a jury trial, that there is no reason to require the government to demonstrate legitimate reasons for filing increased
2 78
charges following such a demand.
A.

THE CREATION OF THE PRE-TRIAL/POST-TRIAL DISTINCTION

The first questionable premise is that previous cases were based
upon considerations of stare decisis and an "institutional bias" against
new trials, which provided the major justification for the Goodwin
pre-trial/post-trial distinction. Only after the Goodwin opinion created that distinction was it possible to avoid the application of the
Pearce/Blackledge doctrine and to uphold Goodwin's conviction on
the increased charges without overruling the entire prosecutorial
vindictiveness doctrine. In order to create this distinction where
none had existed previously, however, the majority was forced to
look beyond the language of the major cases decided prior to Goodwin. A review of the majority's reasoning in light of the cases previously discussed may help illustrate the analytical inconsistencies
upon which the Goodwin result is based.
After the Court established in Pearce the due process principle
prohibiting judicial vindictiveness or the appearance of vindictiveness, the Court clarified its scope in Colten and Chaffin.2 79 None of
the cases, however, differentiated between post-trial and pre-trial
actions in determining whether a "realistic possibility" of vindictive274 See infra text accompanying notes 427-74. The difficulty lower courts have had in
sorting out and applying vindictiveness analysis may even make this protection less than
certain. See infra text accompanying notes 441-45.
275 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 376.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 372.
278 Id. at 383.

279 See supra notes 14-126 and accompanying text.
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2 80
ness might exist to give substance to a defendant's apprehension.
There is no suggestion in any of these cases that they were limited
exclusively to deterring the "appearance of vindictiveness" only in
the post-trial setting.
The one prior "appearance of [prosecutorial] vindictiveness"
case also provides little apparent support for the pre-trial/post-trial
distinction created by the majority in Goodwin. Blackledge v. Perry did
28
not distinguish between pre-trial and post-trial decision making. '
Like Pearce, Blackledge v. Perry was clearly directed toward eliminating
the appearance of vindictive motivation on the part of the prosecution from situations in which fear of vindictiveness might deter the
exercise of rights by defendants. The assertion of the Court in Goodwin that Blackledge was limited to post-trial prosecutorial decisions
2 82
finds no support in the language of the Blackledge opinion.
As mentioned earlier, the teaching of Blackledge v. Perry had
found wide acceptance in the circuits. 2 83 Although the circuits applied various standards to determine the legitimacy of a prosecutor's reasons for increased charges, 284 most of the courts conceded
that Blackledge required that prosecutors adhere to a similar procedure as that imposed upon the judiciary in Pearce.2 85 Since no explicit pre-trial/post-trial distinction existed before the Supreme
Court decided Goodwin, it seemed self-evident that increased
charges brought after a request for a constitutionally enumerated
right, such as a jury trial, gave rise to the spectre of vindictive motivation and required the government to demonstrate a proper basis
2 6
for the increase.
The Spreme Court looked also to Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the actual vindictiveness case, to lend credence to the pre-trial/post-trial
distinction that it adopted in Goodwin.2 87 Because Bordenkircheris the
only case that involved a pre-trial factual setting, one might reasonably have expected a reference in that case to the pre-trial/post-trial
280 See id.
281 See supra notes 127-57 and accompanying text.
282 Id.

283 See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
284 See, e.g., United States v. Ruesqa-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1976) (defendant entitled to exercise right to be tried by district judge without fear or apprehension of
prosecutorial vindictiveness by substituting a more serious charge for misdemeanor
charged in original complaint); United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(reindictment for first-degree murder after trial on charge of second-degree murder
ended in mistrial on motion of defendant held invalid absent any showing ofjustification
for increase in charge). See also supra note 182.
285 See, e.g., supra notes 183-86.
286 See, e.g., Goodwin, 637 F.2d 250.
287 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 377.
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dichotomy set forth in Goodwin. Such a doctrine, however, did not
288
appear in Bordenkircher.
Thus, none of the previous cases mention a pre-trial/post-trial
distinction that the Goodwin court found in those cases. 28 9 They also
make no mention of stare decisis, res judicata or double jeopardy as a
basis for their holdings.290 Nor do they lend direct support for the
Court's assertion in Goodwin that the heart of these cases is an "insti29
tutional bias" against retrials. '
The creation of the pre-trial/post-trial distinction arising from
an "institutional bias against retrials" first announced in Goodwin
was abetted by the Court's failure in earlier cases to clearly identify
the factors that led it to strike down increased penalties in Pearce and
Blackledge but not in Colten or Chaffin. Because the Court has not
clearly explained the unifying principles in these early vindictiveness
cases, a conceptual review of the development of the doctrine may
shed some light on the Goodwin reasoning.
Pearce clearly established that due process violations occurred
when the government actually punished defendants for exercising
rights that were legally protected. 29 2 Drawing from cases that held
that the unnecessary "chilling" of the exercise of rights also constitutes a due process violation, 2 93 Pearce also extended due process to
protect against the fear ofjudicial retaliation on retrial and required
a "prophylactic rule" as a cure. 29 4 The rule imposed an obligation
upon judges to put on record "identifiable conduct on the part of
the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing" as
29 5
reasons for increased sentences on retrial.
In Colten and Chaffin, the Supreme Court began to clarify the
limitations in the due process analysis. 29 6 These limitations focused
29 7
upon the reasonableness of the defendant's fear of retaliation.
Without disturbing Pearce, the Court found that increased sentences
were permissible in retrials before new judges in a trial de novo setting 298 and before juries who were unaware of the original
29 9
sentence.
158-86 and accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 14-186 and accompanying text.

288 See supra notes
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Pearce, 395

U.S. at 725. See supra notes 14-58 and accompanying text.

293 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.
294
295
296
297
298
299

Id.

Id. at 726.

See supra text accompanying notes 59-126.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Blackledge v. Perry established that an increase in charges in a
trial de novo setting, very similar to that in Colten, required a rule
analogous to that of Pearce.30 0 Thus, increased charges filed by a
prosecutor in a trial de novo were found to create a realistic apprehension of vindictiveness, 30 1 while an increased sentence, levied by
a judge in the same sort of proceeding, did not.3 0 2 The touchstone
for sorting out these apparently contradictory results is the Court's
imposition of a reasonableness requirement as a limitation on the
defendant's fear of retaliation. 30 3 Thus, Colten made clear that an
abstract fear on the part of a defendant was insufficient to trigger
the Pearce protections3 0 4 and that different standards might be imposed upon different government agents in the same proceeding.
This analytical framework resulted in the Court finding that, for
judges, a trial de novo was sufficiently different from a retrial after
appeal to obviate the application of the "prophylactic rule." 30 5 The
heart of the Colten analysis was that increased penalties in trials de
novo carry with them a minimal likelihood of actual vindictiveness on
the part of judges because:
1. The increase, if any, would be imposed by a different judge
than that who heard the original trial3 0 6 and,
2. The trial de novo proceeding would not directly burden the
judge responsible for the increased penalty, thus greatly reducing
any underlying motivation to punish the defendant for demanding
30 7
the trial de novo.
As applied to jury resentencing, 30 8 the Court in Chaffin developed more fully the reasoning that rejected increased penalties in
Blackledge and Pearce, but upheld increased penalties in Chaffin and
Colten.30 9 According to the Court, the choice of rights in Chaffin was
distinguishable from Pearce. Not only was the jury in Chaffin a sepa3 10
rate entity that had not been burdened by the second proceeding,
but any increase in penalty depended upon several factors beyond
the control of the government or the jury.3 1 ' Thus, a realistic ap300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307

Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27.

Id. at 28.
Coten, 407 U.S. at 115.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 116.
Id.

Id. at 117.

Id. at 117. It is also significant that in Colten the defendant had a right to ajury trial
in both proceedings. Thus, a chilling of that right was not implicated.
308 Chaffin, 412 U.S. 17.
309 See supra text accompanying notes 59-126.
310 Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 26.
311 See supra text accompanying notes 59-126.
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prehension of vindictiveness could only arise when:
(a) a motivation to punish on the part of a government agent
was accompanied by
(b) the power to exercise discretion in penalizing a
3 12
defendant
(c) without intervening factors that would attenuate the impact
3 13
of any exercise of that discretion.
Applying this three part analysis to determine the reasonableness of a defendant's fear of retaliation at the time a right is exercised helps to clarify the rationale underlying the vindictiveness
cases. The defendant's fear of retaliation in Chaffin was not based
upon the three factors that would make it "realistic" because: (a) a
second jury would not be forced to accept additional burdens because of the appeal and would have little motivation to retaliate, (b)
the power to increase a penalty exists but (c) it is attenuated by intervening independent occurrences before the exercise of that
power is possible. In Pearce, Colten and Blackledge, however, the
power to punish was not diminished by any attenuating factors.
Thus, any distinction between those cases must reside in the first
factor, the motivations of the governmental agent in each of the
cases. The question becomes, whether the "bias against retrials"
rationale from Goodwin can explain the outcome of these cases?
While a generalized "bias against retrials" and resistance to
"doing again what has been done before" may explain the distinctions between the role of the judge following an appeal in Pearce and
the judge in the trial de novo proceeding in Colten, it is apparent that
this rationale cannot explain the contrasting results in Colten and
Blackledge. Both Colten and Blackledge involve a trial de novo procedure, but one involves application of the doctrine to judges and the
other to prosecutors in the same setting, and the cases reach different conclusions. 3 14 It is logically insufficient, therefore, to suggest,
as does the Court in Goodwin, that a "bias against retrials" lies at the
heart of the vindictiveness doctrine in prior cases. Were one to apply the "bias against retrials" reasoning to both Colten and Blackledge,
the unavoidable conclusion is that the outcome in Blackledge would
have been different had a second prosecutor "upped the ante."
Since, like the judge in Colten, the second prosecutor would not have
been "doing again what had been done before," the prophylactic
312
313
314

See supra text accompanying notes 59-75.
See supra text accompanying notes 77-126.
See supra text accompanying notes 59-75 and 127-57.
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rule would not have come into play. Such a reading of Blackledge
would make its holding virtually meaningless and almost irrational.
The "bias against retrials" rationale also is insufficient to explain the similarity in the outcome of Pearce and Blackledge. If "bias
against retrials" were the organizing principle, the distinctions between an appeal and a trial de novo, which figured so prominently in
distinguishing Pearce from Colten,31 5 should also apply to a prosecutor in a trial de novo, as in Blackledge. Thus, the "bias against retrials"
analysis would seem to counsel that Blackledge was improperly decided because, like Colten, the trial de novo is a new determination of
guilt or innocence and, particularly after an initial plea, the prosecutor would not be required to "do again what had previously been
done."
Contrasting results in Colten and Blackledge and the similarity in
outcome in Pearce and Blackledge indicate that the "bias against retrials" could not logically have been the source for the distinctions
between those cases. Rather, these cases contain a different standard for the application of the prophylactic rule to judges as compared to prosecutors. 31 6 While a "bias against retrials" fails to
explain the Court's treatment of these cases, a distinction based
upon a functional analysis of the actors is consistent with the previous cases.
If one views Pearce and Colten as involving the application of the
prophylactic rule to a judicial official who is presumably indifferent to
the outcome of cases, application of a prophylactic rule only in circumstances like Pearce,31 7 in which additional burdens that may be
viewed as an affront to the original judgment or propriety of an earier decision, seems entirely justifiable. The additional burden of
retrial and an institutional or personal bias against retrials, however,
do not explain the application of the doctrine to the prosecutor in
Blackledge, since that case did not involve any appeal or retrial or
challenge to an earlier decision.
This suggests that Blackledge endorsed an application of the prophylactic rule because prosecutors have an incentive to retaliate that
exceeds, or at least differs from, that ofjudicial officials. Blackledge is
apparently grounded in the simple recognition that prosecutors, unlike judges, are presumed to be adversaries and, as such, have an
315 See supra text accompanying notes 14-75.

316 This analysis is buttressed by the language of Blackledge v. Peny, which requires a
prophylactic rule for prosecutors "analogous" to that required for judges in Pearce. See
supra text accompanying footnote 145.
317 Pearce, 395 U.S. 711.
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increased incentive to act in a vindictive fashion by virtue of their
function in the system.
In addition to the "bias against retrials" reasoning, the Goodwin
majority relies heavily upon Bordenkircherv. Hayes to support the pretrial/post-trial distinction. 318 The Court's reliance on this case is
misplaced for two major reasons. First, Bordenkircher, both on its
face and as interpreted by commentators and the circuits, was limited exclusively to plea bargaining, and a "bias against retrials"
could not be relevant because a trial never occurred. But, perhaps
more importantly from a doctrinal viewpoint, Bordenkircher v. Hayes
was not an "appearance of vindictiveness" case at all.
The question in Bordenkircher, unlike the question in the "appearance of vindictiveness cases," was not whether a "realistic apprehension of vindictiveness" arose from an increased penalty
following the exercise of a right. Rather, the question was whether
actual vindictiveness, retaliation for the exercise of the right to a
jury trial, was appropriate in plea bargaining. 319 Thus, by relying
upon Bordenkircher,Goodwin relied upon a case that set out principles
which defined the scope of permissible actual retaliation. The Court
in Goodwin applied this actual vindictiveness case to a factual setting
in which actual retaliation is admittedly impermissible and the "appearance of vindictiveness" the only issue. The result is an analytical merging to two doctrines that address completely different evils:
(1) actual vindictiveness on the part of a prosecutor and (2) the deterrent effect upon the exercise of constitutional rights caused by a
defendant's reasonable fear of vindictiveness, whether actual vindictiveness is present or not.
The irony of using Bordenkircher to support the Court's rejection of Pearce/Blackledgedue process analysis in a pre-trial setting is
that even a cursory reading of Bordenkirchermakes clear that Justice
Stewart's slim five-to-four majority opinion in that case was expressly
limited to plea bargainingsituations and did not apply to all pre-trial
See supra text accompanying notes 228-34.
See supra text accompanying notes 158-86. While one might question whether
such coercion is appropriate even in plea bargaining, a critique of the plea bargaining
process is beyond the scope of this article. It is worth noting, however, that the acceptance of plea bargaining in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), substantially
undercut the concept from United States v.Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), that placing a
burden upon the exercise of rights was improper. Similarly, the acceptance of coercion
as appropriate in plea bargaining in Bordenkircher,434 U.S. 357, has made punitive measures beyond the plea bargaining setting more difficult to detect and prevent. One might
well question whether the benefits of the plea bargaining system, as presently defined,
are worth the costs created by the analytical inconsistencies and contradictions with the
free exercise of rights which seem an inevitable consequence of the practice as it presently operates.
318
319
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situations.3 20 Further, it should be noted that the dissent in that
case would have imposed the Pearce/Blackledgerule even in plea bargaining.3 2 1 Rather than providing precedent for a broad pretrial/post-trial distinction in the "appearance of vindictiveness"
doctrine, Bordenkircher was an "actual vindictiveness" case based
solely upon a specific, narrow exception to the Pearce/Blackledgedoctrine that the Court deemed necessary because of its earlier acceptance of plea bargaining.3 22 The reasoning in Bordenkircher was
grounded entirely upon support for the plea bargaining process and
32 3
was specifically limited only to that situation.
The Court in Bordenkircher actually anticipated, and criticized,
precisely the situation that arose in Goodwin. The Court was clear in
rejecting "the State's unilateral imposition of a penalty in response
to the exercise of a legal right to attack his original conviction"-a
situation very different from the give-and-take negotiation common
in plea bargaining between the prosecution and defense.3 24 The
conclusion that Bordenkircher allowed an exception to the
Pearce/Blackledge rule only for plea bargaining, and only when a defendant is clearly informed as to the alternatives legitimately
presented by the state, is unavoidable. The notion that Bordenkircher
sanctioned the lessening of the vindictiveness standard for all
prosecutorial acts prior to trial, outside the plea bargaining context,
is not supported by any language in Bordenkircher.
The Supreme Court's reliance upon Bordenkircher, an "actual
vindictiveness" case, rather than Blackledge v. Pery,325 a doctrinally
similar "appearance of vindictiveness" case, is all the more curious
in light of the jury trial issues raised by the trial court in
Blackledge.326 The trial court opinion noted that the North Carolina
trial de novo system, unlike the Kentucky system in Colten, did not
provide for jury trials at the initial trial stage. 32 7 Thus, like Goodwin,
the defendant in Blackledge v. Perry could only have received a jury
trial in the second proceeding. The trial court reasoned:
Where a jury trial is only allowed in the Superior Court, it is apparent
that a defendant's right to ajury trial is chilled by permitting a trial on
a felony charge in the Superior Court, after a trial in a misdemeanor
320 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 365.

See supra text accompanying notes 172-81.
For a discussion of the rationale for limiting prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining, see Schwartz, supra note 65, at 16-77.
323 See supra text accompanying notes 158-86.
324 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 362.
325 Blackledge, No. 2800 (E.D. N.C. filed Aug. 24, 1972) (Larkins J., opinion).
326 Id.
327 Id.
321
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court. It is one thing to say that the possibility of imposition of a harsher sentence would not chill a defendant's right to ajury trial, but it is
quite another to say that the possibility of being tried for a felony upon
appeal of a misdemeanor conviction would not have such an effect. 3 28
The trial court found that this distinction between the effect of
a greater sentence versus the effect of an increased charge made
Colten inapplicable. 3 29 Although the trial court incorrectly characterized the constitutional violation as double jeopardy, the underlying principles in Blackledge would seem to be virtually
indistinguishable from the those in Goodwin, that is, the increase in
liability from a misdemeanor to a felony following ajury demand. It
would appear, therefore, that the Blackledge opinion would govern
the factual circumstances that gave rise to Goodwin and would compel a similar outcome.
The foregoing analysis of the reasoning in Goodwin points out
that the pre-trial/post-trial distinction, used in Goodwin to limit the
application of the prophylactic rule, is neither logically consistent
with the outcome of previous cases nor analytically consistent with
the two-part vindictiveness doctrine. The method of analysis relied
upon by the Court has the unfortunate effect of merging the analysis
applied to "actual vindictiveness" in plea bargaining with the principles to be applied in an "appearance of vindictiveness" context.
The result is both additional confusion in the relationship between
"actual vindictiveness" and the "appearance of vindictiveness" and
an overall reduction in judicial scrutiny of pre-trial prosecutorial
acts.
B.

DIVINING THE PRE-TRIAL MOTIVATIONS OF PROSECUTORS

It seems fair to conclude that the cases cited by the Court in
Goodwin provide, at best, tangential support for the pre-trial/posttrial distinction. Even if one were to assume that such a distinction
was implicit in those cases, however, the second questionable premise comes into bold relief. After creating the pre-trial/post-trial distinction, Justice Stevens justified a lower level of judicial scrutiny in
the pre-trial stage by concluding that prosecutors have virtually no
institutional or personal "stake" in the outcome of pre-trial proceedings. 33 0 The Pearce/Blackledge rule is, therefore, "not warranted" prior to trial.3 3 '
As noted earlier, Justice Stevens begins his analysis in Goodwin
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 383.
331

Id.
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by pointing out that punishment for the exercise of a defendant's
rights, as opposed to punishment for a violation of law, has no place
in American jurisprudence. 3 3 2 He also quite correctly points out
that punishment is always a motivation in criminal prosecutions and
333
that subjective motives are exceedingly difficult to determine.
Prior to Goodwin, this reasoning was used to support the need
for a mechanism to remove the appearance of abuse, which did not
require a defendant to prove the prosecutor's subjective motivation. 33 4 This led the Court to conclude, in Pearce and Blackledge, that
it was necessary for the state to make a record of proper justifications for increased penalties to dispel the appearance of improper
' 33 6
motive.3 3 5 In phrasing the issue in terms of a "presumption,
however, the Goodwin majority introduced a new concept into vindictiveness analysis that created an analytical "straw-man." As mentioned in the dissent, the use of the "presumption" language had
the effect of making the application of the prophylactic rule seem
"unreal" or "technical", 3 3 7 but it also did something more.
First, it gives the Court a convenient way to mischaracterize the
previously enunciated doctrine. None of the cases prior to Goodwin
refer to the Pearce/Blackledge prophylactic rule as a "presumption." 33 8 Second, use of the word "presumption" blurred the actual
procedure that the Pearce/Blackledge doctrine required. Justice Stevens failed to make clear that, even before Goodwin, the prosecutor's
actions were presumptively valid. This presumption of validity
could only be brought into question if the defendant could prove a
sequence of events which resulted in exposure to an additional penalty following the exercise of a right. 3 39 Only after the defendant
met this burden would the prosecution be required to justify its actions. 34 0 Whether one considered the defendant's burden of alleging and proving such a sequence of events "raising a presumption,"
"an inference" or making "a prima facie showing," it was absolutely
clear that the government could completely rebut any implication of
improper motive at any time. 34 1 The Court in Goodwin failed to
make clear that the primary effect of the Pearce/Blackledgedoctrine,
332 See supra text accompanying notes 211-51.
333 Id.
334 See supra text accompanying notes 127-57.
335 See supra text accompanying notes 14-58 and 127-57.
336 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 369.
337 Id. at 389 (Brennan J., dissenting).
338 See supra text accompanying notes 14-186.
339 See supra text accompanying notes 126-57.
340 Perry, 417 U.S. at 28.
341 Id. at 27.
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whether characterized as a presumption or not, was merely to put
the burden of coming forward with evidence of proper motive on
the only party who was in a position to do so.
The Goodwin Court also failed to address the nature of the
showing that is required of a prosecutor to rebut an inference of
vindictiveness. Further, by accepting uncritically the standard for
rebuttal required by the Fourth Circuit, the majority unnecessarily
applied the Pearce standards for rebutting judicial vindictiveness in
sentencing to the actions of a prosecutor in filing additional charges.
The Court then concluded that the Pearce standards are too high for
a proper pre-trial balance when applied to prosecutors.3 42 Nothing
in Pearce or Blackledge, however, required the Goodwin Court to adhere to the same standard required of judges in resentencing following retrial set forth in Pearce.3 43 As pointed out by Justice
Blackmun in his concurrence in Goodwin, it was entirely possible to
apply another rebuttal standard to prosecutors under the existing
34 4
doctrine.
According to Justice Stevens, the likelihood of a prosecutor acting to punish a defendant for exercising the right to a jury trial, and
possibly any other pre-trial right, is so remote as to obviate the need
for even a rebuttable "presumption of vindictiveness." 3 45 In support of his view, Justice Stevens asserts that prosecutors have little,
if any, personal stake in the defendant's decision to elect a jury trial
3 46
in federal district court over a bench trial before a magistrate.
In the final analysis, the majority relies heavily on this assertion
to justify the conclusion that the Pearce/Blackledgescrutiny was "not
warranted" in Goodwin.34 7 Justice Stevens cites no authority to support his hypothesis that pre-trial prosecutorial vindictiveness is so
unlikely that creating a record to make judicial scrutiny possible is
not necessary.3 4 8 Rather than relying upon empirical data or case
law that would tend to bolster his assertion, he merely relates a se349
ries of personal observations to justify his conclusion.
According to the majority opinion, the "nature of the right asGoodwin, 457 U.S. at 372.
See supra text accompanying notes 315-18.
344 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 386. Whether one agrees withJustice Blackmun's conclusion
that the prosecution in Goodwin had met its burden, the possibility of applying a standard
other than the Pearce "objective evidence" standard certainly exists in the language of
Blackledge, requiring only an "analogous" doctrine for prosecutors. See supra text accompanying notes 315-22.
345 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 382-83.
346 Id. at 383.
347 Id. at 384. See also supra text accompanying notes 211-51.
348 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384.
342
343
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serted" may also be evaluated to determine whether its exercise is
likely to result in a vindictive response. 35 0 Although there is no justification in previous Supreme Court opinions for linking the nature
of the right asserted to the likelihood of improper governmental
motive in preventing its exercise,3 5 1 Justice Stevens concludes that
the assertion of the right to a jury trial, with its challenges to the
venire, impaneling of the jury, and potential for mistrial, did not
create the sort of impediments that would be likely to cause a prose352
cutor to punish a defendant.
Justice Stevens set forth five major assertions to support the
conclusion that prosecutors should not be required to explain their
reasons when charges are increased after a defendant has exercised
the right to a jury trial:
1) Prosecutors may uncover new evidence or re-evaluate old evidence prior to trial. Thus, a change
in the charging decision is more
a
likely to be vindictive after trial.3S
2) Prosecutors expect defendants to exercise pre-trial procedural
rights that will burden the prosecution.
Therefore, prosecutors are
3 54
unlikely to react in a punitive fashion.
3) Timing of the prosecutor's action is important because prosecutors should be able to exercise
broad discretion prior to trial and
3 55
increase charges if appropriate.
4) The institutional
bias against retrials does not exist in the pre3 56
trial setting.
5) The nature of the right asserted in this case, the right to a jury
trial, does not impose a burden or require the expenditure of resources great enough to give rise to the "personal stake"
or "self vin3 57
dication" that may lead to vindictiveness in retrials.
First, even if one were to agree that increased charges following
a trial are more likely to be influenced by vindictiveness than before
trial, this assertion alone does not completely negate the existence of
vindictiveness during pre-trial stages.3 5 8 For this very reason, actual
vindictiveness in pre-trial charging decisions may be more difficult
to recognize and prove. Second, the expectation that defendants
will exercise pre-trial procedural rights is no less a reason to require
prosecutors to justify actions giving rise to an appearance of vindic350 Id. at 382.
351 See supra text
352 Goodwin, 457
353

Id. at 381.

354

Id.

accompanying notes 14-186.
U.S. at 383.

Id. at 381-82.
Id. at 383.
357 Id. at 382-83.
358 See infra text accompanying note 535. Also, should new evidence be discovered,
the "objective" reason for the increase would be clear.
355
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tiveness. After all, the right of appeal is also commonly exercised.
A logical extension of this reasoning would make frequently exercised post-trial rights less subject to the "prophylactic rule" than
others. Third, the exercise of appropriate discretion is certainly an
important prosecutorial function. This discretion remains unaffected by the Pearce/Blackledgeprophylactic rule since all proper discretionary acts would be allowed under that test. Fourth, it is
correct that a bias against retrials does not arise from the facts in
Goodwin, but this "bias" was not part of the earlier vindictiveness
analysis, and, as the dissent noted, other biases against jury trials
and other pre-trial requests certainly do exist. Finally, the assertion
that the "nature" of the right asserted and the burden imposed
upon the prosecutor are not sufficient to require the application of
the prophylactic rule is, as the dissent pointed out, purely a value
judgment that is little supported by experience or logic.
It is important to note that none of these assertions was supported by empirical data or case law. Instead, they were used collectively to provide cumulative support for the conclusion that the
"possibility that a prosecutor would respond to a defendant's pretrial demand for a jury trial by bringing charges not in the public
interest that could be explained only as a penalty imposed on a defendant 359 is so unlikely that a presumption of vindictiveness cer3 60
tainly is not warranted."
Justice Stevens was correct in pointing out that previous cases
required that there must be more than an "opportunity for vindictiveness." There must be a "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness"
for the prophylactic rule to apply.3 6 ' He failed to describe, however, any guiding principles from previous cases to help determine
when such a "realistic likelihood" might be found to exist. As mentioned earlier, in previous cases, a "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness" arose when three factors were present:
1) a motivation to deter the exercise of a right arising from increased burdens imposed upon the judge or prosecutor,
2) discretionary power to increase penalties,
359 This phrasing of the question, whether vindictiveness was the only motivation for
increased charges, is a completely different inquiry than that addressed in the earlier
cases. Previously the issue was framed in terms of whether vindictiveness may have
played some role in the decision to increase charges. This phrase from Goodwin has the

effect of re-forming the entire doctrine in that it accepts vindictiveness as long as it is not
the sole motivation for the governmental actions. Of course, if this is truly to be the
standard, it is unlikely that the any prosecutorial acts will run afoul of the vindictiveness
doctrine.
360 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384 (emphasis added on "only").
361 See supra text accompanying notes 211-51.

1985] PROHIBITING PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS

387

3) a direct link between the exercise of discretion and a potential
is not attenuated by intervening
penalty suffered by a defendant that3 62
factors beyond government control.
There can be little dispute that the facts in Goodwin fit the second and third criteria found in earlier vindictiveness cases. Thus,
Justice Stevens' focus upon the motivations of the prosecutor in
Goodwin as being determinative is consistent with the analytical
methodology used in previous cases. 3 63 In this respect, Goodwin may
be most closely analogous to the earlier "judicial motivation" case,
Colten v. Kentucky. 36 In Colten, the Court found that judges in a trial
de novo procedure, like the prosecutor in Goodwin, were unlikely to
develop vindictive motivation;3 65 thus any "appearance of vindictiveness" would be abstract and would not require the Pearce pro3 66
phylactic remedies.
The factors cited by Justice White in Colten in examining judicial
motivation revolved around three general themes: first, judges in a
trial de novo were not directly burdened by the exercise of a defendant's rights prior to the trial de novo;3 6 7 second, unlike formal appeals there was no need to examine earlier decisions and, therefore,
no institutional need to vindicate an earlier judicial decision; 3 68 and
third, the sentencing entity was not the same in both proceedings
and the second judge may not even be aware of the first proceeding.3 6 9 Thus, the second judge would presumably feel less of a personal interest in the exercise of a defendant's rights even if some
3 70
need for vindication or burden were created in the trial de novo.
The most obvious distinction between Colten and Goodwin is
that, in relationship to the defendant, the function ofjudges differs
greatly from the function of prosecutors.3 7 ' Unlike the judicial
function, the very purpose of the prosecutorial function is punitive
in nature.3 7 2 The Goodwin opinion itself makes clear that prosecutors are expected and required to act with punitive intent.3 73 The
issue in the prosecutorial vindictiveness doctrine is differentiating
between punitive motives that are improper under the law and those
See supra text accompanying notes 305-14.
See supra text accompanying notes 300-14.
364 Colten, 407 U.S. 104.
365 See supra text accompanying notes 59-75.
362
363

366 Id.

367 Colten, 407 U.S. at 116-17.
368 Id. at 117-118.
369 Id. at 118.
370 Seeid. at 116-18.
371 See supra text accompanying notes 315-18.
372 Id.
373 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372-73.
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that are not.374 This fundamental difference in roles between
judges and prosecutors makes direct comparison with Colten difficult. However, an examination of the reasoning of Colten, while recognizing the differences in roles, is helpful in evaluating the Goodwin
rationale.
An obvious similarity between Colten and Goodwin is that the
judge in Colten was not the same judge who had imposed the original
sentence.3 7 5 The same is true of the prosecutors in Goodwin.
Although one may question whether the second judge would have
some "personal stake" in encouraging defendants to accept the decision of the judge in the initial proceeding, thereby giving deference to a colleague and keeping one's own docket clear, not even
the possibility of such a division of interests exists between the actors in Goodwin.37 6 Both prosecutors shared the same institutionally
required punitive purpose. The demand for a jury trial caused substantial expenditure of additional prosecutorial resources and required the same governmental entity, the prosecutors' office, to
prepare the case a second time. 3 77 In Goodwin, like Pearce and
Blackledge, the exercise of the right by the defendant created additional burdens on the very governmental agency with the power to
378
increase the penalty upon conviction.
The entire prosecutorial vindictivenss doctrine was premised
upon the recognition that vindictiveness must play no part in a system that imposes criminal sanctions if due process is to have any
meaning.3 79 Goodwin clearly expresses the same sentiment. The effect of a rule that upholds prosecutorial discretion unless retaliation
is the sole motivation, as suggested by language in Goodwin,38 0 however, is that punishment for exercise of rights inevitably will be a
permissible prosecutorial tactic. 3 8 1 Were this language of the Court
taken as the foundation for a recasting of the doctrine, one might
well ask whether any retaliatory prosecutorial acts would violate due
process.
Another disturbing by-product of the analysis employed by the
Court, which contrasted the right to a jury trial with that of appeal,3 8 2 is the denegration of the importance of the right to a trial by
374 Id. at 373.

375 Id. at 374 n.5.
376 Id. at 390 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
377 Id.
378 Id.
379 See supra text accompanying notes 354-57.
380 See supra text accompanying notes 59-75.
381 See infra text accompanying note 535.
382 See supra text accompanying notes 211-51.
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one's peers and the presumption of innocence. The Court's analysis balanced the importance of the right in question against the burdens imposed upon the state by its exercise. 388 The curious result
of this method of analysis is to put procedural rights on a "sliding
scale" that raises the right to appeal, a statutory right that applies
only after the presumption of innocence has been removed, above
constitutionally-mandated rights exercised by a defendant who is
presumed innocent prior to a conviction. This result is certainly
anomalous given the teaching of Chaffin, in which the Court, seeking
to justify the elimination of the Pearce rule from jury resentencing,
stated that there is "nothing in the right to appeal or the right to
attack collaterally a conviction.., which elevates those rights above
the rights to jury trial." 3 84 This was particularly so, according to the
majority in Chaffin, because unlike the right to ajury trial, any fear of
vindictiveness arising from increased penalty on appeal was remote
at the time a defendant exercises the right. 3 85 In addition, as noted,
the only other appearance of prosecutorial vindictiveness case decided by the Court, Blackledge v. Perry, was based upon a lower court
ruling concerned with impediments placed upon the right to a jury
trial.386 Thus, Chaffin and Blackledge both would seem to counsel an
outcome contrary to that reached by the Goodwin majority.
The outcome in Goodwin had the effect of creating another doctrinal anomaly. As was noted earlier, Pearce, the seminal appearance-of-vindictiveness case, relied directly upon United States v.
Jackson for the due process doctrine that addressed the "chilling effects" of governmental action upon the exercise of rights. 38 7 Jackson, which, like Goodwin, involved the pre-trial constitutional right to
ajury trial, provided the basis for the expansion of the "chilling effect" doctrine to encompass the exercise of both constitutional
rights and post-trial statutory rights. 3 88 It was the chilling of a pretrial right to request a jury trial in Jackson that gave rise to Pearce,
Blackledge and even Goodwin.3 89 In Goodwin, however, the Court
383 See supra text accompanying notes 240-43. This methodology, as noted in the
Fourth Circuit opinion, is not endorsed by previous Supreme Court cases, although it
has been employed by at least two circuits. See United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449,
453 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981); United States v. Thomas, 617 F.2d
436, 438 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that balancing test may be "substantially undermined" by Bordenkircher);Jacksonv. Walker, 585 F.2d 139, 145 (5th Cir. 1978); Hardwick
v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292, 301-02 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049 (1978).
384 Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 33. See also supra text accompanying notes 77-126.
385 Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 33.
386 See supra text accompanying notes 324-28.
387 See supra text accompanying notes 14-58.
388 Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 723 (1969).
389 Id.
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came full circle in its reasoning by creating a pre-trial/post-trial distinction, relying upon value judgments about the motivations of
prosecutors and weighing the relative importance of certain constitutional rights. The result of the Court's analysis in Goodwin was
that the constitutional right that spawned the entire "appearance of
vindictiveness" doctrine, the right to a jury trial, was found not deserving of the same procedural protection and was granted less protection than the statutory right of appeal, a right which only those
convicted of crimes may exercise.
IV.

PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS AFTER GOODWIN

Any analysis of the impact of Goodwin upon the due process
doctrine prohibiting prosecutorial vindictiveness requires establishing a clear analytical distinction between the two major branches of
the doctrine: the prohibition against actual vindictiveness3 9 0 and
the "chilling effect" upon the exercise of rights arising from an "apprehension of vindictiveness" on the part of a defendant. 391 With
regard to the first branch, actual vindictiveness, the cases have been
unanimous in their condemnation, outside the context of plea bargaining, of increasing penalties for the purpose of punishing a defendant for doing "what the law plainly allows." 3 92 Thus, even after
Goodwin, a due process violation "of the most basic sort" would arise
when a prosecutor actually "up[s] the ante" for the purpose of punishing a defendant for exercising either a pre-trial or post-trial
39 3
right.
A.

THE REBIRTH OF THE ACTUAL VINDICTIVENESS DOCTRINE

The apparent thrust of Goodwin recasts the second branch of the
doctrine, the branch that addresses the "chilling effect" created by
defendants' fear of retaliation in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.3 94 Prior to Goodwin, a combination of (a) the problem of proving a prosecutor's subjective state of mind, 39 5 (b) a concern for the
"unseemly task of examining motives" of a prosecutor in a particular case,3 9 6 and (c) a recognition that the "appearance of vindictiveness" undermines the integrity of the system by deterring the
exercise of rights by defendants and raising the spectre of arbitrary
390 See supra text accompanying notes
391 See supra text accompanying notes
392 See supra note 1.
393 See Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368.
394 See supra text accompanying notes
395 See supra text accompanying notes
396 Id.

14-58 and 211-51.
14-58 and 127-57.

211-51.
14-58 and 127-57.
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punishment,3 9 7 caused the Court to adopt a "prophylactic" rule.
Although Goodwin clearly is directed toward modifying the appearance-of-vindictiveness doctrine and the use of the prophylactic rule,
an effect of Goodwin will be an increased reliance upon the actual
vindictiveness branch of the doctrine.
The result of the application of the "prophylactic rule" prior to
Goodwin was that "actual vindictiveness" was more or less swallowed
by the "apprehension of vindictiveness" doctrine.3 98 Proof of actual
397 See supra text accompanying notes 14-58. The appearance of unfairness has been
recognized by the Supreme Court, scholarly commentators, and the ABA as having a
corrosive effect on public acceptance of a system of punishment. See Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Offutt v.
United States 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); Nesson, Rationality, Presumption andJudicial Cornment: A Response to ProfessorAllen, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1574 (1981). 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINALJUSTICE ch. 3, 3.9(b) (2d ed. 1980), provides that pr6secutors are "not obligated to present all charges which the evidence may support. The prosecutor may in
some circumstances and for good cause consistent with the public interest decline to

"
prosecute. ....
398 Following the imposition of the prophylactic rule in Pearce, Bordenkircher was the

only case in which any evidence of the actual motivations of the government agent were
presented to the Court. Bordenkircher,434 U.S. 357 (1978).
Prior to Goodwin, the only consideration of actual vindictiveness other than
Bordenkirchercame immediately on the heels of Pearcein Moon v. Maryland, 398 U.S. 319
(1970), a case largely ignored by commentators to date. The Court granted certiorari in
Moon on the same day it decided Pearce, and counsel were instructed to brief and argue
the question of the retroactivity of Pearce in addition to the other questions set forth in
the petition for the writ, which was filed, of course, before Pearce was decided. Pearce,
395 U.S. at 975.
Moon is puzzling in several respects. In a per curiam opinion representing the views
of four members of the court, following oral argument, the facts are stated as follows:
[P]etitioner was found guilty of armed robbery by a Maryland jury and sentenced by
the trial judge to 12 years' imprisonment. The conviction was set aside on appeal
by the Maryland Court of Appeals. At a second trialfor the same offense in 1966 the
petitioner was again convicted, and this time the trial judge imposed a sentence of
20 years' imprisonment .... (emphasis supplied)
398 U.S. at 320. The italicized portion is incorrect, as indicated in the opinion of the
Maryland Court of Appeals affirming the second conviction: "On retrial he was again
found guilty of armed robbery and also of larceny and assault with intent to murderfor
which he had not been tried thefirst time. Judge Pugh, of the Circuit Court for Montgomery
County, sentenced him to twenty years for armed robbery. With credit for the time he
had served, and suspended ten-year sentences on each of the other counts (sic)." Moon
v. State, 243 A.2d at 565 (emphasis supplied). Thus, Moon appears to be a case of
prosecutorial, in addition to judicial vindictiveness because two additional counts were
added to Moon's charges after reversal of his first conviction. Yet, the Supreme Court
took no note of this fact, perhaps because it was unaware of the true facts.
Equally curious is the disposition of Moon and the reason given. The Supreme
Court's opinion fails to note that the twenty year sentence Moon received the second
time around was the maximum for armed robbery. Moon v. State, 243 A.2d at 567. In
spite of this, or again perhaps because the court was not aware of it, the writ was dismissed as improvidently granted because:
[T]he dispositive development is that counsel for the petitioner has now made clear
that there is no claim in this case that the due process standard of Pearce was vio-

392

ERLINDER AND THOMAS

[Vol. 76

state of mind of the prosecutor at the time of an increase in penalties became largely irrelevant if the prosecutor was unable to advance legitimate reasons for the increase.3 9 9 Conversely,
establishing a legitimate basis for increased charges would, in the
absence of hard evidence to the contrary, put an end to the inquiry. 40 0 To the extent that courts required prosecutors to advance
objective reasons for the increase, the veracity of the prosecutor's
40 1
assertions of proper motive never even came into issue.
A good example of this phenomenon is Goodwin itself. When
the case reached the Supreme Court, no allegations of actual vindictiveness had ever been made, and no record had been made on
that issue. 40 2 The Fourth Circuit opinion found a due process violation in the "appearance of vindictiveness" while at the same time
observing in dicta that "[o]n this record we readily conclude that the
prosecutor did not act with actual vindictiveness." 40 3 Thus, the
Supreme Court was presented with a case in which the issue of the
actual intention of the prosecutor was entirely unexplored.
Although the prophylactic rule remains in effect after the creation of the pre-trial/post-trial distinction in Goodwin, it will apply
routinely only in settings following a determination of guilt or innolated. As counsel forthrightly stated in the course of oral argument, "I have never
contended that Judge Pugh was vindictive."
398 U.S. at 320.
Moon raises several significant points concerning actual vindictiveness. First, counsel's concession seems incredible in light of the undisputed facts of the case: it would
appear to be an excellent illustration of the fact that it is very difficult to recognize in
concrete terms when vindictiveness in fact exists. Second, in light of Pearce and the
prophylactic rule it fashioned, of what relevance is an assumed absence of actual vindictiveness? In spite of the languge to the contrary in Moon, Pearce clearly identified two
due process violations: the operation of actual vindictiveness and the deterrent or "chilling effect" upon the exercise of rights arising from an appearance of vindictiveness. As
to the latter, the presence or absence of actual vindictiveness is irrelevant because if the
appearance is present, the result will continue to be to deter or chill the exercise of
rights.
Moon indicates that the Supreme Court itself perhaps did not appreciate the full
significance of the distinction between the due process violations identified in Pearce.
The failure of the lower federal courts and commentators to date to appreciate the significance of Moon illustrates the prevalence of the confusion and failure to distinguish
between the presence of actual vindictiveness and the appearance of vindictiveness,
which triggers application of the prophylactic rule.
399 The Pearce/Blackledge prophylactic rule was designed to avoid this very issue. See
supra text accompanying notes 14-58 and 126-56.
400 Of course, it is possible for actual vindictiveness to exist, even though the "appearance of vindictiveness" has been rebutted.
401 By asserting objective factors that provide a proper basis for increased charges,
the prosecutor need not even testify. See Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368; Blackledge, 417 U.S. 21.
402 See supra text accompanying notes 211-51.
403 Goodwin, 637 F.2d at 252.
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cence. 40 4 After Goodwin, it is clear that the "apprehension of vindictiveness" doctrine will not apply in all settings prior to trial.40 5 It is
equally clear that the "actual vindictiveness" doctrine remains in full
force at all times. 40 6 What is exceedingly unclear, however, is how
either the "actual vindictiveness" or "appearance of vindictiveness"
doctrines are to be applied in practice.
If one takes Goodwin at its word, the use of discretionary
prosecutorial power to retaliate for the exercise of rights remains a
serious due process violation whenever it occurs. 40 7 Thus, the elimination of the Pearce/Blackledge prophylactic rule in some pre-trial
settings will necessarily require the development of the previously
unused "actual vindictiveness" branch of the prosecutorial vindic40 8
tiveness doctrine.
As described earlier, the actual vindictiveness doctrine probably
requires the defendant to carry the burden of proof regarding the
prosecutor's subjective motives. 40 9 Since the actual vindictiveness
doctrine has only been addressed in Bordenkircher, there is virtually
no guidance in previous cases for the procedures that will be required following the Court's narrowing of the operation of the
"prophylactic rule" in Goodwin.410 In the absence of guidance from
the Court, one can only speculate as to the approaches the Court
41
will take in implementing the "actual vindictiveness" doctrine. '
A successful motion grounded upon this "actual vindictiveness" branch of the doctrine would presumably require proof of
four necessary elements. First, a defendant must have properly exercised a right granted by statute or constitution. 412 Second, subsequent to the exercise of that right, the prosecutor must have
41 3
increased the potential penalty confronting the defendant.
Third, possibility of the increase must not have been made known to
the defendant during plea bargaining. 4 14 Fourth, the prosecutor
must have increased the penalty for the purpose of punishing the
See infra text accompanying notes 391-406.
Id.
See also supra discussion accompanying notes 211-51.
See Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372.
Some lower courts also have recognized that the actual vindictiveness doctrine
remains as a deterrent to misuse of prosecutorial authority. It is equally clear, however,
that the failure of the Supreme Court to carefully delineate the doctrine has left courts
unprepared to apply the doctrine in a coherent fashion. See infra text and notes 450-95.
409 See supra text accompanying note 395.
410 See supra text accompanying notes 158-86.
411 See infra text accompanying notes 439-83.
412 See Pearce, 395 U.S. 711.
413 See Blackledge, 417 U.S. 21.
414 See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357.
404
405
406
407
408
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exercise of the right. 41 5
Obviously, the first three elements require proof of objective
events that are highly amenable to proof by a defendant. The fourth
element, however, may present an enormous practical problem for a
defendant who is perfectly able to prove the other three. After all,
short of an admission of improper motive by the prosecutor, a defendant would be hard pressed to prove the state of mind of the
prosecutor. 4 16 Although Goodwin does not specifically address this
inherent difficulty in the actual vindictiveness doctrine, the case
makes absolutely clear that such a use of prosecutorial power remains an anathema.
In light of the obvious difficulty faced by defendants in proving
improper prosecutorial motives, the vitality of the actual vindictiveness doctrine will revolve around two major procedural issues that
the Supreme Court has not directly addressed in its vindictiveness
analyses. 41 7 First, what facts must be alleged by a defendant in an
"actual vindictiveness" motion to make out a prima facie case and
avoid a motion to dismiss? Second, what procedures will be available to permit defendants to prove the motivation of the prosecutor? If a defendant must now carry the already heavy burden of
proving an improper motivation on the part of the prosecutor, denying the procedural means to carry that burden will create an illusory doctrine, which pays lip service to "prohibiting" actual
vindictiveness but which, in reality, makes enforcement of that prohibition impossible.
For example, if the prima facie case required in a challenge to
vindictive prosecutorial acts is more than a recitation of the objective factual predicates mentioned earlier, together with a general assertion of improper motive, only a defendant who can allege the
existence of an admission in a "smoking gun" memo will be able to
survive a motion to dismiss. Under this construction, courts would
be prevented from reviewing any prosecutorial impropriety that was
not open and notorious. Thus, prosecutors would be quite free to
take actions that were vindictive in fact without the possibility ofjudicial oversight unless they openly admitted their improper
415 See Blackledge, 417 U.S. 2 1. The Pearce rationale was, of course, that (actual) vindictiveness must play no part in sentencing. See also Pearce, 395 U.S. at 724. The Goodwin
opinion, however, contains a hint that this is no longer the case. Justice Stevens seems
to indicate that only increases based solely on vindictiveness motive are impermissible.
Should this become the test, actual vindictiveness will virtually never prove the basis for
limiting discretion since some mixed motive can certainly be found in almost any case.
416 Goodwin hints that even the subjective state of mind of the prosecutor must be
proved by objective evidence. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 381 n.12, 384 n.19.
417 See infra text accompanying notes 439-49.
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41 8

motive.
Even if a defendant were able to survive a motion to dismiss, he
still has the problem of proving the allegations of improper punitive
actions by the prosecution. A defendant who can make out a colorable claim of actual vindictiveness must be permitted to examine the
prosecution's decision-making process in detail to have any realistic
opportunity of prevailing on a vindictiveness motion. It seems,
therefore, that courts must permit a rather thorough discovery process. 4 19 Such a process certainly would have to include the power to
subpoena both prosecutors and their files and could logically extend
to depositions of prosecutors and their staff as well as full evidentiary hearings regarding the justifications for increased penalties fol4 20
lowing the exercise of rights by defendants.
These procedures will be, of course, extremely burdensome to
the prosecution and time-consuming for the courts. It is difficult,
however, to imagine a meaningful doctrine preventing prosecutors
from actually punishing defendants for the exercise of rights without
similar procedures. Thus, one outcome of Goodwin is likely to be the
need to undertake the "unseemly task" of examining individual
motivations. Should the Court underwrite procedures that do not
provide for full discovery, actual vindictiveness will be implicitly ac4 21
cepted as a legitimate prosecutorial tool.
B.

DISPELLING THE "APPEARANCE OF VINDICTIVENESS"

AFTER

GOODWIN

The "appearance of vindictiveness" doctrine is also in a state of
some confusion after Goodwin but for very different reasons. 42 2 This
418 See infra text accompanying notes 450-95.

419 See infra text accompanying notes 476-82.
420 Id.

421 This possible acceptance of vindictive motivations is all the more troubling in light
of the Court's references to Bordenkircher-type situations as being non-vindictive. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380 n.12.
422 In a lengthy dissent from the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari in Longval
v. Meachum, 651 F.2d 818 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983),Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor provided some insights into the continuing controversy over the vindictiveness doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 442, 493. The circuit court had
held that due process was violated by a judge telling the defendant's lawyer that the
defendant should reconsider his plea of not guilty "because if the jury returns a verdict
of guilty, I might be disposed to impose a substantial prison sentence...." Longval, 651
F.2d at 819.
Following a remand for reconsideration in light of Goodwin, the First Circuit adhered to its original opinion that the judge's comments raised a "reasonable apprehension of vindictiveness" that required resentencing before another judge. Longval v.
Meachum, 693 F.2d 236 (lst Cir. 1982). Justice Rehnquist characterized the ruling as
establishing a per se rule that requires resentencing "whenever a judge makes any state-
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rule required the defendant to carry the burden of alleging and
4 23
proving the same three "objective" elements mentioned earlier.
Once these three elements were alleged and proved, however, the
prosecutor was required to come forward with proper reasons for
the increase. 4 24 Although some differences existed in the circuits
regarding the factors upon which increased penalties could bejustified, 4 25 this procedure largely accomplished the goal of allowing a
limited review of prosecutorial decision-making, without the "unseemly task" of examining subjective motivations of individual prosecutors in a contested evidentiary hearing preceded by full
discovery of the prosecutor's decision-making process.
Although one commentator read the pre-trial/post-trial distincment that is susceptible of appearing from the defendant's perspective to be an attempt
to coerce him to plead." Longval, 460 U.S. at 1099. This, of course, ignores the requirement in the doctrine that the defendant's apprehension of vindictiveness be "reasonable." See supra text and accompanying notes 59-126.
justice Rehnquist apparently felt that the judge's statement was not an implicit
threat, but rather was "simply to inform Longval of the facts of life in his courtroom."
Longval, 460 U.S. at 1099. In criticizing the First Circuit's treatment of vindictiveness,
Rehnquist refers to Goodwin as a case in which the presumption did not apply: "where a
prosecutor presses more serious charges in a plea bargaining situation." Id. at 1100. He
suggests that the Goodwin rationale should prohibit application of a "presumption" regarding judicial actions because of the "impartial position of a judge." Id.
The Rehnquist opinion is revealing in that it avoids any discussion of the "appearance of vindictiveness" rationale of Pearce and Blackledge. See supra text and accompanying notes 279-86. The opinion suggests that because "there is a fully credible
alternative explanation (other than vindictiveness) for the trial judge's behavior" a due
process violation does not lie. Longval, 460 U.S. at 1099. Implicit injustice Rehnquist's
analysis is an apparent rejection of two fundamental principles underlying the doctrine:
first, that vindictiveness must play no role in decision-making and, second, that the court
has no obligation to dispel any "reasonable apprehension" of vindictiveness. See supra
text and accompanying notes 49-58. The possible existence of a non-vindictive motive
simply does not address either problem. The exercise of rights may be chilled and actual vindictiveness may exist whenever the existence of a vindictive motive is not affirmatively eliminated. See supra text and accompanying notes 207, 390-403. This is all the
more important when the governmental officer charged with impartiality and vested
with the power to impose the increased penalty, and not merely request it, plays a role in
encouraging the relinquishing of trial rights. See supra text accompanying note 371.
Goodwin is a case which held that the Pearce-Blackledge presumption does not apply in
a plea bargaining situation. See supra text accompanying notes 158-86. The case which
held that prosecutors may threaten increased penalties in plea bargaining was
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357. See supra text accompanying notes 158-86. That case, of
course, was premised upon the "need for give and take" in plea bargaining negotiations,
a process in which, at least to this point, the judiciary has not been encouraged to engage. The Rehnquist opinion seems to endorse the concept ofjudges actively engaged
in the same process by which prosecutors are allowed to encourage defendants to give
up trial rights. This hardly seems consistent with maintaining the impartial position of
judges upon which justice Rehnquist relies to justify his conclusion.
423 See supra text accompanying notes 412-14.
424 See supra text accompanying notes 127-57.
425 See Schwartz, supra note 65.
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tion as limiting the application of the Pearce/Blackledgeprophylactic
rule exclusively to the post-trial setting, 42 6 this reading is not absolutely accurate. In Goodwin, Justice Stevens apparently leaves the
door open for the application of the Pearce/Blackledge rule in some
pre-trial settings. The opinion seems to confirm that the
Pearce/Blackledge rule is applicable to all cases following trial4 27 but
does not apply to all cases in the pre-trial stage. 42 8 By not clearly
stating that the Pearce/Blackledgerule is inapplicable in any pre-trial
setting, the Court implies that some pre-trial circumstances still exist in which the courts may find the prophylactic rule applicable.4 2 9
Thus, defendants will find it necessary to test the continuing validity
of the prophylactic rule in the exercise of rights both pre-trial and
post-trial.
Another source of confusion stems from the lack of clarity regarding the issue of whether all post-trial increases in penalties will
raise a "realistic likelihood" of vindictiveness or whether some may
be subject to the same sort of "balancing of interests" analysis applied in Goodwin.430 In addition, the nature of the showing required
by the prosecution to overcome the "appearance of vindictiveness"
remains the subject of great confusion. 43 ' The Court has not addressed the content of the "objective criteria" needed to rebut the
presumption of vindictiveness. Thus, it is not clear whether the
Fourth Circuit criteria from Goodwin or other more subjective bases
for prosecutorial decision-making, such as those approved by Justice
Blackmun in his Goodwin dissent, will be sufficient to dispel the appearance of vindictiveness in the pre-trial context. 43 2 Since Goodwin
concluded that a realistic apprehension of vindictiveness did not
arise in that case, the sufficiency of the prosecution's attempts to
comply with the prophylactic rule was never discussed by the majority. As a result, the substance of the prophylactic rule as applied to
prosecutors remains an open question. When viewed in conjunction with earlier cases, however, Goodwin may provide a foundation
for more clearly articulated standards for evaluating prosecutorial
decisionmaking under the prophylactic rule.
From Pearce it is clear that increased sentences on retrial following appeal require judges to make a record of objective data regard426 See Prosecutorial Vindictiveness in the CriminalAppellate Process, supra note 4.

Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 381.
428 See id. at 380-81.
429 See United States v. Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Il1. 1983); see also infra text
accompanying notes 450-95.
430 See supra text accompanying notes 358-62.
431 See infra text accompanying notes 441-45.
432 See infra discussion accompanying notes 450-83.
427
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ing a defendant's conduct occurring after the original sentencing.
Blackledge also makes clear that an "analogous" rule applies to prosecutors. The Court, however, has not disclosed the precise nature
of that analogous rule. The following is a proposal for a prophylactic rule that builds upon Goodwin and that takes into consideration
existing case law and the concern for appropriate prosecutorial discretion expressed in Goodwin.
Given the teaching of Colten and Peny, the actions of prosecutors and judges taken in the same functional setting may be evaluated by different standards. Moreover, Goodwin establishes that
varying standards can be applied to prosecutors before and after
trial. Thus, the theoretical foundation exists for creating a flexible
prophylactic rule that addresses many of the concerns for
prosecutorial discretion expressed in Goodwin. Rather than eliminating meaningful judicial oversite from any stage of a criminal proceeding, a flexible standard for rebutting a realistic appearance of
vindictiveness would allow an appropriate level of discretion for
prosecutors, while allowing courts to protect the exercise of rights
by defendants at all stages of litigation.
1.

The Post-TrialSetting

The showing required of prosecutors in the post-trial context,
as Goodwin concedes, should be closely analogous to that set forth in
Pearce. Once a trial has been completed, the reasons for a valid exercise of discretion that would justify an increased penalty, whether an
increased sentence or increased charges, are relatively few. In the
case of sentencing, Pearce makes clear that only conduct by the defendant subsequent to the original sentence or changes in other objective circumstances provide a valid basis for an increased
sentence. The effect of this standard is to "freeze" the judge's original decision irrespective of mistake, reconsideration, or even new
evidence regarding the originaloffense. 4 33 Implicit in this standard is
the notion that, by the time the first trial has been completed, the
prosecution has had an adequate opportunity to investigate and
present all relevant facts regarding the case. Further, it assumes
that the court has had an opportunity to make appropriate decisions
regarding those facts, whether that is actually the case or not. Pearce,
therefore, incorporates the concept that reasonable limits may be
placed upon the introduction of new evidence that may alter the
43 4
original exercise of discretion.
433 United States v. Carrasquillo, 732 F.2d 1160 (3d Cir. 1984).
434 In Wasman, 700 F.2d 666 (1 1th Cir. 1983) aff'd, 468 U.S. 559 (1984), the Eleventh

Circuit upheld an increased sentence following retrial based upon convictions for other
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Since prosecutorial vindictiveness is ordinarily reflected by the
addition of charges, rather than an increase in the sentence a defendant actually receives, 4 35 the Pearce standard obviously cannot
apply directly to prosecutors because a defendant's conduct following the original trial could have no relevance to a charging decision
involving the original offense. New evidence regarding the original
offense itself, however, presents a more complicated problem.
As applied to prosecutors in the post-trial context, Pearce would
indicate that changes in the factual basis for the original charge occurring after the original trial, such as the death of a previously injured victim, would provide a valid basis for increased charges.
Such a standard would be closely analogous to Pearce and has already been mentioned by the Court in Blackledge as a proper basis
for increased charges in a second trial. Use of undiscovered or
unappreciated facts to increase charges, however, would introduce
the same opportunities for vindictiveness in the post-trial context
that the Pearce standard prohibited. Thus, at least in the post-trial
context, a rule for prosecutors at least as strict as Pearce would seem
appropriate, and only a change in facts which occurred after the original trial should provide a basis for increased charges on retrial.
2.

The Pre-Trial Setting

Assuming that Goodwin is correct in observing that prior to trial
prosecutors must be accorded greater latitude to increase charges, a
different standard should be applied in this context. First, it is axiomatic that purely subjective reasons for increased charges either
before or after trial, i.e., change in policy, mistake, inadvertance,
and new insights can never achieve the goal of removing the appearance of vindictiveness. 43 6 Although in some cases there may be
some dispute as to what constitutes "objective" evidence, it seems
crimes which occurred after the original sentencing. The defendant argued that the
convictions were not "identifiable conduct" following the original sentence as required
to justify an increased penalty in Pearce.
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that Pearcewas designed to prevent the "appearance
of vindictiveness" and that it did not prevent the use of "what had been considered a
legal nullity for sentencing purposes, i.e. a mere accusation, a fact fully relevant to sentencing, i.e. that defendant had committed an additional crime." Id at 668.
The Eleventh Circuit opinion differs from at least two other circuits. See United
States v. Markus, 603 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1979), and United States v. Williams, 651 F.2d
644 (9th Cir. 1981), regarding the use of intervening convictions.
435 Although most of the prosecutorial vindictiveness cases involve increased
sentences, the discussion of the conduct of the prosecution in resentencing in Chaffin,
412 U.S. 17, indicates that the vindictiveness analysis may also apply to an argument for
an increased penalty following retrial. See supra text accompanying notes 100-03.
436 See Schwartz, supra note 65.
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clear that such evidence must be both relevant to the originaloffense
and based upon events beyond the control of the prosecutor. The
more difficult problem concerns (a) whether the objective evidence
must have arisen after the original charging decision or after the
exercise of the right, and (b) by when must the prosecutor learn of
its existence.
If a major objective of the doctrine is to limit the appearance of
vindictiveness, allowing the use of evidence that existed prior to the
exercise of the right, but which had not been used to increase
charges before the right was exercised, will inevitably lead to suspicion that any justification for an increased charge based upon previously existing evidence is pretextual. Conversely, it is quite
plausible that not all relevant facts may be known to a prosecutor
prior to a defendant's exercise of rights. Thus, it seems that the
standard must incorporate the ability to increase charges based
upon evidence that is known to the prosecutor both before and after
the exercise of rights. The standard, however, must not allow a
prosecutor to merely claim ignorance of the evidence as a proper
basis for increased charges. Any vindictive taint hardly could be dispelled by allowing a prosecutor simply to plead failure to prepare a
case properly as a valid justification for a later increase in charges.
Given all these considerations, it seems that the pre-trial standard must require objective evidence and rest upon an objective assessment of reasonableness. If the prosecutor could show through
objective evidence that (a) the factual basis for the increase in
charges did not exist prior to the exercise of rights, or (b) if it existed prior to the exercise of rights, it could not have reasonably
been known through the exercise of due diligence by the prosecutor, an increase in charges would be justified. Such a reasonableness requirement could also be applied to the significance of
evidence existing prior to the exercise of rights. If the evidence is
such that a competent prosecutor could not have reasonably understood its significance, it seems that the appearance of vindictiveness
could be removed by making a record on that issue that the court
could evaluate.
As discussed earlier, the all-or-nothing approach used by the
Court in Goodwin results in elimination ofjudicial scrutiny of important discretionary functions that the court is well equipped to evaluate.43 7 The standards for rebuttal suggested here meet the most
437 In Goodwin, the prosecutor's affidavit stated:

My reasons for seeking an indictment follow.
First, I considered Mr. Goodwin's conduct on February 2, 1976 to be a serious
violation of law. He had intentionally resisted a United States Park police officer in

1985] PROHIBITING PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS

401

important concerns expressed by the Court in Goodwin without relinquishing judicial review. Such a flexible standard would seem to
have much to commend it and few of the flaws inherent in the
Court's approach in Goodwin.
Following Goodwin, the Court will have to clarify the standard to
be applied in evaluating the possible motivations for governmental
acts which give rise to the "realistic apprehension of vindictiveness." Prior to Goodwin, the absolute prohibition against actual vindictiveness caused the Court to apply the "prophylactic rule" if
43 8
there existed the realistic possibility of some retaliatory motive.
The language in Goodwin that suggests that the application of the
prophylactic rule was unwarranted because it was unlikely that a
the performance of his duties, striking the officer with an automobile, leaving him
perhaps seriously injured on the highway, and fleeing through traffic at a high rate
of speed, thus endangering the lives of other drivers.
Second, among the documents I received in the Court file from Magistrate Burgess was a copy of Goodwin's F.B.I. record. That record showed Mr. Goodwin's
lengthy history of violent crime.
Third, based on my conversations with Officer Morrisette and Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney Jones, I judged Goodwin's conduct on February 2, 1976 to
be related to major narcotics transactions.
Fourth, I believe Mr. Goodwin had committed perjury in his testimony under
oath at the preliminary hearing before Magistrate Burgess on March 30, 1976.
Fifth, subsequent to the filing of the initial complaint on February 3, 1976, Mr.
Goodwin had failed to appear for a trial scheduled for April 29, 1976.
In summary, my decision to seek an indictment charging Mr. Goodwin with two
felonies, [18 U.S.C. § 111 and 18 U.S.C. § 1331(c)], was based upon the totality of
the circumstances set forth above and upon my judgment that his conduct on February 2, 1976 involved not merely a traffic incident on the Baltimore-Washington
Parkway but also serious violations of federal law committed by a dangerous individual. My decision to seek a grand jury indictment was not motivated in any way
by, nor did I ever consider Goodwin's request for trial by jury in the United States
District Court.
/s! Edward M. Norton, Jr. EDWARD M. NORTON, JR. Assistant United States
Attorney. Brief for the United States at 30a, 31a app. E, 102 S. Ct. 2485 (1982)
(affidavit of Edward M. Norton, Jr.).
Under the standard suggested here, the reasons for the increased charges in Goodwin would probably not have passed muster. The first three reasons for seeking an
increase in charges were based upon evidence that was either known to the prosecution
prior to the defendant's request for a jury trial or which was readily available to the
prosecution. The fourth and fifth reasons may have been the basis for additional criminal charges but had no proper bearing on the severity of the underlying charge. Penalties for perjury or for violating conditions of bail are available as remedies for the
conduct complained of. Were reasons four and five to be acceptable for increased
charges, the Court would endorse a rule that either makes such penalties redundant or
endorses charging based upon acts following the original charging decision that are legally unrelated to the underlying charge.
More importantly, perhaps, is the fact that all of the reasons for the increase were
known or should have been known to the prosecution long before the request for ajury
trial. Even if the reasons asserted were acceptable, the government should be required
to justify the timing of the increased charge. The affidavit fails to set forth any objective
reasons that prevented filing of increased charges prior to the request for a jury trial.
438 See supra discussion accompanying notes 333-37.
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prosecutor would be acting solely out of a retaliatory motive in increasing charges carries with it disturbing implications for the applicability of the prophylactic rule where mixed motives may be at work. If
the "sole motive" standard is adopted, the prophylactic rule will apply, even hypothetically, only to a very narrow universe of
prosecutorial acts either before or after trial.
V.

GOODWIN IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

Given the relative infancy of the prosecutorial vindictiveness
doctrine, with only three United States Supreme Court decisions to
provide guidance,
it is not surprising that the law in the circuits is
"chaotic." 4 39 Blackledge unleashed a "veritable blizzard" of federal
court decisions involving a myriad assortment of claims of
prosecutorial vindictiveness. 440 The Goodwin decision has done little
to abate the volume of litigation or clarify the chaos regarding the
4 41
doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness.
United States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 257 (6th Cir. 1979).
Before Goodwin, the doctrine was invoked to challenge prosecutorial decisions
made before, during, and after trial. See McEachern, "A Realistic Likelihood of Vindictiveness:" Due ProcessLimitations on ProsecutorialCharging Discretion, 1981 U. ILL. L.F. 693, 701
(440). The claims of vindictiveness included prosecutorial acts in response to the exercise of constitutional procedural, statutory, and even informally asserted rights. Id. at
702.
441 Reported decisions in the circuits through Spring, 1985, involving claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness following Goodwin are set forth below:
1. Meachum v. Longval, 651 F.2d 818 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 458 U.S. 1102 (1982);
Meachum v. Longval, 693 F.2d 236, cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983): Where the trial
judge allegedly retaliated in sentencing defendant who refused to follow judge's advice
during jury trial to plead guilty, the First Circuit applied the prophylactic rule and required resentencing because trial judge's statement was "susceptible of appearing from
the defendant's perspective to be an attempt to coerce him to plead." Longval, 693 F.2d
at 237. After the United States Supreme Court vacated judgment and remanded for
further consideration in light of Goodwin, the First Circuit reaffirmed its previous decision, distinguishing Goodwin primarily because the threat of judicial vindictiveness was
"more serious" than prosecutorial coercion because ajudge is expected to be impartial.
Dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice
and Justice O'Connor, characterized Goodwin as a "plea-bargaining situation" and
stated: "I believe the Goodwin rationale is fully applicable in this case. If anything, the
impartial position of the judge suggests that we should be more reluctant to apply a
presumption of vindictiveness to judges than to prosecutors." Cf Blackledge, 417 U.S. at
23-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that Court should be more reluctant to apply
Pearce prophylactic rule to a prosecutor because latter "is a natural adversary of the defendant").
2. United States v. Russotti, 717 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022
(1984): In a dual sovereignty setting, the Second Circuit upheld a federal indictment
against the defendant that included a homicide charge, after the state conviction for the
same homicide was vacated on appeal. The court rejected the claim of actual
prosecutorial vindictiveness based upon the fact that a federal indictment was a permissible exercise of discretion by an independent sovereign.
3. United States v. Ng, 699 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1983): In a dual sovereignty setting,
439
440
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The primary cause of the confusion is the continuing failure of
federal charges for firearms violations were brought after a plea on state charges for the
same acts. The defendant claimed that the federal charges were in retaliation for a "successful" plea and sentencing. The court held the federal indictment to be a permissible
exercise of discretion by the independent sovereign.
4. United States v. Hinton, 703 F.2d 672, 678 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1121
(1983): The defendant claimed that there was a realistic likelihood of prosecutorial vindictiveness when the prosecutor added a second charge after defense counsel revealed a
weakness in the original charge during plea bargaining. The defendant was only convicted on the second charge. Applying Goodwin, the Second Circuit held that a presumption of vindictiveness does not exist in a pretrial setting.
5. United States v. Silvestri, 719 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1983): The court held that no
presumption of vindictiveness exists in pretrial setting where substantive charges were
added to conspiracy charge after defendant's motion to sever trial was granted. Defendant alleged retaliation for refusal to plead and for unsuccessful motion to dismiss; the
court held that the allegation was without any merit.
6. United States v. Shakur, 560 F. Supp. 366 (S.D. N.Y. 1983): The defendant was
indicted for civil contempt after refusing to testify before a grand jury even though immunity was granted. The defendant alleged actual vindictiveness in that the indictment
was returned as a penalty for exercising her legal right to challenge the subpoena. The
court ruled that the "opportunity for vindictiveness" is not enough to constitute a due
process violation; rather, what is needed is a realistic possibility that the increased punishment is a result of vindictiveness.
7. Fardella v. Garrison, 698 F.2d 208 (4th Cir. 1982): The defendant alleged that
the United States Parole Commission's decision to reopen parole determination gave
the appearance of retaliation for the filing of a writ of habeas corpus and thus a presumption of vindictiveness arose. The Fourth Circuit found decreased due process protection in parole proceedings. Further, the court deferred to the power of the
commission to modify or revoke and order regarding parole.
8. United States v. Whitley, 759 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1985) (en banc): The defendant was charged with a four-count indictment for bank robbery. The defendant pled
guilty to one count and was sentenced to 20 years. The defendant filed a motion to
vacate conviction and sentence. The defendant was tried and convicted on all four
counts. The court held, "[B]ecause Whitley's original plea was to a lesser-included offense and subsequently he was convicted of a greater offense, [North Carolina v.] Pearce
does not apply. The likelihood of either actual vindictiveness or apprehension of vindictiveness, the object of Pearce's prophylactic rule, is minimal when the second sentence is
imposed for an offense greater than that which was the basis of the original conviction.
The complete explanation for the harsher penalty is obvious on the face of a judgment
convicting the defendant of the greater crime." 759 F.2d at 332.
9. United States v. Bryant, 770 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1985): The court held that the
decision to seek a superseding indictment, when precipitated by the discovery of new
evidence, was not motivated by vindictiveness, but rather was the product of a legitimate
law enforcement decision to bring the defendant to trial.
10. United States v. Ward, 757 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1985): No unconstitutional
prosecutorial vindictiveness was shown by calling defendant before grand jury to answer
questions relating to drug transactions even though he had previously adamantly refused to cooperate as to those matters when his own case was pending.
11. United States v. Ruppel, 724 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1984): Absent actual retaliation, mere reindictment after a mistral due to a hung jury is insufficient to demonstrate
the realistic likelihood of prosecutorial vindictiveness.
12. Byrd v. McKaskle, 733 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1984): "Due process is violated by
possibility of increased punishment, on retrial, that poses realistic likeihood of
prosecutorial vindictiveness; actual vindictiveness need not be shown, since fear alone or
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the Supreme Court to distinguish clearly between the due process
prohibition against actual vindictiveness and the protection afforded
vindictiveness may deter defendant's exercise of appeal or collateral attack." 733 F.2d
at 1136.
13. United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1981), appeal after remand,
693 F.2d 1221 (1982), reh'g en banc, 718 F.2d 1360 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066
(1984) (see infra text accompanying notes 482-514).
14. Delaney v. Estelle, 713 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1983): The defendant was originally charged with burglary, which was enhanced by a habitual offender statute and forgery. The habitual offender charge was dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain. The
defendant received fifteen years for burglary and forgery. The defendant's motion for
retrial was granted, whereupon he was reindicted for the same crimes except that this
time the forgery charge was also enhanced. The defendant claimed that the reindictment on the former forgery charge, supplemented by two enhancement provisions, constituted prosecutorial vindictiveness. The Fifth Circuit held that the increase in the
charge must extend beyond the limits of the original indictment; there was no vindictiveness here since the charges facing defendant were the same in the second indictment as
in the first.
15. United States v. Henry, 709 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1983). A challenge to an increased sentence was decided upon statutory grounds, but both the majority and the
dissent discussed Goodwin extensively.
16. Lowery v. Estelle, 696 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1983): The prosecution originally
charged the defendant with robbery by assault; on retrial the prosecution enhanced the
charge to robbery by firearms, of which defendant was eventually convicted. No
prosecutorial vindictiveness was found because the new penal code of Texas mandated a
sentence upon conviction that was less than the sentence for the lesser charge.
17. United States v. Maurcio, 685 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1074 (1982): The prosecution filed felony charges after the defendant refused to plead
guilty to misdemeanor charges. The court held that no actual vindictiveness had been
established because defense counsel was notified of the consequences of refusal and the
defendant was free to accept or reject offer (as in Bordenkircher).
18. United States v. Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (see infra text accompanying notes 438-82).
19. United States v. Suquet, 551 F. Supp. 1194 (N.D. Ill. 1982): The defendant
alleged that a second federal case was brought against him to force him to plead guilty in
a pending case. After the defendant had prevailed on "some motions" indicating a
"clear intention" of the defendant's refusal to plead guilty, the government was forced
to prove its case. The court stated that subsequent changes in the charging decision are
not per se unjustified. Thus the court found no presumption of vindictiveness.
20. United States v. Vega, No. 83 CR-51 1, slip op. (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 1983): The
defendant alleged that the government filed felony charges in violation of an agreement
to prosecute only on misdemeanor charges if he cooperated. The court held that the
kind of conduct alleged by the defendant was not conduct that gives rise to a valid claim
of prosecutorial vindictiveness.
21. Hack v. Broglin, 566 F. Supp. 1505 (N.D. Ind. 1983): The defendant originally entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to 31/2 years in prison. The defendant
had understood the bargain to be 31/2 years to be served on work release. At trial the
defendant was sentenced by the same judge to five years in prison, without setting forth
any aggravating circumstances. The court granted habeas corpus because of actual judicial vindictiveness.
22. United States v. Jefferson, 760 F.2d 821, 827 (7th Cir. 1985), vacated on other
grounds, 106 S. Ct. 41 (1985): "Where trial judge must either lower sentence drastically
or raise sentence imposed on another count, it does not offend rule against increasing
sentence following successful appeal for district court to impose lowest of possible
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by the prophylactic rule applicable where a deterrent effect upon the
exercise of a right would result from a realistic apprehension of vinsentences which was consistent with giving defendant full sentence district court intended to impose on her in first instance."
23. United States v. Grabinski, 727 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1984): The defendant was
prosecuted for failure to file tax return while resident in State of Missouri; the case was
dismissed upon proof of residency in Minnesota. The defendant was reindicted for failure to make two tax returns while a resident in Minnesota. The court held that the
added charge did not raise a presumption of vindictiveness because it was based upon
new information (that is, the court's determination of residency).
24. Luna v. Black, 772 F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1985): The court held that the filing of
an amended information without more does not constitute prosecutorial vindictiveness.
25. United States v. McGiffen, 578 F. Supp. 899 (1983), aff'd sub nom., United
States v. Ballester, 763 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1985): The court held that there has to be a
threat or evidence of hostility to give rise to prosecutorial vindictiveness. The district
attorney's statement that he would refer the matter to federal authorities if appellants
persisted in their efforts to gain dismissal of the state indictment did not constitute a
threat or an expression of hostility. Also, the statement was not converted into a threat
or expression of hostility when the district attorney stated that the penalty carried by the
federal charge was more severe than that carried by the parallel state charge.
26. United States v. McWilliams, 730 F.2d 1218, 1219 (9th Cir. 1984): "Allegation that United States Attorney was biased against defendant and interested in seeing
him punished did not support claim of vindictive prosecution in filing second indictment
charging defendant with obstruction ofjustice after he had engaged in altercation with
his brother who had been on his way to United States attorney to offer testimony against
defendant on charges of making false statement in acquisition of firearm and receipt of
firearm by convicted felon."
27. United States v. Allen, 699 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1982): The defendant was indicted by federal prosecutors only because he received "favorable treatment" at sentencing in an unrelated state case. It was not clear what right the defendant exercised, if
any. The court held that there is no presumption of vindictiveness in the sentencing
setting and no "actual" vindictiveness was alleged.
28. United States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1982): A routinely
filed misdemeanor for illegal entry in the United States was changed to felony charges
after defendant entered a not guilty plea. No appearance of vindictive prosecution because the decision to increase charges was based upon review of defendant's record as a
whole, some of which was not available to prosecutors until after defendant had entered
his plea.
29. United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1206 (1983): A second indictment was brought after the first indictment was dismissed
due to a motion by the defendant. There was no vindictiveness because the second
indictment included fewer charges and lighter penalties than the first indictment. The
court held that no reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness arises when the prosecutor
increases charges prior to trial because the government may reevaluate the societal interest in prosecution prior to trial.
30. United States v. Banks, 682 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117
(1983) (see infra text accompanying notes 529-38).
31. United States v. Barker, 681 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1982): The court held that
reinstatement of original charges after plea to lesser charge was vacated is not vindictiveness.
32. United States v. Frederick, 551 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Kan. 1982): The defendant
agreed to cooperate with government prior to indictment. After the cooperation, the
government filed charges in addition to those on which the defendant agreed to cooperate, allegedly in violation of agreement. The court held that there was no presumption

406

ERLINDER AND THOMAS

[Vol. 76

dictiveness. A related issue is a lack of understanding of what is
meant by "actual vindictiveness." These problems stem from the
fact that, largely because of the advantages of the prophylactic rule,
which were stated in Pearce4 42 and reiterated in Blackledge,4 4 3 the prohibition against actual vindictiveness has been overshadowed by a
nearly universal reliance upon the prophylactic rule.
With the sole exception of Bordenkircher,4 44 every Supreme
Court decision concerning a claim either of prosecutorial or judicial
vindictiveness has been based upon an analysis involving the prophylactic rule. Even Bordenkircher fails to provide guidance in defining the meaning of actual vindictiveness. Thus, the meaning of
actual vindictiveness and the analytical and procedural distinction
which might differentiate judicial treatment of actual vindictiveness
from the operation of the prophylactic rule has not been defined
beyond the abstract proposition that a prosecutor has a clear duty to
punish a defendant for violating the law but may not punish a deof vindictiveness where the charging decision in this pretrial setting was treated like that
in Bordenkircherbecause the defendant was aware of the possibility of additional charges.
33. United States v. Vigil, 743 F.2d 751 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 600
(1984): The court held that preindictment delay is not a violation of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment absent a showing of actual prejudice or a showing that the
delay was purposefully caused by the government to gain tactical advantage or to harass.
34. United States v. Taylor, 749 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1985): "Prosecutor's
indictment of defendant on felony counts, after initial conviction based on charge of
cocaine possession only had been reversed, did not constitute improper prosecutorial
vindictiveness for defendant's exercise of his appeal rights, where prosecutor originally
charged cocaine offense only because he thought potential 15-year sentence for such
offense would be adequate, and his decision to subsequently charge other felonies was
based primarily on his view of equitable and appropriate sentence for defendant's criminal conduct, rather than to penalize defendant for taking appeal." 749 F.2d at 1514.
35. United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748 (11th Cir. 1985): After refusing to plea
bargain, the defendants were charged with additional counts. The court held that these
facts alone will not give rise to a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness.
36. United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508 (1Ith Cir. 1984): The defendant was
fully informed of government's intention to seek sentence enhancement and prosecute
him as a dangerous special drug offender if defendant did not plead guilty as charged.
The court held that the defendant simply declined to accept the offer and there was no
basis for arguing prosecutorial vindictiveness.
37. United States v. Spence, 719 F.2d 358 (11th Cir. 1983): The defendant was
indicted for tax evasion and false statements after a successful appeal and acquittal on
retrial of drug possession and sale charges. The court held that there was no presumption of vindictiveness because the subsequent indictment was for separate and distinct
original conduct, and there was no proof of actual vindictiveness.
38. United States v. Wasman, 700 F.2d 663 (11th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 559
(1984): The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether a judge may base
increased sentence after retrial upon convictions of charges which were pending at initial sentencing. See infra discussion of Wasman accompanying notes 561-96.
442 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725-26.
443 Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 28.
444 See supra discussion at 20-23.

1985] PROHIBITING PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS

407

fendant for exercising a right.4 4 5 As the lower courts' attempts to
apply Goodwin illustrate, it is far easier to state this abstract concept
than it is to apply it properly to the facts of a particular case. Unlike
Justice Stewart's famous observation about obscenity, vindictiveness
is very easy to define but very difficult to "know it when [we] see
it."446

After Goodwin, the due process focus in the pre-trial context
necessarily shifts from the issue of a "realistic apprehension of vindictiveness" to that of actual vindictiveness. This major change in
focus results from Goodwin's holding that while the "presumption"
does not apply to a defendant's pre-trial demand for ajury trial, the
defendant may still prove through objective evidence that the prosecutor's conduct was motivated by actual vindictiveness. 44 7 The
Court, however, does not pay sufficient attention to the change in
focus it has just created and thereby presents the lower courts with
significant analytical and procedural issues. The Goodwin opinion
continues to blur the analytical distinction between actual and a realistic apprehension of vindictiveness by its description of the
Pearce/Blackledge rule as a "presumption" and by requiring the defendant to prove only through the use of "objective evidence" that
actual vindictiveness was the "sole" motivation for the prosecutor's
conduct. 4 4 8 In addition, Goodwin provides no guidance regarding
important procedural issues involved in an actual vindictiveness
hearing, such as the showing the defendant must make to receive an
evidentiary hearing and the parameters of discovery and the hearing
itself. Three recent lower court cases illustrate the continuing analytical inconsistencies that continue to plague the vindictiveness
44 9
doctrine following Goodwin.
A.

THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS STRUGGLE WITH GOODWIN

1.

United States v. Gervasi

In United States v. Gervasi, a defendant in an auto theft case,
Soteras, was originally charged with car theft in state court. 4 50 Attorney Gervasi, representing Soteras, allegedly approached the arresting officer to discuss a bribe.4 51 The officer contacted the state
445 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372.

446 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
447 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380 n.12, 384.
448 Id. at 380 n. 12.
449 Krezdorn, 693 F.2d 1221 (1982), rev.'don rehearingen banc, 718 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066 (1984); Banks, 682 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1117 (1983); Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
450 Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. at 634.
451 Id.
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prosecutor's office, which then wiretapped telephone conversations
and electronically eavesdropped on meetings between the officer
and the attorneys for Soteras. The state did not secure a court order because it believed the particular method used did not violate
Illinois law. Also, because Gervasi was then a candidate for judge,
4 52
the state feared a "leak" if it sought judicial authorization.
This decision proved to be a miscalculation by the state because
after the attorneys for Soteras had been indicted in state court with
eleven counts of bribery and conspiracy, the trial judge suppressed
evidence of the overheard conversations based upon a violation of
4 54
Illinois law. 453 The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the ruling.
The effect of the ruling was to make inadmissible the bulk of the
state's evidence and, thus, prevent it from proving its case against
Gervasi and the other defendants. The state prosecutors then contacted federal prosecutors, who reviewed the state's file and indicted
Soteras and his attorneys for conspiracy, mail fraud, and
45 5
racketeering.
The defendants in Gervasi moved to dismiss on the basis of
prosecutorial vindictiveness, without specifying whether they were
alleging actual vindictiveness, the appearance of vindictiveness or
both.4 5 6 The motion alleged two principle reasons for seeking dismissal of the federal indictment: (1) the federal indictment was in
retaliation for defendants' success in suppressing the incriminating
conversations under state law, particularly since all parties agreed
the conversations were admissible in federal court; and (2) the federal indictment was retaliatory because it stripped the defendants of
their more liberal rights under state law, including the defendants'
absolute right to a bench trial in state court. 4 57 The state prosecutor
had maintained that the case was before a "defendant's judge" in
state court.4 58 In federal court, defendants enjoy only the right to a
jury trial; a bench trial can occur if only there is the consent of the
4 59
judge, the prosecutor, and the defendant.
The government's response to the defendant's motion also
Id. at 635.
Id.
People v. Gervasi, 89 Ill. 2d 522, 434 N.E.2d 1112 (1982).
Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. at 643. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1434 and 1952. The federal
charges carried less potential incarceration than the state charges on which defendants
initially were indicted. The federal prosecution arguably still "upped the ante," however, if the prosecution could not prove its case in state court.
456 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Prosecutorial Vindictiveness, Gervasi, 562 F.
Supp. 632 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
457 Id. at 636.
458 Id.
459 FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a). See also Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
452
453
454
455
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made no distinction between actual vindictiveness or an apprehension of vindictiveness. It relied primarily on the position that there
can be no vindictiveness where the prosecutions are brought by separate prosecutorial offices, each representing a different sovereign. 4 60 The government cited Goodwin for the proposition that
defendants were not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because
"there is no evidence indicating that the state prosecutors did anything more than realize that the case had been brought in the wrong
forum as the evidence that was inadmissable in state court is ad4 61
missable in a federal proceeding."
Faced with these competing claims, the district judge held, in an
order granting defendants' motion for an evidentiary hearing, that
"there can be no presumption in this case of vindictive prosecution"
because "it is generally the right of each sovereign to make
prosecutorial decisions in relation to the same defendant without
regard to the decision of the other governmental body." 4 6 2 Therefore, according to the court, the facts did not establish the "realistic
likelihood" of vindictiveness necessary to trigger the application of
4 63
the Pearce/Blackledgeprophylactic rule.
Having determined that defendants were not entitled to invoke
the prophylactic rule, and thus would have to prove actual vindictiveness in order to prevail on their motion for a hearing on that
issue, the trial court concluded, without citation, that a hearing is
necessary because "the Court regards the claim pressed here as one
464
that is not frivolous."
The judge then defined the scope of the hearing in light of his
interpretation of Goodwin, placing the burden of proof on defendants which must be satisfied by "objective evidence." The defendants would not be permitted to probe the "subjective" motives of
the federal or state prosecutors because that subject is "irrelevant"
460 Government's Reply to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Prosecutorial Vindictiveness, Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. 632.
461 Id.
462 Unpublished Order and Memorandum Opinion, United States v. Gervasi, 82 CR
635, p.2 (Hart, J., January 26, 1983) (citing Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Unpublished
Order].
463 Unpublished Order, supra note 462, at 2. Judge Hart did not interpret Goodwin as
imposing a blanket prohibition on the "presumption" in the pre-trial context, but rather
only where the facts do not indicate a "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness," a proposition that seems true to Pearce and Blackledge. See also Andrews, 633 F.2d at 454, 464.
464 Unpublished Order, supra note 462, at 3. This test for determining the necessity
of an evidentiary hearing was apparently transplanted from cases dealing with claims of
selective prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Oaks, 508 F.2d 1403, 1404 (9th Cir.
1974), appeal after remand, 527 F.2d 937 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976).
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to the determination of the motion. 46 5
By defining the scope of an actual vindictiveness hearing in this
manner, the district court in Gervasi both echoes and amplifies the
confusion in Goodwin regarding the nature of actual vindictiveness
claims. When Pearce and Blackledge emphasized the necessity for objective evidence, it was in the context of: (a) establishing the factors
that give rise to the realistic apprehension of vindictiveness necessary to trigger the operation of the prophylactic rule 46 6 and (b) the
nature of the showing required to dispel the appearance of vindictiveness in the post-trial setting.
The oft-repeated premise that "motives are complex and difficult to prove," however, leads to the opposite conclusion when discussing the admissibility of evidence to prove actual vindictiveness.
It is difficult to conceive of an issue more subjective than "actual
vindictiveness.- 4 67 In fact, actual vindictiveness, being totally subjective in nature, can rarely, if ever, be proven solely by "objective
'46 8
evidence.
The reasons underlying this fundamental error in Goodwin, and
Gervasi's interpretation of Goodwin, appear more clearly in a later
published opinion. That opinion states that the limitation to objective evidence "after Goodwin comports with the basisfor the prophylactic rule set out in Blackledge and re-echoed in Goodwin itself:
'Motives are complex and difficult to prove'." 4 69 Here, the Gervasi
court expressly equates the type of evidence applicable to trigger
the prophylactic rule with that required to prove actual vindictive°
ness, two entirely different propositions.47
465 "The [Goodwin] court also held that if a presumption should not lie, then the defendant would have to come forward with objective evidence in order to prevail on the
motion ....
That is, the defendant must tender evidence which is objective in nature to
sustain their motion. The subjective motives of the prosecutors-whether those representing the State of Illinois or those acting on behalf of the United States- are irrelevant to the determination of the motion. At the hearing to be held in this matter, the

parties will not be permitted to probe the subjective motives of those instigating the
instant prosecution." Unpublished Order, supra note 462, at 3.
466 Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726; Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 27, 29 n.7.
467 Some courts have gone so far as to hold, albeit erroneously, that a defendant must
show that the prosecutorial conduct "would not have occurred but for hostility or punitive animus towards the defendant... Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d at 1169.
468 But see State v. Hailing, 66 Or. App. 180, 672 P.2d 1386 (1983).
469 Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. at 638 n.3 (emphasis supplied).
470 "Whether the presumption is with the defendant or the government, at a hearing
on a motion to dismiss for vindictive prosecution, the court cannot allow a prosecutor to
come to the witness stand and testify as to subjective motivation, whether that testimony
is voluntary or drawn out through cross-examination. The Fourth Circuit recognized
this in Goodwin and established a presumption to make certain that these questions are
decided on the basis of objective evidence. The Supreme Court reversed in Goodwin
based on where the Fourth Circuit thought the presumption line should be drawn. The
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Equating the type of evidence admissible to prove actual vindictiveness with that necessary to trigger application of the prophylactic rule illustrates one aspect of the previous discussion. In Goodwin,
the Supreme Court confused the concept of actual vindictiveness
with a "realistic apprehension" of vindictiveness and erred in referring to the Pearce/Blackledge "prophylactic rule" as a "presumption. '4 7 1 The prophylactic rule of Pearce and Blackledge was crafted
as a device to prevent the "chilling effect" resulting from a "realistic
apprehension of vindictiveness": it was never applied nor was it intended to apply to actual vindictiveness. When "apprehension" is
the issue, the defendant must allege objective facts to establish that
the apprehension is "realistic." The subjective motivation of the inof the existence of a
dividual prosecutor is irrelevant to the issue
"realistic apprehension of vindictiveness." 4 72
The situation is just the opposite, however, when the issue is
actual vindictiveness, as in Gervasi. The doctrine simply cannot operate in the fashion described in Gervasi. The defendant cannot be
required to prove very subjective facts involving the prosecutor's
state of mind, while at the same time be restricted to "objective"
evidence. If the due process protection against actual vindictiveness
is not a chimera, the defendant must be permitted full discovery and
presentation of evidence regarding the subjective motivations of the
prosecution, for that is the heart of actual vindictiveness. Requiring
the defendant to prove this subjective fact only through objective
evidence strips the due process prohibition against actual vindictiveness of any real meaning by rendering it incapable of proof.
Goodwin's use of the term "presumption" contributes to the
problem.4 7 3 This confusion illustrated by the statement in Gervasi
that only objective evidence is proper "[w]hether the presumption is
with the defendant or the government." 4 74 This statement lumps
together, and thus treats identically, two radically different concepts
of the term "presumption": 1) whether it is appropriate to apply
the prophylactic rule, which Goodwin mischaracterized as a
"presumption", or 2) whether governmental actions, such as the filreversal did not undercut the Fourth Circuit's conclusion as to the necessity for presumptions and limitations to objective evidence in such matters." Id.
471 See supra discussion at notes 211-329.
472 See infra note 503.
473 "This case involves presumptions. The question presented is whether a presumption that has been used to evaluate a judicial or prosecutorial response to a criminal
defendant's exercise of a right to be retried after he has been convicted should also be
applied to evaluate a prosecutor's pre-trial response to a defendant's demand for a jury
trial." Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 369-370.
474 Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. at 638 n.3. See also Unpublished Order, supra note 462, at 3.
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ing of federal charges in Gervasi, will be presumed to have been
done in good faith. To equate these "presumptions" is incorrect
because they stand for two completely different propositions which
may be related in Gervasi but which require completely different
47 5
inquiries.
At the hearing in Gervasi, the defendant's evidence consisted
primarily of state court records, demonstrating that in numerous recent instances the state's attorney had dropped state prosecutions
4 76
before the same state trial judge in favor of federal prosecutions.
The defendants were also allowed to introduce the deposition of an
attorney who said that he had a conversation in a bar near the criminal courts building with one of the assistant state's attorneys involved in the case. The latter allegedly said, "[T]he reason the
Gervasi case was sent over to federal court was that the state
'couldn't get a fair shake... from [the state trial judge]', and that we
can try our case over there better than we can in front of [the state
4 77
trial judge] ."
The government maintained that the deposition testimony was
irrelevant. 4 78 The government's position is technically correct in
light of the court's previous ruling regarding the scope of the hearing: "objective" elements, such as when the conversation took
place, are relevant only if the substance of the conversation is relevant. 4 79 Here the substance involved subjective motives of state
475 The burden of proving actual vindictiveness has never been articulated by the
United States Supreme Court, nor does Gervasi suggest what the burden is. It would
appear to be a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. Nix v. Williams, 105 S. Ct.
2681 (1985) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 n.14 (1974)). It is erroneous to state that the party who does not bear the burden of persuasion thereby enjoys
a presumption in its favor. See infra note 552. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973); United States v. Smith, 65 F.R.D. 464 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
476 Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. at 636. This seems strange evidence for defense counsel to
offer since he must prove actual vindictiveness against his client, while establishing identical governmental conduct in "numerous other cases" can be viewed as demonstrating
just the opposite. If the defendants' theory were to prove that theirs was but part of a
series of vindictive prosecutions, the short answer is that this is both more difficult and
unnecessary for defendants to prove under any recognized test for demonstrating actual
vindictiveness. Perhaps defendants were simply attempting to comply with the "objective evidence" limitation.
477 Id. at 635-36. For reasons unstated, neither party to the alleged conversation was
ever tendered as a witness. Indeed, it does not appear the government presented any
evidence at all.
478 Id. at 636 n.2. The district court overruled the government's objection with the
cryptic comment that "for purposes of deciding the important issues presented here the
Court has admitted the exhibit." Id.
479 The district court later expanded on its view of the alleged conversation between
the attorney and one of the assistant state's attorneys prosecuting the case in state court:
The federal prosecutors certainly could have called [the assistant state's attorney] as a witness in the hearing held before this Court. This testimony would not
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prosecutors, which would be inadmissible in a hearing limited to
"objective" evidence. Unless "objective" is defined to include what
the judge later referred to as a "barroom conversation, ' 4 8 0 the
purely subjective motivations of the state in offering to transfer, and
thefederalprosecutors in agreeingto accept prosecution of the case, would
be irrelevant at a hearing limited to objective evidence. It is precisely this sort of evidence of the subjective motivations of the prosecutor, however, that will often be the only evidence a defendant
can introduce to prove a claim of actual vindictiveness.
At the hearing, defendants argued both actual and a realistic
appearance of vindictiveness on the following grounds:
1. The federal prosecution was designed and motivated to penalize
these defendants for their state court success in exercising their statutory and constitutional rights.
2. The institution of a federal prosecution under such circumstances
will deter other defendants from exercising their rights.
3. The prosecution is an attempt to avoid and make meaningless
these defendants' rights to the greater procedural and substantive protections afforded by Illinois law, including the right to a trial by the
court without a jury, and the protection of the more stringent
state
48
standards as to the admissibility of overheard conversations. '
The district court ultimately denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss the indictment because the evidence they presented was "legally irrelevant" to proof of actual vindictiveness on the part of the
federal prosecutors. "[D]efendants have admitted that they do not
seek to prove actual vindictiveness on the part of the federal prosecutors, but instead ask this Court to find such vindictiveness by the
state's attorney. ' 4 2 Since the fifth amendment due process clause
limits only the federal government in federal prosecutions, proof of
vindictiveness on the part of the state's attorneys was meaningless.
In the final analysis, the district court decided the motion in
light of its previous rulings regarding the scope of the hearing,
based upon the absence of "objective proof" of improper motivations of the prosecution. In effect, the court decided the motion
based upon the dual sovereignty theory originally urged by the
government. 48 3 The defendants apparently waived their right to the
have been out-of-bounds based on the Court's January 26 Order. It would not have
requiredprobing the subjective motives of [the assistantstate's attorneyl, but would have addressed objective evidence: whether the conversation took place and the content of the conversation. The government has taken the position, however, that [the] testimony is
irrelevant.
Id. at 641 n.7 (emphasis supplied).
480
481
482
483

Id. at 641.

Id. at 636.
Id. at 641.
The court stated:
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extensive discovery necessary to prove actual vindictiveness, including depositions and production of internal memos and other documents by the United States Attorney's Office, by failing to make
such a request. The judge was correct in holding an evidentiary
hearing, but, following Goodwin's false path, incorrect in limiting it
to "objective" evidence. By limiting the nature of the inquiry, he in
effect made it impossible for defendants to sustain their burden.
Given the state of the record, the validity of the holding is problematical. Gervasi, however, is an excellent illustration of the result of
the absence of guidance provided by Goodwin in raising and deciding
claims of vindictiveness in the pre-trial context.
2.

Commentary

Gervasi is an excellent example of the pitfalls facing defendants
and lower courts after Goodwin if the lower court has not read Goodwin with a critical appraisal of the roots of the vindictiveness doctrine established in Blackledge and Pearce.
It is now apparent that: (a) if defense counsel in good faith believes that prosecutorial actions toward the defendant have been
motivated by vindictiveness, and/or (b) objective facts present a realistic apprehension of vindictiveness, particularly in the pre-trial
context, the motion to dismiss 48 4 should allege separate actual vinIn any case, all the evidence presented by the defendants, both direct and circumstantial, is legally irrelevant to the vindictive prosecution claim. They have not
proven that the federal prosecutors acted with actual vindictiveness in seeking the federal indictment. And the defendants have admitted that they do not seek to prove
actual vindictiveness on the part of the federal prosecutors, but instead ask this

Court to find such vindictiveness by the state's attorney. Vindictive prosecution is a
defense brought under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The guarantee . . . is a limitation placed upon the federal government. Except in certain
limited circumstances, a federal district court is without power to review the
prosecutorial activities of state authorities. Furthermore, the remedy for a proven
case of vindictive prosecution is a dismissal of the indictment. Thejudiciary has the
power to dismiss an indictment on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct or abuse,
but this power is narrowly circumscribed. (Citations omitted).
In the case at bar the defendants ask this Court to dismiss an indictment, voted
by a federal grand jury at the behest of the prosecutorial arm of the executive
branch, not for the acts of the federal prosecutors but for the acts and motives
attributable to the state prosecutors. This would be punishing the federal prosecutor who has acted fairly and above-board.
Id. at 641-42 (emphasis in original).
484 When Gervasi mischaracterizes the vindictiveness doctrine as a "defense" to
charges, it is not alone in this error. See also United States v. Krezdorn, 718 F.2d 1360,
1365 (5th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Krezdorn III]; Two Models, supra note 4 (1983).
The issue of vindictiveness normally will arise, as indeed it did in Gervasi, in the procedural context of a motion to dismiss under FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b). A motion to dismiss
based upon prosecutorial vindictiveness meets all the requirements of Rule 12; the issue
is capable of determination without trial of the general issue. Moreover, it is erroneous
to term it a "defense" because the merits of the vindictiveness claim are determined
without regard to the guilt or innocence of the accused.
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dictiveness and realistic apprehension of vindictiveness claims. The
two separate allegations should be clearly distinguished in order to
emphasize and clarify to the court the distinction between the two.
Many courts and commentators have incorrectly assumed Goodwin drew a "bright line" by adopting a per se stance that the prophylactic rule never applies in the pre-trial stage since there is not a
"realistic apprehension" in that factual context. 4 85 This assumption
is incorrect because the language in Goodwin implies the opposite
conclusion: a change in the charging decision before trial is much
less likely to be improperly motivated than is such a change made
during or after a trial. 4 86 This is different than saying the prophylactic rule never applies prior to trial. Some courts and commentators
have joined Gervasi in noting that there remains after Goodwin the
opportunity for the defendant to establish a realistic likelihood of
vindictiveness even prior to trial.4 87 Just as there exists the possibility of proving actual vindictiveness at any stage of the case, so might
the facts at any stage demonstrate the realistic likelihood necessary
to trigger the prophylactic rule.
Although Gervasi is correct in concluding that the presumption
can apply at the pre-trial stage, it is less clear that the court was correct in deciding that it did not apply in that case simply because two
different prosecutorial offices were involved. The court never explains why this single fact was sufficient to conclude that the likelihood of vindictiveness was not realistic. Practically speaking, the
prophylactic rule simply puts the burden on the party that is in the
best position to rebut the appearance of vindictiveness which otherwise exists. In this situation, that party is the prosecutor's office,
which generally does (and certainly should) maintain extensive
records of all events and considerations involved in making the
charging decision.
In cases involving the United States Attorney's office, the required prosecutorial memorandum is generally a thorough synopsis
of all relevant factors involved in the charging decisions, including
documentation of "objective" events, if any exist. 48 8 The prosecutor is privy to, and therefore in the best position to demonstrate, the
basis of a particular charging decision. The prosecutor should be
required to explain the basis of a charging decision if the question
of a realistic apprehension of vindictiveness is at all a close one. Gervasi falls within the latter category because, as the court noted, the
485 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380.
486 Id. at 381.
487 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 65, at 197.
488 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES AvrORNEYS' MANUAL TITLE

9 (1985).
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claim in that case was clearly not "frivolous." 4 89 Indeed, if the lack
of a "frivolous" claim is all that is necessary to require an evidentiary hearing involving the "unseemly" task of determining the
question of actual vindictiveness, this standard simply reinforces the
conclusion that the burden should generally be placed on the prosecutor, rather than forcing the defendant to drag the facts out of the
prosecutor through extensive discovery. As noted above, this is exactly what Pearce and Blackledge sought to avoid by adopting the rule
490
in the first instance.
Gervasi illustrates a major practical problem created by Goodwin.
The natural adversarial position of the prosecutor vis-a-vis the defendant and counsel in the fiercely competitive criminal justice system4 9 ' would be only exacerbated by arguments over document
production, depositions and the evidentiary hearing itself.4 92 If actual vindictiveness is not present prior to this process, it may well be
present afterward as an unnecessary, and costly, residue. Certainly,
if a prosecutor is tempted to engage in "self-vindication" when he
has been told by an appellate court to "do over again what he
thought he had already correctly done," a great temptation will also
be present when he is accused of wrongdoing by the defendant and
counsel.
An evidentiary hearing into actual vindictiveness seems guaranteed to produce animosity; such a hearing simply cannot be limited
to "objective" evidence. The hearing in Gervasi was not limited to
objective evidence, but instead was a curious hybrid of objective and
subjective evidence. 49 3 It is difficult to see how a "hearing" of the
type conducted in Gervasi, where no witnesses actually testified,
helped the court in any way decide the issues involved, particularly
since the court ended up denying the motion on the basis of dual
sovereignty. 4 94 The type of hearing conducted in Gervasi contributes nothing to determine the existence of actual vindictiveness.
See infra note 501.
Id.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the extreme difficulty, complexity,
and unseemly task of proving the existence of actual vindictiveness in any particular
case. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725 n.20; Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372-373.
492 See, e.g., Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 32-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("I think the Court
too readily equates the role of the prosecutor, who is a natural adversary of the defendant ... with that of the sentencing judge in Pearce."). See also Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at
364-65; Andrews, 633 F.2d at 455.
493 See infra notes 502-510 and 513-518 and accompanying text.
494 Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. at 642. It should be noted that the dual sovereignty theory is
the same reason put forward by the court in support of its refusal to apply the prophylactic rule and by the government in arguing that defendants were not even entitled to
an evidentiary hearing.
489
490
491
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By refusing to apply the prophylactic rule to a demand for a
jury trial and generally discouraging its application in the pre-trial
context, Goodwin opens wide the Pandora's box that Pearce and
Blackledge sought to keep dosed. By shifting the focus to actual vindictiveness, and thus requiring proof of subjective motivation, one
result of Goodwin is to force the courts into the "unseemly" task of
probing the subjective motives of members of the executive branch
of government. Such confrontations between two separate
branches of the government are generally considered "undesirable," particularly given the difficult nature of determining subjective motivation. 49 5 Thus, if one of Goodwin's objectives, in refusing
to apply the prophylactic rule in the pre-trial context, was to discourage judicial inquiry into the charging decisions made by the executive prior to trial, it may have achieved exactly the opposite result
by shifting the focus to actual vindictiveness.
B.

GOODWIN'S IMPACT UPON THE OPERATION OF THE PROPHYLACTIC
RULE

1.

United States v. Krezdorn

Ultimately, the most restrictive impact of Goodwin on the vindictiveness doctrine will be felt in diminishing the effectiveness of the
previously healthy prophylactic rule, which addresses the "chilling
effect" resulting from a realistic appearance of vindictiveness. This
threat stems from the implication in Goodwin that the prohibition
against the appearance of vindictiveness will prevent an increase in
charges if a prosecutor's conduct can be explained only as having
4 96
arisen from a vindictive motive.
The concept that in order to violate due process vindictiveness
must be the prosecutor's sole motivation, is antithetical to the command of Pearce, Blackledge and Goodwin that actual vindictiveness
must play "no part" in the prosecution. 49 7 If actual vindictiveness
must play "no part" in any prosecution, it follows that vindictiveness
as part of the prosecutor's motivation, rather than the sole reason for
the prosecutor's conduct, is violative of due process. To require a
defendant to establish that vindictiveness is, or appears to be, the
sole motivation, imposes another almost impossible burden. Given
495

In fact, in this situation the court may be forced to brand the prosecutor a "liar,"

or at least find that the prosecutor acted in bad faith. Andrews, 633 F.2d at 455.
496 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384. The corollary to this proposition, at least in some circuits, is that it must appear that the prosecutorial conduct could not have been motivated by any purpose other than vindictive desire to deter or punish. See, e.g., Krezdorn
III, 718 F.2d at 1365.
497 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373; Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 25; Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725.
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the existence of a grand jury indictment or conviction which has
been reversed, or a variety of other possible justifications, the prosecutor can almost always make a plausible claim that the defendant is
merely being punished for violating the law, not for exercising a
legal right. Moreover, given the fiercely adversarial nature of the
criminal justice process, the prosecutor may be able to argue that
the conduct is simply part of the "give-and-take" of the system,
4 98
pointing to Bordenkircher as support for this proposition.
The dilemma presented by the presence of dual motives for
prosecutorial action is illustrated by United States v. Krezdorn.4 99 The
defendant was initially indicted on five, and convicted of four,
counts of forging immigration documents. The district court permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of thirty-two additional forgeries not charged in the original indictment, reasoning
that the uncharged evidence was relevant because it showed the
existence of a common plan or scheme. On appeal the Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding the additional forgeries inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 50 0 because the existence of a "plan"
was not an element of the offense with which defendant was
charged. Therefore, the additional forgeries did not fall within the
"plan or scheme" exception to the rule that evidence of a defendant's "other crimes" is inadmissible. 50 ' However, the Court of Appeals did observe in dicta that "[t]he existence of a plan would be
02
directly at issue in, for instance, a conspiracy charge." 5
On remand, the defendant was reindicted on the four forgery
counts on which he was originally convicted, but the superseding
indictment also charged a conspiracy. 50 3 The conspiracy charge added five years imprisonment and a ten thousand dollar fine to the
potential punishment faced by the defendant, over and above the
penalties for the four counts of forgery. The thirty-two inadmissible
forgeries "were alleged to be overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy charged in the superseding indictment." 50 4 The defendant
498 Bordenkircher, 343 U.S. at 362.
499 United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Krezdorn I].
500 Id. at 1381. In order for the uncharged forgeries to be admissible, they must sat-

isfy the two-pronged test which is set forth in Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. FED. R. EvID. 404(b). The district court found that the evidence "was relevant to
the existence of a plan or scheme and its probative value outweighed its possible prejudice." Krezdorn I, 639 F.2d at 1381.
501 Id. at 1331-32.
502 Id. at 1331 n.7.
503 United States v. Krezdorn, 693 F.2d 1221, 1224 (5th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited
as Krezdorn II].
504

Id. at 1223-24. The conspiracy count was brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 371.
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moved to dismiss the conspiracy count, arguing that the objective
facts set forth above created a "reasonable appearance" of vindictiveness. The prosecutor simply denied any vindictive motive for
the superseding indictment. 50 5
An evidentiary hearing was held. Although in this setting, unlike Gervasi, the hearing could have been more properly limited to
objective evidence for the increased charge to rebut the realistic
apprehension of vindictiveness, in fact it was not. The Assistant
United States Attorney responsible for the case testified that he was
aware of all the facts giving rise to the conspiracy charge at the time
the government brought the indictment and that no new evidence
had come to light since the first trial. 50 6 He testified that the conspiracy charge was not contained in the original indictment because
' 50 7
it would have "involved some administrative inconvenience.
The prosecutor also testified, without explanation, that "he was of
the impression that even if Krezdorn was convicted of the conspiracy charge, he would not receive any punishment in addition to that
meted out after his first conviction." 50 8 Although the district court
noted that "[the] prosecutor did not gain this impression by any
communication from this court," it apparently accepted this testimony at face value because it found that the government was not
concerned with increasing the amount of punishment to which the
defendant would be exposed. 50 9
The district court, however, properly concluded that the facts
presented a "reasonable apprehension" of vindictiveness. The
court also found the government had failed to explain the increased
severity of the superseding indictment in terms sufficient to dispel
the reasonable apprehension of retaliatory motive created by the addition of charges following appeal. 5 10 The district court concluded
that the conspiracy charge was added for the "primary, if not sole
purpose of" transforming the thirty-two additional forgeries from
inadmissible extraneous evidence "into evidence admissible as overt
acts in a conspiracy." 5 11 Accordingly, the conspiracy count was dismissed, giving rise to Krezdorn H.512
505 Id. at

1224.

506 Id.
507 Id. The prosecutor's apparent reference was to the fact that defendant's alleged
co-conspirator was a Mexican citizen; consequently, the government "knew" he could
never be extradited and "would simply clutter up the court records as a fugitive." Id. at
1224 n.5.
508 Id. at 1224 n.6.
509 Id.; Krezdorn III, 718 F.2d at 1363.
510 Krezdorn III, 718 F.2d at 1363.
511 Id.
512 See infra note 541. Additionally, the dismissal of the conspiracy count in Kre-dorn
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Since there was an increase in charges and potential penalties
after a trial and reversal, Krezdorn II begins by stating that, even after
Goodwin, "this case falls squarely within the category of cases as to
which the Supreme Court has stated that a presumption of
prosecutorial vindictiveness is justified by the high probability that
the charging decision was improperly motivated." 5 13 The court
then addresses the nature of the burden the prosecutor bears in order to dispel an otherwise reasonable apprehension of vindictiveness. It properly finds, albeit somewhat by accident, that, in light of
the purposes of the prophylactic rule fashioned in Pearce and
Blackledge, the appearance of vindictiveness can only be overcome by
showing that "intervening circumstances, of which the prosecutor
could not reasonably have been aware, created a fact situation which
did not exist at the time of the original indictment."5 1 4 Focusing on
should be contrasted to the statement in Gervasi that "the remedy for a proven case of
vindictive prosecution is a dismissal of the indictment." Gervasi, 562 F. Supp. at 642.
This statement is accurate as it pertains to the facts in Gervasi because the defendant
claimed that securing the indictment itself was vindictive. It also accurately describes
the facts and relief in Blackledge v. Perry. In situations involving the addition of charges,
such as Krezdorn, however, the accepted remedy is dismissal of the count. See, e.g., Andrews, 633 F.2d at 451. But cf. United States v. Banks, 682 F.2d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1982).
In Banks, the district court dismissed the entire indictment as to one defendant, based
upon her motion that one new count had been added to a superseding indictment as a
result of prosecutorial vindictiveness following a successful appeal. Since the Ninth Circuit determined that the additional count was not prohibited by the vindictiveness doctrine, however, it never reached the issue of the propriety of the district court's dismissal
of the entire indictment in this situation.
513 Krezdorn II, 693 F.2d at 1227.
514 Id. at 1230. Blackledge "requires a rule analogous to that of the Pearce case" in the
area of prosecutorial vindictiveness. 417 U.S. at 27. The subject of the nature of the
prosecutor's burden to rebut a "presumption" of vindictiveness needs further examination. The Fifth Circuit engages in a rather complicated "balancing test" in which the
nature of the burden of rebuttal depends "on whether the prosecutor added a new
charge for relatively distinct criminal conduct occurring within the same 'spree' of activity; or whether the prosecutor simply substituted a more serious charge for the same
criminal activity, as in Blackledge." Krezdorn II, 693 F.2d at 1228. If the new charge is for
"relatively distinct conduct occurring within the same 'spree' of activity," because this is
"a relatively serious infringement" upon traditionally broad prosecutorial discretion, literally "any reasonable explanation for the added charges [is sufficient], so long as the
explanation tends to negate an inference of retaliatory motivation." Id. at 1228-29. If,
however, the prosecutor simply substitutes a more serious charge for the "same criminal
activity," then "rebuttal explanations focusing on the prosecutor's lack of subjective retaliatory motivation are irrelevant." Id. at 1229. Thus, the appearance of vindictiveness
"can be overcome only by a showing that intervening circumstances, of which the prosecutor could not reasonably have been aware, created a fact situation which did not exist
at the time of the original indictment." Id. Since the court in Krez-dorn II decided that the
case fit in the second category of adding more serious charges for the same activity, it
applied the more stringent test recited above. Id. at 1230, 1231. This more stringent
test seems to hew more closely to the line set by Pearce's requirements of "objective
information concerning identifiable conduct" of defendant and that "the factual data
upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record." Pearce,
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a defendant's "realistic apprehension" of vindictiveness, the court
notes that "the very right vindicated on appeal is the basis of the
prosecutor's decision to add a new count to the superceding indictment," 5 15 rendering the defendant's successful appeal a "pyrrhic
victory."
Given these findings, Krezdorn 11 affirmed the decision of the
district court because:
1. The objective facts created a realistic apprehension of vindictiveness, triggering the application of the Pearce/Blackledge prophylactic
rule;
2. The prosecutor's decision to increase the charges for the purpose
of admitting extrinsic evidence previously ruled inadmissible had "an
especially chilling effect" on the right of appeal; and
3. The prosecutor failed to dispel the realistic appearance because he
charges by reference to newly diswas unable to explain the increased
5 16
covered facts or evidence.
The prosecutorial response to Krezdorn I, given the validity of
Pearce's warning that motives are complex and difficult to prove,
does in fact create a realistic apprehension of two motives, one
proper and one improper. On the one hand, it appears to be an
attempt to render the evidence of the additional forgeries admissible in response to the Fifth Circuit's dicta in Krezdorn I: due process
does not prohibit this so long as the defendant is not exposed to a
more severe penalty in the process. 51 7 However, it also realistically
appears to the defendant to be an attempt to punish him for successfully exercising the right to appeal by adding an additional
charge exposing him to a more severe penalty. The government's
action did indeed render the defendant's success a pyrrhic victory by
basing the additional charge upon the same evidence that resulted
in the original reversal. If vindictiveness or a reasonable apprehension of it must play "no part" in the case, Krezdorn 11 was correctly
decided. If vindictiveness must appear to be the "sole" motivation,
then the decision was erroneous. It was essentially this dispute over
whether vindictiveness must be the "sole motivation" for the prosecutor's action that led the Fifth Circuit to grant rehearing en banc,
395 U.S. at 726. It also comports with the citation in Blackledge of Diaz v. United States,
223 U.S. 442 (1912), where the defendant was originally tried and convicted for assault
and battery. Subsequent to the original trial, the assault victim died, and defendant was
then tried and convicted for homicide. Basically, the Fifth Circuit adopted the correct
test for rebuttal in Krezdorn II, or at least faced in the right direction, but not necessarily
for the right reasons.
515 Krezdorn II, 693 F.2d at 1231.
516

Id.

Cf. United States v. Motley, 655 F.2d 186, 189 (9th Cir. 1981), cited in Krezdorn II,
693 F.2d at 1231 n.30.
517
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which produced United States v. Krezdorn.51 8
Krezdorn III reversed the previous panel's decision, holding this
to be the type of case in which any explanation offered to rebut the
"presumption" will suffice if it demonstrates either a lack of actual
vindictiveness or "that events occurring since the time of the original charge decision altered that initial exercise of the prosecutor's
discretion. ' 5 19 The court confirmed its previous "illustrative list" of
such "events altering" the initial exercise of the prosecutor's discretion by citing Hardwick v. Doolittle.5 20 In Hardwick, the court stated
that "proof of mistake or oversight" in the initial decision, a "different approach" by a successor prosecutor, or "public demand for
prosecution on additional crimes" would be sufficient to rebut the
52
appearance of vindictiveness. 1
Krezdorn III cited the district court's finding that the superseding indictment was obtained for the primary, if not the sole, reason
of conforming to the dicta in Krezdorn I, but then concluded that "a
reasonable minded defendant would appreciate that the prosecutor's actions were taken to pursue a course indicated by the appellate opinion rather than to impose a penalty on Krezdorn for having
exercised his right of appeal." 52 2 The Fifth Circuit en banc reversed
Krezdorn II, holding that the prosecution successfully rebutted any
appearance of vindictiveness and finding that vindictiveness did not
appear to be the sole motivation for the prosecutor's action in adding a conspiracy count to the superseding indictment.
2.

Commentary

Krezdorn III is illustrative of the vindictiveness doctrine's potential demise in several respects. Although it correctly stated that in
the district court hearing the defendant did not establish actual vindictiveness, that was not the issue. It is also incorrect to state as
518 Krezdorn III, 718

F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1983).

519 Id. at 1365. In essence, Krezdorn III disagrees with Krezdorn I regarding whether

the conspiracy count was simply a substitution of a more serious charge for the same
criminal activity or was for relatively distinct conduct occurring within the same "spree"
of criminal activity. See infra note 551. Krezdorn III accuses the panel in Krezdorn H of
assuming erroneously that the original indictment charged the defendant with conspiracy. Krezdorn III, 718 F.2d at 1363. Although Krezdorn II does appear to make this error,
it does not seem to be the basis of the panel's conclusion that the prosecutor was simply
substituting a more serious charge for the same criminal activity. Rather, Krezdorn II was
based upon the fact that the conspiracy count in the superseding indictment was "for the
same basic criminal behavior of selling forged border-crossing applications." Krezdonz
11, 693 F.2d at 1230. This conclusion remains valid, regardless of whether Krezdorn was
charged with conspiracy in the original indictment.
520 Hardwick, 558 F.2d 292.
521 Id. at 301.
522 Krezdorn III, 718 F.2d at 1365.
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does the Fifth Circuit that the district judge reached "a legal conclusion to the contrary. ' 5 23 Once again, the Fifth Circuit confuses actual vindictiveness with a reasonable appearance of vindictiveness.
The district judge, however, understood the distinction between the
two because the "legal conclusion" he reached was that although
defendant had not proved actual vindictiveness, this was a case
where a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness existed. 5 24 Therefore,
the Pearce/Blackledge prophylactic rule applied, and the prosecution
failed to rebut it through objective evidence. The district judge's
conclusion which was affirmed in Krezdorn I1 conforms to the teaching of Pearce and Blackledge, and Krezdorn III does not.
Krezdorn III can be seen as a result of a misapplication of the
teachings of Goodwin and the limitations Goodwin places on the prophylactic rule in the post-trial setting. Krezdorn III achieved this result by refusing to apply properly the prophylactic rule in a posttrial setting. It misinterpreted the nature and function of the prophylactic rule by allowing the prosecutor to assert virtually any explanation to rebut it. Goodwin did not address the operation of the
rule in the post-trial setting. In fact, it justified the limitations it
applied to the operation of the rule before trial, by contrasting that
setting to the different set of facts existing post-trial.5 25 Nor does
Goodwin supply any authority for the idea that the rule may be rebutted by virtually any explanation, including a showing of an absence
of actual vindictiveness that may consist of no more than a bare assertion of proper motive. 52 6 There is nothing in Goodwin that modifies or limits the teaching of the Pearce/Blackledge doctrine in the
Id.
Krezdorn also serves to underscore the artificiality of Goodwin's general pre/post
trial distinction in terms of the applicability of the prophylactic rule. Assume the
Krezdorn setting with the following alteration: after the original indictment but before
trial, the defendant is notified that the government intends to introduce the same evidence of thirty-two additional uncharged forgeries for the same reason. Defendant
makes a motion in limine prior to trial under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to prohibit
introduction of the extrinsic evidence, which the district court grants but with the same
dicta regarding the relevance to a conspiracy charge as was contained in Krezdorn I. The
government then secures a superseding indictment adding the conspiracy count. Since
the timing of the addition of the conspiracy count in this hypothetical is pre-trial, the
same action, which the Fifth Circuit in Krezdorn 11 found to give rise to a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness, suddenly would be "far less likely" to have the same appearance
under Goodwin simply because it is taken pre-trial. Yet the actual motives for the action,
as well as the appearance to the defendant, would be absolutely the same. Only the
timing and the nature of the right (appeal v. motion in linine) would change; yet, these
are the very factors which Goodwin makes determinative. See Goodwil, 457 U.S. 368. But
neither in fact is determinative of the presence, or appearance, of vindictiveness.
525 See supra text accompanying notes 252-56.
526 In fact Goodwin notes with approval that the "Court emphasized in Blackledge that it
did not matter that no evidence was present that the prosecutor had acted in bad faith or
523
524
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post-trial settings: the prophylactic rule applies and an appearance
of vindictiveness may be rebutted only by objective evidence justifying the prosecutorial conduct with reference to newly discovered
facts or evidence.
Krezdorn III would reduce the prophylactic rule to the status of a
mere evidentiary presumption. 5 27 This may be due in part to Goodwin's use of the misnomer "presumption." As the dissent makes
528 It
clear, the rule is much more than an evidentiary presumption.
is not directly concerned with the presence or absence of actual vindictiveness; if it were, there would be no point in limiting rebuttal
evidence to objective evidence because "subjective evidence is perfectly acceptable to establish subjective motive." Instead, the prophylactic rule is designed to eliminate the "chilling effect" on the
exercise of rights which would otherwise arise from the realistic appearance of vindictiveness and to provide a record for judicial review. This oversight function is the reason evidence to rebut the
application of the prophylactic rule is limited in the post-trial setting
with malice." Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 376. Additionally, "the presumption again could be
overcome by objective evidence justifying the prosecutor's action." Id.
527 The court stated:
The district court also concluded that the government's purpose in seeking the superseding indictment was 'getting around' an evidentiary obstacle created by the
appeal. As the panel expressed it, '[Tihe prosecutor is attempting to turn a successful appeal into a pyrrhic victory.' 693 F.2d at 1231. This is wrong. In Krezdorn's
original appeal we were presented with a claim of evidentiary error. In responding
to that claim, we ruled that Krezdorn's four convictions must be reversed. Although
we observed that the proof admitted in error might have been proper if Krezdorn
were charged with conspiracy, we did not rule whether the prosecutor could exercise his discretion to add such a charge. Krezdorn's appellate victory vindicated his
right not to be convicted of the substantive counts based on improper evidence. He
now stands an innocent man. However, his assertedly felonious conduct is still subject to another trial-a process that certainly contemplates the proper exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. It confuses the evidentiary principle vindicated by the appeal and the independence of the prosecutorial function-a matter not before the
prior panel-to reason that the subsequent addition of the suggested conspiracy
charge deprived him of his prior appellate success.
718 F.2d at 1365.
528 The dissent argued:
The 'presumption' is no more an evidentiary presumption than the parol evidence
rule is an evidence rule.... In a deterrence scheme, the prosecutor's actual motive
is irrelevant [because] [a]pprehension of a retaliatory motive can certainly exist in
the factual absence of such a motive.... Thus, even in the face of a factual finding,
supported by the record, of no actual vindictiveness, a 'presumption of vindictiveness' would still establish a due process violation. No mere evidentiary presumption concerned with the presence or absence of actual vindictiveness would function
in that manner.
If the presumption of vindictiveness were intended to be a mere evidentiary
presumption of actual vindictiveness, it would relate to that very subjective, 'complex and difficult to prove,' question of motive. In that case, there would be no
point in restricting rebuttal evidence to objective evidence-subjective evidence is
perfectly acceptable to establish subjective motive.
Id. at 1371.
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to the objective showing discussed above. In spite of Krezdorn III's
language regarding what a "reasonable minded defendant" should
"appreciate," given the facts of the case there remains a realistic
appearance of vindictiveness which a reasonable minded defendant
would appreciate and which the prosecution failed to rebut. Under
these circumstances, the due process doctrine set forth in Pearce and
Blackledge requires that the court dismiss the conspiracy charge,
Goodwin notwithstanding.
C.

GOODWIN IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

1.

United States v. Banks

It is instructive to compare Krezdorn III with a previous decision
of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Banks.5 29 Banks involves a similar issue in terms of the presence of dual motivations for
prosecutorial conduct, but presents the issue in the context of an
interlocutory appeal, chronologically halfway between the pre-trial
context of Goodwin and the post-trial posture of Pearce and Blackledge.
KaMook Banks and her co-defendants, including her husband,
American Indian leader Dennis Banks, were arrested on a fugitive
warrant by Oregon state police after notification by the FBI of their
presence in the state. The police impounded and searched defendants' vehicles pursuant to a warrant, resulting in the seizure of various items including explosive material. Oregon authorities later
destroyed the explosive material in the presence of an FBI agent,
who photographed the process. After a five count indictment was
filed against them, defendants filed a motion to suppress evidence
relating to the materials that had been destroyed. This motion was
granted, and the government initiated an interlocutory appeal,
53 0
which ultimately proved successful.
Upon remand, the district court ruled, for reasons not stated in
the opinion of the Court of Appeals, that certain counts of the initial
five count indictment "could not simply be reinstated." 5 3 1 The government thereupon obtained a "new" indictment against Ms. Banks,
containing the initial five counts plus a sixth count charging a firearms violation. It was this new indictment that prompted the motion to dismiss on the basis of prosectorial vindictiveness. The
district court granted the motion, finding that the government had
failed to dispel the appearance of vindictiveness created by the addi529 Banks, 682 F.2d 841 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983).
530 Id. at 843.
531 Id. at 844.
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tion of the firearms count against her. 53 2
The Ninth Circuit reversed again, in the second interlocutory
appeal in the case. Citing Goodwin for the proposition that a "prosecutor should remain free before trial to exercise the broad discretion
entrusted to him to determine the societal interest in prosecution,"
the court held the prophylactic rule did not apply because there is
no realistic likelihood of vindictiveness when the prosecutor is required by court order to obtain a new indictment. 53 3 The likelihood
of vindictiveness is not realistic, according to the Ninth Circuit, because the prosecutor will necessarily have to review the evidence
and reconsider what charges to present to the grand jury. 5 34 The
Ninth Circuit held that the prophylactic rule should not be applied,
at least in part because the district court found there was "no evidence that the government's action was vindictive infact," in spite of
the fact "there have been many hotly contested disagreements be53 5
tween the parties during the lengthy proceedings.2.

Commentary

Banks is another example of the confusion that exists between
actual vindictiveness and the appearance of vindictiveness. It also
represents a blind application of Goodwin, one which is belied by the
facts of the case. Banks also illustrates the mechanistic nature of
Goodwin's pre-trial/post-trial distinction regarding the operation of
the prophylactic rule.
While it is true that Banks involved a pre-trial setting, it is
equally true that many of the factors mentioned in Goodwin as integral to establishing a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness are present. Having to present the case to the grand jury a second time
532

Id.

533 The court stated:

If, as in Goodwin, and Gallegos-Curiel,there is not a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness when the prosecutor decides to increase charges based on his review of the
evidence prior to trial because he has 'simply come to realize that information possessed by the State has a broader significance,' there is even less likelihood of vindictiveness when the prosecutor is required by court order to obtain a new
indictment.
Id. at 845.
534 The court continued:
In this case the prosecutor clearly had a legitimate reason to reconsider the scope
and content of the new pretrial indictment. Long after the original indictment was
obtained, but before any trial had been held, the Government was compelled by
court order to obtain a new indictment and to present witnesses and evidence to a
new grand jury. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that there is a 'realistic
or reasonable likelihood of prosecutorial conduct that would not have occurred but
for hostility or punitive animus towards the defendant.'
Id. at 845-46 (emphasis in original).
5135 Id. at 846 (emphasis in original).
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forces the prosecution to do over again what it thought it had done
correctly. 53 6 Given the defendants' success on the motion to suppress, there certainly existed the strong temptation for the prosecution to engage in "self-vindication. '53 7 In a case marked by "hotly
contested disagreements" and where the government was forced to
take two interlocutory appeals resulting from defendant's successful
exercise of her rights, it is simply ignoring reality to conclude there
is not a realistic likelihood that the additional charge was motivated
at least in part by vindictiveness.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
Banks presents a situation, like Krezdorn, where dual motives, one
proper (a response to a court order) and the other improper (vindictiveness), resulted in the additional charge. Under these circumstances, a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness exists, and the
prophylactic rule should apply.53 8 Therefore, the prosecuting attorney should be required to demonstrate why and/or how a review of
the evidence led him/her to "up the ante." In other words, the
prosecutor must explain why the initial charges did "not reflect" the
extent to which the defendant was legitimately subject to prosecution. What objective facts led the prosecutor to realize after the trial
began that the information possessed by the government had a
"broader significance," and what was that significance? As Pearce
and Blackledge held, unless the record demonstrates at least some
objective reasons for the increase, the appearance of vindictiveness,
which otherwise exists, is not dispelled.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, the genesis of the "appearance of vindictiveness"
doctrine seems to have been an attempt by the Court to avoid the
application of double jeopardy principles to judicial discretion in
sentencing. Rather than adopting Justice Douglas' viewpoint, expressed in the dissenting opinion in Pearce, that judges should be
prohibited from increasing penalties following re-trials in all circumstances, the Court created an "appearance of vindictiveness"
doctrine that would prevent abuses that might arise, while attempting to maximize judicial discretion in that small number of cases in
which increased sentences would be justifiable based upon occurrences after the original sentence.
The effort to maintain that discretion in the relatively small
536 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 383.

537 Id.
538 See supra note 535 and accompanying text.
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number of cases in which it might apply has been extremely costly,
not only in terms of both judicial and prosecutorial resources, but
also in terms of the uncertainty the rule has created for defendants.
Had the Court originally taken the position that all increased
sentences on retrial following appeal were improper, it is possible
that some small number of defendants, who might receive increased
sentences on retrial after Pearce, would escape additional punishment. Absent some showing that original sentences do not, in a systemic fashion, reflect the legitimate societal interests involved,
however, it is difficult to see any substantial benefit in increased
sentences on retrial, except the maximization of judicial discretion
in a very small number of cases.
As the vindictiveness doctrine has come to be applied to prosecutors, the central issue addressed in Blackledge v. Perry and subsequent cases, the need for an effective mechanism to sort out proper
prosecutorial acts of discretion from improper punitive use of
prosecutorial power, is yet to be resolved. 53 9 Even the Goodwin
opinion indicated that prosecutorial reprisals for the exercise of
rights have no place in decision-making. 540 Justice Stevens succinctly stated the continuing problem: 54 ' "If punishment is a central
purpose of criminal prosecutions, how are we to distinguish be54 2
tween permissible and impermissible state motives?"
Goodwin may be read as an attempt to limit spurious challenges
to the proper exercise of pre-trial prosecutorial discretion. But in
so doing, it may result in significantly reducing legitimate challenges
to the misuse of prosecutorial power prior to trial.5 43 Whether this

is good or bad policy depends largely upon whether the reduction
of potentially spurious challenges to increased penalties following
the exercise of rights outweighs the dangers inherent in weakening
constitutional safeguards on the power of prosecutors to punish the
exercise of pre-trial rights.
In assessing this aspect of the policy flowing from Goodwin it is
important to recall that under the Pearce/Blackledge rule, only those
increased charges which did not, or could not, be supported with
legitimate justifications were subject to dismissal. 5 44 Thus, the doctrine had no direct effect on the original charging decision. Moreover, the "presumption" against increased charges following the
539 Goodwin, 457
540 Id. at 372.

U.S. at 373.

541
542
543
544

accompanying notes 272-432.
U.S. at 372.
accompanying notes 390-432.
accompanying notes 14-52 and 127-57.

See supra text
Goodwin, 457
See supra text
See supra text
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exercise of a right, if one existed, was always rebuttable. 5 45 Thus,
the likelihood of unfounded claims of vindictiveness seriously impeding criminal prosecutions appears to have been rather remote.
On the other hand, elimination of the requirement of a governmental showing of non-vindictive motivation in the pre-trial context,
when charges are increased following the exercise of ajury demand,
has some potentially serious consequences. First, there would no
longer be a meaningful incentive for prosecutors to refrain from intentionally using their power in a vindictive fashion. 5 46 As long as
vindictive motivations were not overtly made known to a defendant,
and perhaps even if they were, 54 7 vindictiveness and reprisals could
take place virtually free from challenge. 548 In plea bargaining, it is
already clear that such motivations are permissible and may be
5 49
openly expressed.
Goodwin is a reflection of the inherent contradiction between the
stated goals of the due process doctrine which prohibits vindictiveness, 5 50 namely, separating punishment for crime from punishment
for the exercise of rights, 5 5 1 and the goals of plea bargaining approved by the Court in earlier cases; that is, inducing defendants to
give up rights by pleading guilty. 55 2 Viewed in this context, Goodwin
is an expression of the conflict of imperatives faced by prosecutors
in virtually every criminal prosecution. 55 3 The response of Goodwin,
however, does little to help prosecutors or judges sort out those
conflicting imperatives or ensure the discovery of actual vindictiveness where it does exist. 5 5 4 In fact, rather than setting out standards
that would aid prosecutors in effectively fulfilling their obligations,
Goodwin is an indication that the Court may be willing to "solve" the
problem by reducing judicial oversight of the prosecutorial
function. 5 55
See supra text accompanying notes 127-57.
See supra text accompanying notes 439-49.
547 Two very disturbing footnotes in Goodwin seem to indicate that even the open
threats of the prosecutor in Bordenkirchermay not amount to the sort of "objective evidence" of actual vindictiveness that Goodwin continues to condemn. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at
381 n.12, 384 n.19. If these footnotes and the reference in the opinion to objective
evidence is taken seriously, the exception created in Bordenkircherwill have swallowed the
doctrine.
548 See supra text accompanying notes 390-432.
549 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357.
550 Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372-73.
545
546

551 Id. at 372.

Bordenkircher,434 U.S. 357; Brady, 397 U.S. 742.
See supra text accompanying notes 450-95.
See supra text accompanying notes 390-432.
555 See supra text accompanying notes 390-432. This tendency to view the functions of
the executive branch as sacrosanct has been reflected in earlier opinions by ChiefJustice
552

553
554
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This reverence for the discretion of the executive also may explain both the current Supreme Court's reluctance in Goodwin to admit to the "likelihood" of pre-trial punitive motivation on the part
of prosecutors and the reluctance of courts to review prosecutorial
decisions generally. 5 56 Although Goodwin may continue to allow a
distinction to be made between open threats in plea bargaining,
which are acceptable, and open threats outside of plea bargaining,
which are not acceptable, the case carries with it the disturbing implication that: (a) the Court may be willing to accept some vindictiveness as an element of prosecutorial strategy, 5 57 and (b) the
Court is extending an invitation to an increase in the Court's own
words of "due process violation[s] of the most basic sort."
Even if one assumes that increased flexibility in increasing
charges has greater justification in the pre-trial setting, absent some
indication that under-charging is a serious, systemic problem, one
might fairly ask what societal purpose is served by maximizing that
flexibility. The cost to judicial and prosecutorial resources created
by this attempt to maximize their discretion can be seen by the numerous cases that have attempted to apply and refine the doctrine.
The cost to the system also includes far more than the costs to individual defendants who must risk increased penalities from judges
and prosecutors. The greatest cost may be that the perception of
"fundamental fairness," upon which the system must be based to
maintain its authority, is diminished by a rule which appears to be
applied to varying circumstances in an inconsistent, arbitrary and
highly technical fashion.
In assessing the impact of Goodwin and the other cases that elaborate upon the Pearce/Blackledge doctrine, one might well question
Burger who, long before he was appointed to the Supreme Court, indicated that the
courts have no power to review prosecutorial decisions. Two Models, supra note 4, at 472
n.24 (1983). While this is an obvious misstatement of the law that cannot be taken literally, it may more properly reflect the rationale underlying much of Goodwin than the
reasoning of the opinion itself. Id. at 471. As has been noted elsewhere, this reverence
for a "separation of powers" defeats the very purpose of that doctrine by insulating all
sorts of improper government acts from review. Id. at 470. Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis, a noted commentator, has addressed the use of the separation of powers doctrine
as a reason to limit judicial review of the executive:
If separation of powers prevents review of discretion of executive officers, then
more than a hundred Supreme Court decisions spread over a century and threequarters will have to be found contrary to the constitution! If courts could not interfere with abuse of discretion by executive officers, fundamental institutions
would be altogether different from what they are.
Id. at 471 n.25.
556 Id. at 471 n.24.
557 See supra text accompanying note 358 and the discussion of Gervasi, supra notes
450-95.
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whether defendants can more freely exercise rights without fear of
retaliation because those cases have been decided; a fair answer, it
seems, is that they cannot. Perhaps it is time to rethink the doctrine
and for the Court to clarify the doctrine in a straight-forward manner that will reverse the trend toward a vindictiveness doctrine without substance which no longer accomplishes its major task:
protecting due process by allowing defendants to exercise their procedural and constitutional rights free from governmental retaliation
and the fear of such retaliation.
VII. ADDENDUM
After this article was written, the Supreme Court decided Wasman v. United States,558 a judicial vindictiveness case, and Thigpen v.
Roberts,5 59 a prosecutorial vindictiveness case. A review of each case
reveals that the analysis presented in this article regarding the confusion in the doctrine between "actual vindictiveness" and "appearance of vindictiveness," which was exacerbated by Goodwin, is
apparently correct and that the need remains to define more precisely the showing necessary to dispel the appearance of vindictiveness when it arises.560
In Wasman v. United States, a defendant received a higher sentence on retrial following an appeal, based upon a conviction that
occured after the first trial for an offense that had been committed
prior to the first trial.5 6 ' The case turns on an interpretation of conflicting language in Pearce, which at one point stated that "conduct
on the part of the defendant" between trials was the proper stan56 2
dard, not the fact of the intervening conviction.
A unanimous Court agreed that the second conviction was
based on the sort of "factual data upon which the increased sentence [may properly be] based." 56 3 Five Justices who concurred in
the judgment, however, dissented from the reasoning in the opinion
of the Court written by the Chief Justice precisely because it failed
to properly describe the appearance of vindictiveness/actual vindic5 64
tiveness distinction.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion recognizes the obligation to re558 Wasman, 104 S. Ct. 3217 (1984).
559 Thigpen v. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. 2916 (1984).
560 See Prosecutorial Vindictiveness in the CriminalAppellate Process, supra note 4, and text
accompanying notes 390-449.
561 Wasman, 104 S. Ct. at 3219.
562 Id. at 3221.
563 Id. at 3224.
564 Id. at 3225-26.
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but the "presumption that an increased sentence or charge resulted
from vindictiveness. ' 56 5 Further, he makes clear that the defendant
must "affirmatively prove actual vindictiveness" 566 when the presumption does not apply. While this formulation helps to confirm
the continued vitality of both branches of the doctrine, the rest of
56 7
the opinion serves to undermine the rationale for the distinction.
Throughout his opinion, the ChiefJustice applies the presumption language from Goodwin in a manner which obscures the rationale for establishing the rule prohibiting both actual vindictiveness
and the "reasonable apprehension of vindictiveness." 568 The Burger opinion suggests that due process forbids "only enhancement
motivated by vindictiveness toward the defendant for having exercised guaranteed rights. ' 56 9 He asserts that Pearce and Blackledge
"presumed" vindictiveness because "there was no evidence introduced to rebut the presumption of actual vindictiveness behind the
increases; in other words, by operation of law, the increases were
deemed motivated by vindictiveness. ' 5 70 Thus, one of the predictions of the article, that the use of the presumption analysis would
5 71
blur the true issues underlying the doctrine seems to be accurate.
Moreover, the entire opinion fails to credit the "reasonable apprehension of vindictiveness" as having any bearing upon the doctrine
5 72
whatsoever.
By failing even to consider whether an apprehension of vindictiveness exists which might chill the exercise of protected rights, the
Chief Justice is free to suggest that Pearce would have been differently decided if the state had "advanced a legitimate justification for
the increased charge." 5 73 Thus, as predicted in this article, a postGoodwin opinion suggests that assertion of any legitimate motive for
an increased penalty, even if it is intertwined with improper motives,
will suffice, irrespective of the reasonableness of the defendant's ap574
prehension of vindictiveness.
Justice Powell, joined by Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment and in those
parts of the opinion that did not discuss the "presumption of vindicId. at 3223.
Id. at 3222.
Id. at 3222-25.
Id. at 3221. See supra text accompanying notes 338-44.
Wasman, 104 S. Ct. 3223.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 390-411.
Wasman, 104 S. Ct. 3217.
573 Id. at 3225.
574 See supra text accompanying notes 398-409, 379-81, 438 and 477.
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
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tiveness. '57 5 The Powell opinion briefly points out that Pearce was
intended to protect against the appearance of vindictiveness which
5 76
would deter the exercise of rights.
Justice Stevens, the author of the opinion in Goodwin, concurred
in the judgment but firmly rejected most of the reasoning in the
majority opinion.5 7 7 He also rejected the notion that Pearce was concerned only with actual vindictiveness. 5 78 Without referring to his
opinion in Goodwin, Justice Stevens cited both Pearceand Blackledge to
confirm that the reasonable apprehension of vindictiveness remains
5 79
as a cornerstone of vindictiveness analysis.
In Thigpen v. Roberts, the first post-Goodwin prosecutorial vindictiveness case, 58 0 the defendant was convicted of four misdemeanors
arising from a traffic accident in which a fatality occurred. 58 ' He was
fined a total of $1,300 and was sentenced to eleven months in jail on
one offense, six months on another, and ten days on a third. 58 2 He
appealed the convictions, and the case was transferred for a trial de
novo. 58 3 While the appeal was pending, he was indicted for manslaughter.5 84 The state elected not to proceed on the misdemeanors; he was convicted of manslaughter and was sentenced to twenty
585
years in prison.
The Mississippi courts denied Thigpen's appeals. 58 6 A federal
magistrate recommended that a writ of habeas corpus issue based
58 7
upon both double jeopardy and prosecutional vindictiveness.
The district court adopted the magistrate's ruling, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed solely on double jeopardy grounds. 588 A majority of
the Supreme Court, however, concluded that the case was controlled by Blackledge v. Perry and affirmed the granting of the habeas
corpus petition. 58 9
Justice White's majority opinion suggests that this case is identi575 Wasman, 104 S. Ct. at 3225.
576 Id.
577
578

Id. at 3226.
Id.

579 Id. For a discussion of the importance of maintaining this analytical distinction,
see supra text accompanying notes 390-438.
580 Thigpen, 104 S. Ct. 2916 (1984).
581
582
583

Id. at 2918.
Id. at n.1.
Id. at 2918.
Id.
Id.

584
585
586 Id.
587 Id.

588 Id.
589

Id. at 2919.
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cal to Blackledge in all important respects. 5 90 A convicted misdemeanant who exercised a right to a trial de novo was faced with felony
charges on retrial in both cases. 5 9 1 The only possible factual distinction, according to the majority, is that in Blackledge the same attorney
was responsible for the entire prosecution. 59 2 The majority opinion
confirms the analysis in this article that such a distinction is meaningless because the vindictive motivation "does not hinge on the
continued involvement of a single individual" 5 9 and observes that
Blackledge v. Perry referred to "the State" rather than "the prosecutor." 59 4 Despite this language, the majority declined to determine
what rule would apply when two independent prosecutors are involved. 5 95 In Thigpen, the same prosecutor played a role at every
stage following the intial trial.5 96 Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor and
Powell dissented, at least in part, on the ground that the case should
be remanded to the Fifth Circuit in light of Blackledge v. Pery.597
The impact of Thigpen is that it demonstrates that Blackedge, at
least in the post-trial setting, remains unaffected by Goodwin.598 In a
footnote, the majority opinion summarily rejected the state's argument that Goodwin has overruled or modified Blackedge.59 9 In addition, the majority made clear that a vindictiveness analysis is
appropriate even when the subsequent charges do not share all of
the same elements as the previous charges. 60 0 According to the majority, the critical aspect of Blackledge was not "the congruence or
lack thereof of the offenses charged." 60 1 Rather, it was a subse60 2
quent indictment for the "same conduct."
There is nothing in Thigpen, however, to clarify the apprehension of vindictiveness/actual vindictiveness distinction or the showing required necessarily to dispel an appearance of vindictiveness. 60 3 In fact, the continuing confusion in the doctrine is illustrated by a footnote in which the Court cites the actual vindictiveness case, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, to describe the evil to which
590 Id. at

2917.

591 Id.
592 Id.
593 Id. See supra discussion accompanying
594 Thigpen, 104 S. Ct. 2917.

notes 371-78.

595 Id.
596 Id.
597 Id.

at 2920-24.
598 See supra text accompanying notes 390-421.
599 Thigpen, 104 S. Ct. at 2919 n.4.
600 Id. at 2919 n.5.
601 Id.
602 Id.
603 Id. at 2916-20.
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Blackledge was directed as "the danger that the State might be retali60 4
ating against the accused for lawfully attacking his conviction.As discussed above, this formulation misconstrues the Blackledge rationale and ignores important distinctions between the Bordenkircher
rationale and the "reasonable-apprehension-of-vindictiveness" portion of the doctrine. 60 5 Furthermore, in Thigpen, the majority decided the case without a remand because the state failed to advance
a legitimate basis for the increased charges and a remand would
therefore be futile.60 6 The showing required to justify an increased
charge was never litigated.
On February 26, 1986, the Supreme Court decided Texas v. McCullough,60 7 a judicial vindictiveness case. Chief Justice Burger's
opinion recites certain facts found to be dispositive by the majority.
The jury sentenced McCullough to twenty years at his first murder
trial. The trial judge granted the motion for a new trial based upon
prosecutorial misconduct. At the second trial "the State presented
testimony from two witnesses who had not testified at the first trial
that McCullough rather than his accomplices had slashed the throat
of the victim." 60 8 A second jury convicted McCullough. He elected
to be sentenced by the trial judge, who imposed a sentence of fifty
years. In response to McCullough's motion, the judge stated that
she imposed the harsher sentence because of the testimony of the
two new witnesses, the fact that she had learned for the first time on
retrial that McCullough had been released from prison only four
months before the offense for which he was convicted, and the fact
that "had she fixed the first sentence, she would have imposed more
'60 9
than twenty years."
Based upon these facts, the Supreme Court reversed the Texas
Court of Appeals which had resentenced McCullough to twenty
years, finding that the harsher sentence violated Pearce because it
was not based upon events occurring after the first trial. The
Supreme Court finds that "[t]he facts of this case provide no basis
for a presumption of vindictiveness." 61 0 The opinion emphasizes
facts which, in the view of the Court, demonstrate an absence of
actual vindictiveness. The fact that the sentencing judge granted
the motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct,
"hardly suggests any vindictiveness on the part of the judge towards
Id. at 2919 n.5.
See supra discussion accompanying notes 321-329.
606 Thigpen, 104 S. Ct. at 2920.
607 106 S. Ct. 976 (1986).
608 106 S. Ct. at 978.
609 Id.
610 Id. at 979.
604
605
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[McCullough]" and provides no temptation for the judge to engage
in self-vindication at the time of sentencing. 61 ' The majority also
contends that McCullough cannot argue a realistic apprehension of
vindictiveness because he chose to be sentenced by the judge rather
than the jury, suggesting that he did not perceive the judge to be
vindictive. Finally, the opinion, citing Colten, emphasizes that different sentencers were involved. It concludes that where "the second
sentencer provides an on-the-record, wholly logical, nonvindictive
6 12
reason for the sentence," Pearce requires no more.
For many of the same reasons, the majority goes on to state in
dicta that "[e]ven if the Pearce presumption were to apply here, we
hold that the findings of the trial judge overcome that presumption." 61 3 Recognizing that a defendant may be reluctant to move
for a new trial and/or appeal if a harsher sentence may be imposed
based upon new evidence revealed on retrial, the Court nevertheless regards this as an incidental chilling effect, an insufficient basis
for limiting a court's broad discretion in sentencing.
In his dissent, Justice Marshall, with whom Justices Blackmun
and Stevens join, stresses facts not mentioned by the majority. After
the first trial, the district attorney publicly declared his dissatisfaction with the jury's sentence. Hejoined in McCullough's motion for
a new trial because he wanted the opportunity to secure a harsher
sentence upon a retrial. It was after the close ofjury selection at the
second trial that McCullough chose to be sentenced by the judge if
convicted; many prospective jurors had been excused after indicating that their knowledge of the results of the first trial would affect
6 14
their ability to give McCullough a fair trial.
Addressing the applicability of the prophylactic rule, Justice
Marshall initially rejects the argument that Pearce does not apply because different sentencers were involved: the "message of Pearce is
not that a defendant should be given a chance to choose the sentencing agency least likely to increase his sentence," but rather that
vindictiveness play "no part" in the sentence after retrial.6 15 The
dissenters argue that the same personal and institutional prejudices
identified in Pearce may infect sentencing following a retrial ordered
by the judge because the judge "may still resent being given a
choice between publicly conceding [trial] errors and waiting for her
judgment to be put to the test on appeal," particularly where the
611

Id.

612 Id. at 980.
613 Id.

614 Id. at 984 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
615 Id. at 984-85.
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errors do not cast doubt on the defendant's guilt.6 16 The dissenters
would apply the prophylactic rule to this case because "[i]t is far
from clear that [the trial judge's] decision to grant a new trial was
made out of either solicitude for McCullough or recognition of the
61 7
merits of his claim."
Nor would the dissent agree with the majority's dicta that the
reasons stated for the increased sentence were sufficient to rebut a
presumption of vindictiveness. Emphasizing that the justifications
deemed adequate by Pearce were limited to occurrences taking place
after the first trial, Justice Marshall stresses that some new information will inevitably become available to a sentencing judge "in the
course of any retrial, or merely by virtue of the passage of time." 61 8
This leads the dissent to conclude that the chilling effect of the majority's decision places a defendant in the same position he occupied
before Pearce.
McCullough does not involve a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness. It is a judicial vindictiveness case where the majority, based
upon the facts stated in the opinion written by the Chief Justice,
refused to apply the Pearce prophylactic rule to ajudge who imposed
the harsher sentence, but had not imposed the first sentence and
had granted the motion for a new trial. This limits McCullough's
reach to a relatively narrow universe of cases, a conclusion buttressed by Justice Brennan's concurrence.
McCullough limits the post-trial application of the prophylactic
rule in judicial vindictiveness cases, but only where there are a
number of intervening factors between the defendant's exercise of a
right and the imposition of the increased penalty. In terms of the
analysis employed earlier in this article, McCullough does not call for
application of the prophylactic rule because between the granting of
the post-trial motion and the second sentencing, the district attorney decided to retry the case and McCullough chose to be sentenced
by the judge rather than the jury. Although the first factor never
seems to be in doubt, there was no way to predict the second and,
most important, it was completely beyond the control of the judge.
In terms of McCullough's potential application to prosecutorial
vindictiveness, it is particularly significant that the majority relies
upon the fact that a jury imposed the first sentence and the judge
the second, citing Colten in support of the importance of this fact. In
prosecutorial vindictiveness cases this distinction never exists because the governmental agency, the prosecutor's office, is always the
616
617
618

Id. at 985.
Id. at 986.
Id. at 987.
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same. As Colten, Blackledge and Thigpen all make clear, the fact that a
different person may represent the office at different stages of the
prosecution is irrelevant. Thus, McCullough arguably has no application to the prosecutorial vindictiveness doctrine because of the functional distinctions between judges and prosecutors.
Finally, addressing the majority's dicta regarding the adequacy
of the reasons stated for the harsher sentence, the new testimony at
the retrial does not satisfy the "objective evidence" requirement of
either Pearce or Wasman. The "chilling effect" is not incidental because there will always be some new testimony at a retrial that the
judge can cite to justify a harsher sentence. Nor does the fact that
the judge grants a motion for a new trial, in which the district attorney joins, serve to dispel an otherwise reasonable apprehension of
vindictiveness.

